In 1967, the second year of the Cultural Revolution, amidst the fierce power struggle between Mao Zedong’s “Proletarian Headquarters” and Liu Shaoqi and Deng Xiaoping’s “Capitalist Headquarters,” a major case unfolded right under Mao’s nose in the Chinese Communist Party capital of Beijing – the Communist Party Central Committee Special Committee case.
On October 8, 1967, many units and individuals in Dongcheng District of Beijing received a letter titled “An Open Letter from the Communist Party Central Committee Special Committee to All Party Members.”
The open letter pointed out that the Cultural Revolution launched by Mao had caused massive destruction to the party and the country in political, organizational, ideological, economic, and cultural aspects.
“It is believed that Mao is capricious, suspicious, and often swings from one extreme to another. A leader with these weaknesses, unable to control himself, cannot avoid causing disastrous consequences for the people he leads.”
The open letter accused Chen Boda, head of the Central Cultural Revolution Group, of being a traitor, Kang Sheng, a consultant to the Central Cultural Revolution Group, of being a Trotskyist, and Jiang Qing, vice-chairman of the Central Cultural Revolution Group and Mao’s wife, of being ambitious.
The open letter also put forward some proposals for party and state construction, calling for the support of the entire party and suggesting the establishment of a new Communist Party Central Committee Special Committee to replace the old one.
According to the political standards of the Chinese Communist Party at the time, this was a genuine “counterparty, antisocialist, anti-Mao Zedong thought” counter-revolutionary letter.
According to Wu Faxian, a member of the Central Cultural Revolution Steering Committee and Deputy Chief of Staff of the Central Military Commission at the time:
At 10 a.m. on October 9, after the letter was reported through layers of channels, it was delivered to the hands of Zhou Enlai, convener of the Central Cultural Revolution Steering Committee and Premier of the State Council. After reading it, Zhou Enlai immediately presented it to Mao Zedong.
That evening, at the Central Cultural Revolution Steering Committee meeting held at Diaoyutai State Guesthouse, Building 16, Zhou Enlai took out the letter for everyone to peruse and said, “This leaflet is very important, a case must be broken. Jiang Qing and others did not say anything after reading it. Only Chen Boda, having read it, said, “This is very much like the tone of the ‘February Countercurrent,’ and the content is also similar to the ‘February Countercurrent.'”
The “February Countercurrent” refers to some events in February 1967 where some veteran members of the Chinese Communist Party criticized members of the Central Cultural Revolution Group such as Jiang Qing.
On February 14 and 16, 1967, Zhou Enlai chaired a meeting of the Political Bureau of the Chinese Communist Party at the Huiren Hall of the Zhongnanhai. During the meeting, Marshal Ye Jianying and other veteran cadres of the Chinese Communist Party expressed strong dissatisfaction with the practices of Jiang Qing and other members of the Central Cultural Revolution Group in attacking veteran cadres. After Jiang Qing and others complained to Mao Zedong, Mao harshly criticized these veteran cadres. From February 22 to March 18 of the same year, the Politburo of the Chinese Communist Party held seven consecutive meetings, besieging these veteran cadres on charges of “capitalist restorationist backlash.” Subsequently, the Political Bureau of the Chinese Communist Party ceased its activities, replaced by the Central Cultural Revolution Group.
Chen Boda said that the tone and content of this letter were similar to the “February Countercurrent,” linking this letter to the power struggle among the top leadership of the Chinese Communist Party at the time.
On the evening of the Central Cultural Revolution Steering Committee meeting, no conclusion was reached on the leaflet issue, only to be determined that Mao Zedong would make the final decision.
On the afternoon of October 10, in Hall 118 of the Great Hall of the People, Mao Zedong personally presided over an expanded meeting of the Political Bureau Standing Committee of the Chinese Communist Party, specifically to discuss the leaflet issue. After inquiring about the details of the leaflet, Mao asked everyone to give their opinions. Chen Boda said that such a leaflet could not have been written by an ordinary person, only high-level leaders’ secretaries, such as Deng Xiaoping’s secretary, could write it. At this point, Mao said to Zhou Enlai, “Enlai, you are responsible for organizing a task force to crack this case, it must be cracked.”
On the evening of October 10, Zhou Enlai presided over the Central Cultural Revolution Steering Committee to discuss the specific implementation of Mao’s instructions. Zhou designated Chen Boda to lead this task force, and also designated Minister of Public Security Xie Fuzhi and Deputy Chief of Staff of the Central Military Commission Wu Faxian to join the task force.
On the evening of October 11, Chen Boda convened a task force meeting at the Great Hall of the People, with Xie Fuzhi, Wu Faxian, and relevant personnel from the Ministry of Public Security in attendance. Chen Boda said that the investigation of this case was mainly the responsibility of Xie Fuzhi and the staff of the Ministry of Public Security. The meeting then began to study the case. Personnel from the Ministry of Public Security believed that based on various circumstances, the likelihood was higher for the perpetrator to be in Beijing, so Beijing should be the focus of the investigation, while also paying attention to several other areas around Beijing.
After the meeting, the Ministry of Public Security established a “10.8” special task force led by Vice Minister Yu Sang, and immediately began the investigation. However, after nearly a month of investigation, no results were found.
Zhou Enlai was very anxious. He heard from someone in the Ministry of Public Security that the “Special Committee” had a tower-type organization, involving senior figures such as Marshal Zhu De and Chen Yi. Therefore, Zhou said to Chen Boda, “Why aren’t you holding meetings based on the materials from the Ministry of Public Security? Is this material true or false? Chairman Mao has been waiting for the progress of the case. How can you treat the task Chairman Mao assigned like this?”
There were two connections between the letter and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs:
First, one of the letters was dropped into a mailbox inside the Foreign Ministry gate, guarded by soldiers 24 hours a day.
Second, the letters criticized the foreign policy of the Chinese Communist Party during the Cultural Revolution, especially mentioning the most serious diplomatic incident created by the Red Guards during the Communist Party rule – the burning of the British Mission in Beijing.
According to Yang Rongjia’s book “The Secret Behind the Diplomatic Department of the Republic – A Diplomat’s Personal Experience during the Cultural Revolution”:
In the morning of October 9, 1967, a mailman in Dongcheng District of Beijing unexpectedly retrieved 87 identical leaflets from the mailbox in his responsible area, one of which came from the Foreign Ministry mailbox. The leaflet mentioned that China was in chaos, there must be traitors in power who have disrupted the political order, and it was hoped that a wise and brave loyalist would emerge to restore order. The wording was grand, using many old terms and phrases, signed by “The Communist Party Central Committee Special Committee” Battle Horse Wailing Battle Team.
Such an occurrence during the Mao era of ‘class struggle’ naturally shocked the authorities above. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs was thrown into chaos in an instant and became the main suspect. Everyone was implicated, and for a moment, a sense of imminent danger prevailed.
The “Ministry of Foreign Affairs Proletarian Revolution United Preparatory Group” immediately mobilized everyone to convey the “reactionary leaflet” to each person, calling on everyone to actively recall clues and expose any information to expedite the resolution of the case.
It was reported that not long ago, in front of the East Building of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, a big-character poster signed “Battle Horse Lament” was seen. Why was the battle horse lamenting? Wasn’t it because a major capitalist-roader had fallen, hence the horse lamenting for losing its master? Wasn’t this a defense for Liu Shaoqi, who was accused of being the ‘biggest capitalist-roader in the party’? Such thoughts were probably running through people’s minds.
Therefore, it was imperative to get to the bottom of this leaflet. How to investigate it? The leaders of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs came up with a solution, requiring every official at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to write a piece (selected by them, with some words matching the ones in the leaflet) for analysis by the investigative team.
This case caused a stir at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs for one or two months. Until the sender was found and the letter that ended up in the Foreign Ministry mailbox was discovered to be a misprint by the post office, the officials at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs breathed a sigh of relief.
On November 20, 1967, the special task force of the Ministry of Public Security received a report from the Tianjin Public Security Bureau saying that the culprit of the “10.8” case had been found. In the He Ping district of Tianjin, during public scrutiny of handwriting by a local police station, a member of the public reported that the handwriting in the letter might be by a coal factory worker named Shen Jianyun. After technical examination, it was confirmed that the handwriting on the letter matched Shen Jianyun’s.
The public security authorities immediately arrested Shen Jianyun. During the interrogation, Shen confessed to the crime.
Shen Jianyun, 50 years old, a native of Tianjin, born into a landlord family, had a university education. Before his arrest, he worked shaking coal balls in a coal factory. Before the establishment of the Communist regime in 1949, he served as a military policeman in Qingdao. When the Chinese Communist Army entered Qingdao, he secretly returned to Tianjin, concealed his identity, and worked as a clerk in the Tianjin City Court.
During the Anti-Rightist Movement of 1957, Shen Jianyun was labeled a rightist, sentenced to reform through labor, and later sent down to the coal factory for labor reform. When the Cultural Revolution began in 1966, he did not show any unusual behavior because he usually kept quiet in the factory. Amid the chaos of the early Cultural Revolution, he stayed at home and did not go out.
The interrogator asked, “Why did you write this material?”
Shen Jianyun answered, “The Cultural Revolution is so chaotic, the Communist Party’s rule won’t last long. I want to find another way out.”
Shen Jianyun admitted that he drafted the letter, made the seal, printed it himself, and posted it. At 5 a.m. on October 8, he took a train from Tianjin to Beijing. Upon arrival, he walked from the train station along Qianmen Street to Qianmenlouzi, turned east to the street near Lioguo Hotel, and began posting letters in mailboxes all the way to Beijing Railway Station.
Question: You are not familiar with the Communist Party’s policies. How could you criticize the Communist Party’s policies comprehensively, especially our country’s foreign policy?
Answer: I pay close attention to newspapers and collect information regularly. Some events deeply affect me. During the Cultural Revolution, I collected more than a thousand various small newspapers. The things I wrote can be found in these small newspapers and in the newspapers.
While interrogating Shen Jianyun, the public security authorities searched his home and seized the steel plate, iron pen, printing machine, packaging paper from the People’s Daily used to make the open letter, and over a thousand copies of Cultural Revolution tabloids.
After the public security department confirmed that it was Shen Jianyun who committed the crime, an investigation report was drafted. However, top leaders like Chen Boda did not believe a coal factory worker like him could draft such a letter on his own; they suspected it was orchestrated by someone else.
When Chen Boda met with the task force members, he said, “This case is not solved yet; it can’t be closed. Finding Shen as a culprit is just the beginning of this case; we need to dig deeper and find the mastermind.”
Following Chen Boda’s instructions, the task force conducted further investigations to discover the mastermind. Despite multiple interrogations, Shen Jianyun kept insisting that he acted alone and denied being instructed by anyone. The task force investigated everyone Shen Jianyun had contact with, whether inside or outside the party, but they found no clues to the mastermind.
Chen Boda ordered the dissolution of the original task force and the establishment of a new task force with military representatives to continue the investigation, led by Zhaodian Cheng, former Deputy Commander of the Air Forces, to delve deeper into finding the mastermind.
On August 19, 1968, Chen Boda met with the task force and said, “A few coal workers could not have written this. Even university students could not have drafted such a document. How could he know so many party secrets? There must be a source behind this.” “What you’ve found may not be the bottom; if you haven’t found anything, keep going up.” “This is a big case, hitting the ‘February Countercurrent’ stuff, a large anti-revolutionary case, a big conspiracy case. Pay attention to the ‘February Countercurrent.'”
Xie Fuzhi said, “It was the Black Commander’s Headquarters led by Liu and Deng that instructed him to do it, aiming to expose the mastermind.” “This is not an ordinary counterrevolutionary act, but done by Deng Xiaoping, some people involved in the February Countercurrent.”
Under the instructions of Chen Boda and Wu Faxian, the task force, led by Zhao Dengcheng, adopted tactics such as extracting confessions and inducing confessions, making use of this case to fabricate more false claims.
The task force searched for breakthroughs everywhere. In March 1968, Zhou Ciao, a former intern researcher at the Philosophy and Social Sciences Department of the Chinese Academy of Sciences, was being detained by public security for scrutiny. The investigators coerced Zhou into admitting to having connections with the blacklists, only allowing him to confess to members of the Liu-Deng (leadership) and the February countercurrent.
On December 10, 1968, under repeated inducements and coercion by the investigators, Zhou confessed that Zhu De, Chen Yi, Ye Jianying, and others had organized a “traitorous group” in August 1967, preparing to collaborate with Soviet revisionism, serve as the inside connection, and launch an armed coup.
The next day, the investigators accused Zhou of not hitting the mark yet and continued to press him. Zhou then changed his statement, claiming that the central leadership, including Zhu De, had formed a “Chinese (Marxist-Leninist) Communist Party” in mid-August 1967. Zhu De was the general secretary, Chen Yi was the deputy secretary, Ye Jianying and others were members.
Following this, Zhao Dengcheng and others used Zhou Ciao’s “confession” to induce and coerce another intern researcher at the Chinese Academy of Sciences, Hong XX, who was simultaneously detained by public security to make a similar confession. In 30 days, he was interrogated 43 times.
On January 27, 1969, Hong XX confessed that there was a “Chinese Communist Party (Left).” On January 28, he further “confessed” that Zhu De, Chen Yi, and Ye Jianying were members of the “Chinese Communist Party (Left).”
Subsequently, under the instructions of Zhao Dengcheng and others, the state economic committee’s mass task force group began to extract confessions from Ji XXX, an official of the economic committee, forcing her to also confess to a “Chinese Marxist Communist Party,” where Li Fuchun was the Chairman, Xu Xiangqian was the Vice-Chairman, Chen Yi was the General Secretary, and Ye Jianying was a member.
Chen Boda, Wu Faxian, and Xie Fuzhi frequently met with the task force members, continuously giving instructions to further dig into the mastermind.
Due to the incredulous nature of these “confessions,” they ultimately did not report to Zhou Enlai or Mao Zedong.
A coal worker from an inconspicuous coal ball factory in Tianjin, during the height of the power struggle in 1967 when Mao called for the removal of capitalist-roaders from top to bottom, took a single trip to Beijing and caused a massive stir in Zhongnanhai. This could be considered a remarkable phenomenon of the decade-long Cultural Revolution.
After uncovering the so-called “counterrevolutionary letter” case, Mao’s political enforcers were not content to end it there, persisting in their pursuit of the supposed masterminds, attempting to use this case as a means to falsely accuse and smear more high-ranking CCP officials. Subsequently, a series of ugly, absurd, and farcical dramatizations unfolded, marking yet another spectacle of the decade-long Cultural Revolution.
Looking back at history, internal power struggles within the CCP have always been ruthless. Why? This is due to the atheistic, struggle philosophy, and the evolution of the “survival of the fittest” principle, leading to the belief that “any means necessary to achieve the end” prevail.
Initially published by Dajiyuan.