Recently, the International Security Advisory Board (ISAB) of the United States released a report titled “Report on Biotechnology in the People’s Republic of China’s Military-Civil Fusion Strategy,” which studied the biotechnology in China’s military-civil fusion strategy, revealing China’s goals, implementation, and impact on international biosecurity.
ISAB Chairman Edwin Dorn stated in a memorandum to the U.S. State Department on November 12 that “China (CCP) has identified biotechnology as one of the areas that can enable a country to dominate the next Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA). According to its strategy, China (CCP) seeks to apply modern technology to military-civil fusion to develop the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) into a ‘world-class military’ by 2049, with biotechnology identified as a key focus for research and development.”
Dorn further mentioned that “ISAB’s goal is to advise the State Department and other federal agencies on how the United States can adapt to the evolving global biotechnology landscape, especially in the context of strategic competition with China.”
The report pointed out that the Chinese government’s emphasis on biotechnology is evident, with the market value of Chinese biotech companies estimated to have grown to over $300 billion from 2016 to 2021, a hundredfold increase.
The strategic focus of China (CCP) on developing the biotechnology industry far surpasses the traditional industry policies adopted by other global biotech leaders. Over decades of national plans and policies, China (CCP) has designated biotechnology as a strategic emerging industry, calling for nationwide efforts, utilizing professional knowledge, financing, subsidies, and diplomatic support to drive biotech innovation, making it a key element of “comprehensive national power.”
The national biotechnology strategy of China (CCP) blurs the boundaries between the public and private sectors, creates a competitive advantage for companies supported by China, and leverages joint ventures and commercial forces to support military goals, enhancing the capabilities of the Chinese military. Industries must depend on channels controlled by China (CCP), from pharmaceutical precursors to data required for medical, agricultural innovations, and biological synthesis pathways in manufacturing, contrasting with the U.S. goal of establishing sustainable, diversified, and flexible supply chains for essential drugs and chemicals through domestic and international biotech partnerships.
The report summarized China’s commitment to military-civil fusion, including:
1) Removing barriers between civilian and military departments to facilitate direct flow of technology, talent, and capital;
2) Utilizing private sector to access international technology, investment, R&D, and partnerships to develop China’s military and intelligence capabilities;
3) Systematically transferring technology to ensure the PLA wins the competition to develop and integrate a range of key and emerging military applications, including artificial intelligence, biotechnology, and quantum computing.
In various strategic documents of China, biotechnology frequently appears, including a list of tasks by the Office of the CCMCFD’s Deputy Director, such as strengthening biosecurity civil-military collaborative mechanisms, enhancing coordination for infectious disease prevention and control, promoting the shared construction of biosecurity-related infrastructure and platforms, enhancing biosecurity monitoring and early warning networks, and improving national defense capabilities.
As China seeks to fully implement the integration of civilian and military biotech R&D and enhance the modernization of the military, some analysts have raised concerns about China’s investments in becoming a leader in the field of biotechnology, warning that China’s funding for research on gene editing, human enhancement, and other biotech applications for military purposes has raised concerns about potential risks.
Analysts also noted the Chinese military’s special interest in bio and biotech applications. Analysis by the Center for a New American Security (CNAS) indicates that Chinese military strategists, including a retired general and former president of the National Defense University of China, are increasingly focusing on biology and biotech as new domains of military strategy.
This indicates that Chinese military experts are broadly considering how to use biotechnology to enhance offensive capabilities and achieve ambitions in economic competition.
According to CNAS, “Since 2016, the Central Military Commission has funded projects in military brain science, advanced bionic systems, bio and bionic materials, human enhancement, and ‘new concept’ biotechnology.”
To achieve biotechnology goals, China has made long-term investments to open new markets for China-supported enterprises, acquire foreign technology and knowledge, and obtain intellectual property through legal and illegal means.
The report highlighted that in the closely related field of biopharmaceuticals, China has historically subsidized Chinese companies through unfair and illegal means to steal intellectual property. These methods include granting significant subsidies and regulatory advantages to domestic enterprises (including discriminatory approval procedures, price controls, export financing, and procurement policies), pressuring joint ventures to transfer technology, supporting IP theft through spying, cyber theft, or hacker activities, recruiting Chinese citizens to conduct research at American universities or companies and bringing back their skills, knowledge, and in some cases stolen data or materials to China.
The growth of China’s biotech industry is intertwined with that of the United States. The U.S. currently relies on Chinese companies to provide raw materials and equipment for research and biopharmaceutical manufacturing, while China depends on U.S. investment in basic research and research-based training at American institutions to cultivate its professional talent.
For over two decades, Chinese nationals have been the largest foreign scientists in the United States, contributing to overall innovation in the U.S.
However, when the technology itself poses dual-use risks, or when there are hostile relationships between U.S. and China-born researchers, intellectual property theft, transfer, and misuse of technology become national security issues for the United States.
The report stated, “Given China prioritizing global leadership in the field of biotechnology to benefit its economy, establish the reputation of a global leader, and support its goal of military dominance, Beijing has a strong incentive to recruit relevant technical personnel who have studied and worked in the United States to work at Chinese state-owned or state-supported institutions, bringing back their knowledge and skills. While biotech companies and major R&D companies are unwilling to disclose details of IP theft, court documents and other public records describe large-scale IP theft in the biotech field (biopharmaceuticals and agricultural applications).”
Well-known legal cases include a Chinese citizen working for Pfizer stealing research data on mRNA vaccines and a Chinese company in the U.S. stealing trade secrets from pharmaceutical companies.
The report suggests that the intertwined R&D between China and the U.S. makes it challenging to eradicate IP theft; the U.S. Department of Justice has been criticized for investigating Chinese-American scientists under the guise of “research integrity” without evidence of economic espionage or national security impact, leading to talent drain and negative effects on U.S. innovation.
In conclusion, the report recommends that the U.S. State Department and other government agencies take action to develop a global biotechnology system, allowing for broad partnerships to cooperate in scientific research and trade to address the challenges posed by China’s biotechnology military-civil fusion plan.
The report looks ahead, stating, “In the future, no single country (including China) will exert sole control over crucial drug data or supply chains but will contribute to the fiercely competitive global bioeconomy based on common practices and values with the U.S. and its partners. This requires implementing a long-term strategy and necessitates State Department leadership to establish a global environment that aligns with U.S. interests.”