US Congress members call on universities to publicly disclose risks in recruiting Chinese engineering students.

On Wednesday, March 19, US Congressman John Moolenaar, chairman of the House Committee on China, sent letters to several universities requesting disclosure of the learning situation of Chinese students in STEM programs (Science, Technology, Engineering, and Mathematics), as well as potential risks this may pose to US national security.

The universities receiving the letters include Carnegie Mellon University, Purdue University, Stanford University, University of Illinois, University of Maryland, and University of Southern California.

Congressman Moolenaar emphasized that Beijing strategically exploits US universities to acquire key technology, which poses a serious risk to the US. Each year, hundreds of thousands of Chinese students study in the US, some of whom engage in cutting-edge research such as artificial intelligence, quantum computing, chips, and aerospace engineering.

Approximately one-third of foreign graduate students in STEM fields at US universities are from China. Some students have direct connections to projects funded by the Chinese government, talent recruitment programs, and research institutions associated with the Chinese military-industrial complex.

Moolenaar noted that despite warnings from US intelligence officials that American universities have become “soft targets” for espionage and intellectual property theft, top universities continue to enroll a large number of Chinese students in critical research projects. He questioned whether these universities prioritize short-term economic benefits over long-term national security and education of American students in core fields.

“The Chinese Communist Party has established a systematic channel to embed researchers in top US institutions, enabling them to directly access sensitive dual-use technologies,” Moolenaar said. “The US student visa system has become Beijing’s ‘Trojan horse,’ allowing their researchers unrestricted access to top US research institutions, directly threatening US national security.”

According to a Harvard University study, only 25% of Chinese graduate students plan to immigrate to the US or another Western country after completing their studies. More concerning is that nearly half of Chinese graduate students briefly stay in the US for employment after graduation before returning to China, while a quarter plan to return directly after graduation.

This trend raises significant concerns that Chinese students, after acquiring advanced knowledge in the US, may transfer technology and research achievements back to China.

Moolenaar further pointed out that this talent drain is not accidental but a deliberate action by Beijing to advance its technological ambitions through academia. “China’s talent recruitment programs actively encourage students and researchers to return to China, utilizing the skills they have learned to help that regime achieve economic and military ambitions,” the congressman stated. “Hence, US universities have become training grounds for China’s technological rise. Without stronger protection measures, US academic institutions may inadvertently assist Beijing in surpassing US innovation.”

He warned that if US universities continue to unrestrictedly enroll Chinese students, it could accelerate technology transfer, enhance Beijing’s military and economic competitiveness, and harm US interests. “If this trend is not curbed, it will continue to squeeze the development space of US domestic talents, undermine research integrity, and bolster China’s (CCP) technological aspirations at a heavy cost to us,” Moolenaar wrote in the letter.

However, the reality challenge lies in the fact that international students, especially those from China, paying full tuition fees bring considerable revenue to US universities, leading many universities to financially rely on foreign students.

In a joint report released in September 2024 by the House Committee on China and the Committee on Education and Labor, several cases were revealed where US researchers benefited from federally funded projects, assisting Beijing in significant technological advancements in critical and emerging technology fields.

The committees found that this often leads to the transfer of dual-use technologies crucial to Chinese strategic goals, including artificial intelligence and chip research. As the US struggles to retain these tech talents or enroll students more likely to stay in the US, American universities may unintentionally become incubators for Chinese technological and military progress.

Moolenaar requested universities to provide key information, including:

1. Whether the university has monitoring mechanisms to track foreign students’ involvement in military or dual-use applications research?
2. Whether there are restrictions on Chinese students participating in export-controlled courses (such as advanced chip engineering, quantum computing, artificial intelligence, and aerospace engineering)?
3. How many Chinese graduates from the school choose to stay in the US, and how many return to China?
4. Whether Chinese students are disproportionately concentrated in high-tech fields such as artificial intelligence, quantum computing, robotics, aerospace, and chips?
5. Whether the school conducts background checks on Chinese students applying for sensitive research projects?
6. How many Chinese STEM graduates return to China, and which industries or institutions do they typically join? For example, do they enter Huawei, Chinese Academy of Sciences, China Electronics Technology Group Corporation, or China Aerospace Corporation?

This inquiry aims to address concerns about the potential risks and implications of Chinese student involvement in STEM programs in the US and to safeguard national security interests.