The tensions caused by the live-fire exercise of the Chinese Communist Navy in the Tasman Sea of Australia have not subsided, as new incidents have arisen in the South China Sea and the Taiwan Strait.
On February 24th, the Chinese Maritime Safety Administration announced a four-day live-fire exercise from 8 a.m. on the 24th to 6 p.m. on the 27th in the Beibu Gulf (China calls it the Beibu Gulf), adjacent to Vietnam, warning passing ships to avoid the designated area in the northwest of Hainan Province, near the Chinese side of the sea. The Chinese Maritime Safety Administration did not mention Vietnam in the announcement, and Vietnamese authorities did not comment on the notice.
The live-fire exercise came after Vietnam released a map showing its 14 baseline points, extending from the mouth of the Beilun River bordering China in the north to the maritime boundaries connecting the southwest with Cambodia.
China and Vietnam signed an agreement in 2000 delineating their territorial boundaries in the Beibu Gulf. Another agreement established a joint fishing zone. However, in 2024, China unilaterally expanded its claimed area by declaring a new baseline, overlapping with international waters by over 20 nautical miles, with some areas overlapping up to 50 nautical miles. This encroachment on international waters in violation of international norms could affect international shipping, research, and other activities in the region.
In response to China’s announcement of the Beibu Gulf baseline last year, the Vietnamese Ministry of Foreign Affairs published a new baseline map of the Beibu Gulf from Guangning Province to Guangzhi Province, involving 14 nearshore points in the coastal areas. This area lies between Hanoi and the Guangdong-Leizhou Peninsula and Hainan Island of China, with Vietnam’s important ports, corresponding to China’s important naval base in the southern theater, making it a strategically important region.
The statement from the Vietnamese Ministry of Foreign Affairs stated that the baseline “provides a more solid legal foundation for the protection and exercise of Vietnam’s sovereignty, sovereign rights, and jurisdiction, service economic development, ocean management, and promotion of international cooperation.” Vietnamese official media reported that the Beibu Gulf baseline map was issued according to Resolution No. 68 issued by the Standing Committee of the National Assembly of Vietnam, in accordance with the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea exercising Vietnam’s rights and obligations.
On the same day Vietnam announced the new baseline map, Vietnam also imposed trade sanctions on certain Chinese steel products, levying anti-dumping duties of 19.38%, 26.94%, and 27.83% on Chinese steel products exported to Vietnam.
Although China-Vietnam relations have generally remained stable in recent decades, disputes over oil exploration and fishing rights have occasionally intensified, leading to heightened tensions between the two countries. Reports indicate that in September last year, the Chinese military attacked Vietnamese fishing boats in the disputed Paracel Islands, resulting in multiple injuries. In addition to Vietnam, China has maritime and territorial disputes in the South China Sea with the Philippines, Malaysia, Taiwan, Brunei, and Indonesia. Recently, tensions between China and the Philippines have been particularly concerning. Last week, a Chinese navy helicopter flew within less than 10 feet of a Philippine patrol plane over the South China Sea, near the disputed island of Huangyan in the northwest of the Philippines.
The live-fire exercise took place in the northwest of Hainan Island, less than 200 kilometers from the Vietnamese coast, just days after Vietnam’s publication of the new baseline map. China’s actions could easily be interpreted by the international community as a retaliation against Vietnam’s maritime claims.
While conducting live-fire exercises in the Beibu Gulf, vessels with Chinese backgrounds have once again stirred up trouble in the Taiwan Strait. Taiwan suspects that China is again using gray zone tactics to disrupt Taiwan’s undersea cables.
On February 25th, Taiwan’s Ministry of Digital Development stated that the “Tai-Peng No.3” submarine cable connecting Taiwan and Penghu suffered a complete breakdown around 3 a.m. suspected to be caused by the Togolese cargo ship “Hongtai.”
The Taiwan Coast Guard Administration reported that around 3 a.m. on February 25th, it received a report from Chunghwa Telecom that a breakage occurred in the Tai-Peng No.3 submarine cable 6 nautical miles northwest of Jiangjun Fishing Port and requested the Coast Guard Administration’s assistance in the investigation. The Coast Guard Administration stated that the CGA vessel 10079 was deployed to monitor the Togolese cargo ship “Hongtai” in the incident area and conducted broadcast evacuation upon discovering the ship anchoring.
The Ministry of Digital Development of Taiwan stated that Taiwan currently has 14 international submarine cables and 10 domestic island cables, all of which are critical infrastructure. Future efforts will strengthen the resilience of the island communication network, including the construction of satellite communication stations, subsidizing telecom companies to expand microwave capacity and submarine cable construction, improving overall communication stability through multiple communication means and contingency mechanisms to ensure uninterrupted communication for the government and the public.
The Coast Guard Administration stated that the “Hongtai” vessel remained stranded 0.5 nautical miles from the Tai-Peng No.3 line northwest of Jiangjun Fishing Port from 19:10 on the 22nd to 3 a.m. on the 25th. The Coast Guard Administration broadcast calls to the “Hongtai” ship several times without response. Later, at 3:24 a.m., the Coast Guard Administration received a report from Chunghwa Telecom suspecting that the submarine cable was damaged by an external force.
This was another bizarre vessel where the Automatic Identification System (AIS) did not match the hull marking. The Coast Guard Administration pointed out that the radio response and shipside appearance of the “Hongtai” vessel were labeled as “Hongtai 168,” but the AIS displayed “Hongtai 58.” The Coast Guard Administration emphasized that the investigation into the submarine cable breakage incident is still ongoing. The Togolese cargo ship involved, “Hongtai,” is actually the “QuanYi” ship with Chinese backgrounds, with all 8 crew members onboard being Chinese nationals. Therefore, Taiwan does not rule out that this incident was a provocative action by China using gray zone tactics.
In fact, such cable breakage incidents have occurred multiple times. In early January of this year, two optical cables connecting Taiwan’s Matsu Islands, just 10 nautical miles off the coast of China, were cut off. The same thing happened in February 2023 when two Chinese merchant ships severed two cables connecting these islands to other parts of Taiwan. These repeated incidents of submarine cable breakages have heightened concerns about China’s attempts to disrupt Taiwan’s telecommunications.
So far, Taiwan has not provided the exact reasons for these incidents, but investigations point to China, suggesting that these seemingly accidental cable breakages may have been intentional. These actions, disguised as civil activities by China, could be blatant military attacks if they occurred during active hostilities. In terms of actual consequences, these actions have exceeded the realm of gray zone operations and resemble sabotage activities of intelligence agents. In subsequent actions, Taiwan is likely to intensify law enforcement efforts against these suspicious vessels and personnel. Taiwan should significantly raise the costs of China’s gray zone operations to deter their expansion, complexity, and shift towards a more nearly warlike direction.
Looking around the periphery of mainland China in the Pacific region, including countries such as North Korea, China has almost found no country or region to genuinely cooperate with politically, diplomatically, and militarily. Vietnam may be one of the few countries that have maintained good relations with China in recent decades. China apparently has not considered Vietnam significant, and its excessive maritime claims and aggressive behaviors of bullying the weak could quickly push Vietnam towards confrontation. This would benefit the United States in achieving its Indo-Pacific strategic goals by uniting more regional allies.