The Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) launched by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) was initially envisioned as a flagship project by CCP leader Xi Jinping to influence the global stage. However, due to factors such as project delays, cancellations, and the increasing number of unfinished projects, this initiative is gradually losing momentum on a global scale.
By the end of 2024, Brazil became the latest major economy to reject the BRI initiative, following India and Italy, distancing itself from Xi Jinping’s global infrastructure project. Although Brazilian President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva did not sever ties with Beijing, he ultimately decided that Brazil is better off maintaining bilateral contacts rather than formally joining the BRI initiative. This decision reflects increasing skepticism among countries about the long-term benefits proclaimed by the initiative.
The BRI was launched with great fanfare in 2013, ultimately attracting 150 countries to join. However, due to unfulfilled promises, numerous financial entanglements, being labeled as CCP’s debt trap diplomacy, and the CCP’s expanding geopolitical influence, it has consistently sparked broader backlash. As a result, several countries are reassessing their level of participation. India and Brazil are important members of the international organization advocated by the CCP, the BRICS (comprised of Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa). With these two countries opting out, the global credibility of the BRI project is waning, dealing another heavy blow to the CCP’s ambition to reshape global trade through infrastructure diplomacy.
In fact, the BRI initiative falls far short of being a game-changer on a global scale. Its characteristics include procrastination, inefficiency, and failures. The China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) was originally touted as a jewel in the crown of the BRI initiative. However, due to poor planning, rampant corruption, and attacks by insurgent groups, Pakistan’s crucial Gwadar Port has been unable to operate smoothly, serving as a prime example of existing problems.
Meanwhile, key infrastructure projects like the Karachi-Lahore motorway and the modernization of the Karachi to Peshawar Main Line-1 railway in Pakistan remain incomplete or stalled because the CCP government refuses to fund these projects in Pakistan without unsustainable debt burdens. With debts to China amounting to as much as $69 billion, Pakistan is now facing increasing trade imbalances, financial instability, and security risks instead of the economic prosperity originally promised by the BRI initiative.
Not only the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor, but nearly all other BRI projects have failed to bring any benefits, often leaving participating countries in a worse off situation. Infrastructure projects like the high-speed rail in Indonesia and the “railway to nowhere” in Kenya have yet to be completed. Investments by China in ports such as Hambantota in Sri Lanka, Gwadar in Pakistan, and Payra in Bangladesh have consistently prioritized Beijing’s strategic interests over local economic growth.
Hambantota Port in Sri Lanka stands out as one of the most notorious examples. Despite warnings about the limited economic viability of the Hambantota Port project, Sri Lanka accepted over $1 billion in loans from China to fund the project. When the port failed to generate income to repay the loans, the Sri Lankan government was forced in 2017 to lease the port to a state-owned Chinese company for 99 years, effectively relinquishing control of this important maritime asset.
The BRI initiative in Southeast Asia has also failed to deliver on its promises, with over $50 billion in pledged infrastructure projects by China remaining undelivered. A report by the Lowy Institute based in Sydney, Australia, shows that while China is the largest infrastructure financier in Southeast Asia, only 35% of its projects have been completed, compared to 64% and 53% completion rates for projects financed by Japan and the Asian Development Bank, respectively.
Laos was also lured by China’s promises of development, borrowing substantial debts from China to fund the $6 billion Boten-Vientiane railway construction project. However, Laos now faces a severe financial crisis, leading to China seizing 90% of the profits of Laos’ national grid in 2020 and effectively controlling the country’s power grid.
For many countries trapped in the BRI initiative’s debt trap, these infrastructure loans have been tools used by the CCP government to exert long-term financial leverage, making them economically dependent on China and vulnerable to undue influence from the CCP regime.
In addition to debt diplomacy, the CCP government’s economic strategy includes dumping surplus products in partner countries of the BRI initiative, flooding markets in countries like Cambodia, Nepal, and Myanmar with cheap Chinese goods. This practice not only undermines local industries but also stifles domestic innovation, leading to long-term economic dependence on China.
More worrisome is that many investments under the BRI initiative actually have the potential for dual use, allowing the CCP regime to transform civilian infrastructure into military assets, expanding its strategic footprint in the Indian Ocean and other regions. Ports and railways built under the guise of trade could become military logistical hubs, raising serious security concerns for host countries.
For countries caught in Beijing’s web, the cost of CCP “friendship” goes far beyond financial debts, eroding national sovereignty, limiting government policy choices, exacerbating domestic economic reliance on China, among other negative impacts. The experiences of Sri Lanka, Pakistan, and Laos serve as a stark warning: the allure of Chinese investment often comes with a heavy price. The BRI initiative not only fails to promote development but burdens these countries with unsustainable debts, forcing them to deal with unfinished or unusable projects and increasing vulnerability to the harmful influences of the CCP regime.
While the CCP continues to boast of the success of the BRI initiative in its foreign propaganda, the reality tells a different story. In 2023, 19 countries including Turkey and Kenya completely ceased cooperation with the BRI initiative, and in the entire year of 2022, Russia, which had no collaborations, only signed one agreement. By 2024, more countries had canceled or halted BRI projects. However, China’s total foreign investment increased by 10% that year. Of course, this figure includes all foreign investments, not just those within the BRI initiative, so it cannot be solely attributed to the robust development of the initiative.
The majority of the growth in China’s foreign investment can be attributed to non-BRI investments, such as acquisitions in high-tech industries, energy transactions outside the BRI framework, and capital injections into state-owned enterprises operating overseas. Furthermore, the global high inflation in 2024 inflated the investment figures, making it seem like China was expanding its overseas investments when in reality, rising costs of materials, labor, and energy were simply inflating expenses. As infrastructure projects stall or fail to yield returns, the CCP government may inject more funds to prevent defaults, undertake loan restructuring, or maintain its foothold in critical regions, and these additional funds injected do not truly contribute to genuine investment growth.
The growth in China’s foreign investment is far from a signal of success for the BRI initiative; rather, it may reflect the CCP’s increasing financial burden as it strives to uphold the initiative. As more countries recognize potential risks and seek to break free from the CCP regime’s control, the BRI initiative will no longer expand but quietly retreat.
(Note: This translation and rewrite have been produced without the original reporter’s name, publisher’s name, editor’s name, and date as requested.)