Tang Qing’s Current Affairs: The Times Have Changed, Leaking Secrets in the Two Sessions

Hello everyone, welcome to “Tang Qing’s View on Current Affairs”.

This year’s meetings of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) seem a bit off, with a significant reduction in military representatives and consecutive disappearances of high-ranking military leaders, revealing many party-state secrets. What exactly is happening within the military? Is Xi Jinping’s power being shaken?

At the same time, hidden tensions between the US and China are surging, as Trump is reshaping global trade rules, while Xi Jinping is anxious about whether China will follow in the footsteps of the Soviet Union. During the meetings, a famous quote by Xi Jinping was turned back by Li Qiang, dripping with sarcasm.

Do these changes in the military imply a greater power struggle? How will the US-China confrontation reshape the world order? Today, we will discuss these key issues. If you enjoy our program, don’t forget to like, subscribe, and share.

On March 4th and 5th, the National People’s Congress and the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference in Beijing opened. While these annual “Two Sessions” may seem routine, they serve as a window for external observers to gauge the power dynamics within the CCP. This year, the most abnormal aspect revealed through this window is the sudden shrinkage of the military representative delegation.

How did this shrinkage happen? Let’s look at the data – this year’s national congress military delegation consists of only 267 people, 14 fewer than the 281 from last year. Where did these 14 people go? The official explanation is that they were dismissed due to corruption issues.

This explanation sounds “reasonable,” right? But is the situation really that simple? It’s important to note that the reduction in military representatives far exceeds that of other delegations within the People’s Congress and the CPPCC. In other words, Xi Jinping’s rectification within the military is much harsher than in other areas.

So, who are the people that have not appeared?

One of the most notable is a few high-ranking military officials who have been “missing” for some time, such as:

Miao Hua: a member of the Central Military Commission, Director of the Political Work Department of the Military Commission, a Vice Admiral, who completely disappeared after being suspended from his duties last November.

Yuan Huazhi: Navy Political Commissar, a Vice Admiral, mysteriously disappeared and has not been seen since.

Wang Chunni: Commander of the Armed Police, a Vice Admiral, also remains silent.

Li Qiaoming, the Army Commander, is also a Vice Admiral, and his situation is more delicate. He had also “disappeared” for a while before, leading to speculations whether he was in trouble. However, at the military delegation establishment meeting, he suddenly reappeared, seemingly dispelling the rumors of investigation. But the others, to this day, have not been seen.

In fact, the signs of these disappearances emerged as early as December last year. During a promotion ceremony for Vice Admirals, Li Qiaoming, Yuan Huazhi, and Wang Chunni were all absent, leading people to speculate they were under investigation. Now, it seems the answer is mostly affirmative; Li Qiaoming successfully “resurrected,” while the others can be assumed to have fallen from grace.

So, what exactly is the cause of this wave of military purges? Undoubtedly, it is directly related to the corruption case in the Rocket Forces.

Last September, former Defense Minister Li Shangfu and former Deputy Commander of the Army Deng Zhiping were removed from their positions as People’s Congress representatives. In December, Deng Zhiping’s predecessor, former Deputy Commander of the Army You Haitao, and South Sea Fleet Commander Li Pengcheng were also dismissed.

The purge within the CCP military indicates turbulence within the military. Thus, a continuous cleansing of “disloyal” senior military figures is necessary. However, the harsher the purge, the more dissent may brew within the military ranks.

At this point, some may ask: with the reduction of military representatives and the consecutive disappearance of generals, will this affect the military’s combat effectiveness?

The answer is clear; the impact is already evident. Let’s discuss the most direct effect – morale. A photo published by Epoch Times shows that on March 5th, before the opening of the CCP National People’s Congress, military representatives entered the Great Hall of the People. A military officer, upon seeing a reporter taking photos, covered his face with his hat.

Roy Kamphausen, an expert from the National Bureau of Asian Research, told Voice of America that despite the improvement in the technical equipment level of the Chinese military, morale within the military is decreasing because the “anti-corruption” campaign has left many military officials feeling self-threatened and unsure if they might be the next target.

With generals being brought down and commanders suddenly “disappearing,” who within the military will dare to take initiative or lead troops into battle? This scenario, if applied within a company, might result in an attitude of “slack off as long as you can get away with it.” However, within the military, this issue is not trivial and directly impacts life and death on the battlefield.

Apart from the missing high-ranking military officials, changes in seating arrangements for the Vice Chairmen of the Military Commission during the Two Sessions also reveal a subtle anomaly.

Who are these two individuals? Zhang Youxia and He Weidong. One is a veteran, and the other is a newly promoted military figure under Xi Jinping’s leadership. The question arises, who truly holds the reins of power within the military?

According to standard hierarchical practices, the greater the military authority, the higher the ranking. However, during the Two Sessions’ main session, He Weidong was more proximal to the central leadership due to his higher position within the Political Bureau, surpassing Zhang Youxia. Interestingly, the reports during the grouped discussions of the military delegation by Xinhua News Agency placed Zhang Youxia’s remarks ahead of He Weidong’s, contrary to their seating orders, suggesting that Zhang Youxia wields actual power.

What’s even more intriguing is the difference in their speeches:

Zhang Youxia mentioned “Chairman Xi” but did not emphasize the “Chairman of the Military Commission responsibility system” as in the past.

He Weidong also mentioned “Chairman Xi” but placed the “Party Central” before “Chairman Xi” and subsequently mentioned the “Chairman of the Military Commission responsibility system.”

In the CCP’s discourse system, changes in terminology are often not arbitrary but convey some form of political signal.

Furthermore, in the past, high-ranking military officials uniformly professed loyalty in their speeches, often rallying behind the phrase “resolutely obey Chairman Xi’s command.” However, this year, both Vice Chairmen of the Military Commission did not mention this, nor did other military representatives.

The sudden absence of this “standard move” carries significant implications worth pondering.

Rumors about Xi Jinping losing power have not ceased over the past year. During this year’s Two Sessions, Epoch Times columnist Zhong Yuan observed interesting phenomena. Regardless of entering or leaving a place, Xi Jinping always walks at the forefront as usual. However, while some officials applaud when Xi passes by, most do not focus on Xi himself but look further beyond him. Ignoring Xi’s presence in front of him or behind him seems to make the rumors of Xi losing power more convincing.

Interestingly, Premier Li Keqiang did not display the submissive attitude towards Xi as he did in the past. The interaction between Li Keqiang and Xi seems more balanced, even somewhat cheerful. In contrast, the expression of Cai Qi, on the other side of Li Keqiang, appears stern. The rivalry between Li Keqiang and Cai Qi has long been public knowledge. In the past, Cai Qi relied on a close relationship with Xi Jinping to gain an upper hand, but as Xi Jinping’s leadership within the CCP weakened, Cai Qi struggled to stand out.

Li Keqiang also made a striking move. On March 5th, during the opening ceremony of the National People’s Congress, Li Keqiang warned that the world is undergoing an “unprecedented ‘great upheaval.'” He stated that the increasingly complex and severe external environment may have a greater impact on China in areas such as trade and technology.

China specialist Zhang Jiadun posted a comment on X, saying, “Times have changed! In March 2023, Xi Jinping was confidently talking about the ‘great upheaval unseen in a century,’ appearing in a posture of changing the world order. But now, 2025 March, Li Keqiang is using the same phrase to describe threats to China from global conditions.”

Everyone knows that the “great upheaval unseen in a century” is a political term Xi Jinping introduced, generally referring to a significant shift in the world order at the beginning of the 21st century. The CCP’s official definition of this great upheaval is that the trend of “rising in the east, declining in the west” is irreversible, the collapse of US hegemony is inevitable, and the world will shift towards a multipolar framework.

Now, Li Keqiang is employing this phrase to describe threats to China from the external environment, flipping the narrative. One might wonder, is Li Keqiang purposely mocking Xi Jinping? Does this imply that Xi Jinping’s vision of a “new world order” is crumbling? Is his actual ruling capacity on the decline?

In reality, what truly concerns Xi Jinping is not just internal issues. Externally, the US’s containment of China has reached a “no-limits” level.

The US-China confrontation has evolved beyond just a trade war, expanding to encompass economic, technological, military, and information warfare – nearly a full-scale “new cold war.”

So, what does Xi Jinping fear the most? Whether China will become the “next Soviet Union.”

According to the Wall Street Journal, following Trump’s victory, Xi Jinping immediately instructed his close aides to study the history of the US-Soviet Cold War. Why? Because he fears that China might end up like the Soviet Union, fully blocked by the US, ultimately economically ruined and isolated from the world.

This illustrates that Xi Jinping himself is well aware that China is currently at a dangerous turning point.

Of course, on the surface, he does not admit to this. Official propaganda continues to portray an image of “leading the global transformation.” However, internally, they have already begun adopting defensive measures.

While Trump has made many enemies on the international stage, starting trade disputes with Mexico and Canada, angering European allies over the Ukraine issue, and threatening to withdraw from various international agreements, the US still firmly holds the global economic, technological, and financial system.

In contrast, China’s situation is entirely different: economic crises are intensifying, global supply chains are reorganizing, foreign companies are relocating, and key areas such as semiconductors, artificial intelligence, and high-end manufacturing are being “blocked” by the US. All these factors are causing Xi Jinping increasing anxiety.

Looking back at the history of the Soviet Union, you will find that its collapse was not due to a war but because of Western economic sanctions and technological blockades that gradually weakened it.

So, will China follow the same path as the Soviet Union?

This is no longer just a question of “possibility” but a reality that is unfolding.

Moreover, this US-China confrontation has now extended to information warfare, with even the US Embassy in China experiencing it firsthand.

Here’s what happened: On March 3rd, the embassy posted news on Weibo and WeChat about Trump’s meeting with Ukraine’s President Zelensky. However, the comments section quickly filled with overwhelmingly “anti-US” voices.

Strangely, these comments seemed incredibly “uniform,” all flooding with content like “US hegemony” and “US failure.” This seemed off.

The US Embassy in China then posted on X social media platform, stating: “Our Weibo comments are being filtered by an opaque censorship mechanism that we ourselves cannot control.”

What does this mean? The comments under the embassy’s news, are not random but “filtered” by Weibo’s censorship mechanism. The embassy exposed this censorship mechanism, leading to a protest post breaking a million views in just a day, but was swiftly deleted.

What does this reveal?

Beijing tightly controls public opinion to not only manipulate domestic information flows but even tamp down foreign governments’ channels of expression.

This tactic echoes the Soviet-era approach – blocking genuine information, manufacturing a nationwide “anti-Western” narrative, and using this to solidify political power.

However, the question remains, can the CCP’s information blockade truly evade the fate of the Soviet Union?

Currently, the US’s containment strategy has reached its core – global trade rules. Trump’s goal is to make it impossible for China to continue developing within the current system.

The Wall Street Journal reported that Trump’s team has long planned a series of actions against China, his core strategy is to expedite the end of conflicts in the Middle East and Ukraine, focusing American energies on confronting China.

How is this containment carried out? Let’s break it down:

This strategy is harsh. While China and Russia’s relationship seemed close over the past years, Trump saw through the mirage: in true geopolitical competition, China and Russia cannot truly be “close allies,” but merely entities utilizing each other for mutual gains.

Therefore, Trump is trying to weaken the cooperation between China and Russia by extending an olive branch to Putin in diplomacy. If Russia reduces its reliance on China, Beijing’s international position becomes even more precarious.

During his campaign, Trump promised to impose higher tariffs on Chinese goods. Upon taking office, he immediately increased tariffs on goods exported from China to the US.

The Trump administration is pushing Canada, Mexico, and other countries to adopt stricter trade restrictions against China, preventing Chinese enterprises from bypassing tariffs and accessing the American market through these nations. It is also uniting with Europe, Japan, and South Korea to enhance restrictions on China’s technology and semiconductor industries.

Apart from tariffs, Trump’s team is considering more stringent investment restrictions and export controls, such as further limiting China’s access to high-tech semiconductor technology and even imposing sanctions on China’s key industries like shipbuilding directly.

In January, Trump openly declared his intention to “reclaim” the Panama Canal.

Within a few weeks, the operating rights of China in Panama’s ports were discreetly sold by Li Ka-shing’s Hutchison Group to a consortium led by the US BlackRock, with negotiations personally conducted by the 96-year-old Li Ka-shing, facilitating a swift deal, garnering profits exceeding $19 billion.

This not only caused a significant spike in Hutchison’s stock prices for two consecutive days but also shielded the company from potential litigations or scrutiny from the US in the future. Some analysts believe that Li Ka-shing’s approach was a “retreat for advancement,” evading geopolitical storms while securing greater flexibility for the company’s future development.

Faced with such intense repression, what countermeasures can Beijing employ?

Given the escalating pressure from Trump, Xi Jinping certainly won’t sit idly by.

However, the problem lies in the limited countermeasures left for the CCP.

In recent years, Beijing has learned its lessons – retaliating with tariffs against the US would only result in greater losses for China. With the US importing more goods from China than vice versa, Beijing cannot retaliate on an equal footing.

Previously, the Chinese Foreign Ministry made strong statements, indicating that they were willing to “follow through to the end.” But in recent days, US Defense Secretary Hagase publicly stated, “To want peace, one must prepare for war.” Subsequently, China’s tone softened immediately, emphasizing that “whether cold or hot, war is not winnable and should not be fought.”

Since November last year, China has sent multiple delegations to Washington to negotiate with the new US government, attempting to prevent further escalation of the trade war. Additionally, Beijing is trying to court traditional US allies to counter Washington’s containment.

Currently, Beijing is contemplating exporting control measures on key resources like rare earths to counter US manufacturing, using this as leverage against Trump’s tariffs.

Xi Jinping is still waiting to see if Trump’s team will eventually leave room for negotiation with China. According to sources, Beijing had hoped to leverage concessions on the fentanyl issue in exchange for easing tensions. However, Trump’s new tariff escalation has disrupted these plans.

Faced with increasingly severe external pressures, will Xi Jinping be forced to compromise and seek a reconciliation? Or will he choose a more aggressive approach, potentially escalating conflicts on issues such as the Taiwan Strait and the South China Sea?

What lies ahead in the US-China confrontation? Feel free to share your thoughts in the comment section. Don’t forget to like, subscribe, and stay tuned for our next episode.