Hello everyone, welcome to “Tang Qing’s Current Affairs Report”.
Recently, there has been an incident where a former senior journalist from Xinhua News Agency was sentenced to one year in prison and had his pension confiscated just for writing a letter. How did this happen? What red line did he cross?
It all started with the sudden death of Li Keqiang…
On October 25, 2023, Li Keqiang arrived in Shanghai. However, two days later, the official announcement was made that he had died of a “sudden heart attack” at the age of 68. The notice was brief, without mentioning the rescue process or providing specific details. Such an important figure being passed over so lightly would raise suspicion, wouldn’t it?
Soon, spontaneous mourning activities took place, especially in places like Hefei, Anhui, and Zhengzhou Central Park, where flower seas bloomed, and crowds gathered. Why did so many people mourn him? It’s not because of his political achievements, but rather because compared to the current political environment, Li Keqiang at least appeared more moderate, advocating for market economy, giving people some hope.
However, the authorities chose silence, not responding, not explaining, seemingly wanting to let it all quietly pass by. It was at this time that former Xinhua journalist Gu Wanming stepped forward.
On October 30, 2023, he directly wrote an open letter to the Party Central Committee and the State Council, making five demands:
1. Do not rush to cremate the body, investigate thoroughly first;
2. Set up an investigation team, disclose the truth;
3. Hold those responsible accountable;
4. Perform an autopsy on the body to determine the cause of death;
5. Hold a decent funeral.
You say, daring to make these demands at this time, isn’t it “crossing the red line”? Indeed, not long after, he was arrested.
In November of last year, the court officially sentenced Gu Wanming to one year in prison. A month later, Xinhua News Agency directly canceled his retirement benefits, essentially depriving him of security in his later years.
A retired journalist from Xinhua News Agency revealed in an interview that Gu Wanming was targeted because of “recklessly criticizing the central authorities”. This is a major taboo within the Communist Party; once sentenced, not only would one be politically silenced, but their basic livelihood security would also be lost, serving as a warning to others within the system: Do not challenge the bottom line.
Gu Wanming, born in 1951, had a humble background, later entering Fudan University’s journalism department. He worked at Xinhua News Agency for 30 years, even serving as the director of the Guangdong branch. It can be said that he was a journalist cultivated by the Party. Having devoted 30 years to the Party, he ended up in such a situation in his later years just because of writing a letter.
However, if this leads to a realization of the Party’s true nature, a complete awakening, breaking away from the Party, and embracing a new world of possibilities, it might not be such a bad thing after all.
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Recently, the atmosphere in China’s political scene has been increasingly eerie. Vice Premier of the State Council, Ding Xuexiang, a member of the Politburo Standing Committee, has suddenly “disappeared” from multiple key events.
It is worth noting that he has been considered one of the potential “successors.” However, events that he should have attended recently have been replaced by others, leading to various speculations. Is there a health issue? Or has the power struggle within Xi’s camp intensified?
Now, let’s look at a few key details. On February 10, at the AI Technology Summit in Paris, the representative sent by the Chinese Communist Party was expected to be Ding Xuexiang, but in the end, he was replaced by Zhang Guoqing. It is important to mention that technology is Ding Xuexiang’s responsibility, and the last-minute replacement raises questions.
Furthermore, on February 7, the opening ceremony of the Asian Winter Games was held in Harbin. Most senior officials of the Chinese Communist Party were present, including Xi Jinping, Cai Qi, Wang Yi, He Lifeng, and Wang Xiaohong, but Ding Xuexiang was notably absent. Whereas he had attended events like the Hangzhou Asian Paralympic Games and Chengdu National Games last year, his sudden disappearance this time is indeed unusual.
Earlier in December last year, Jiang Wangzheng, residing in Australia, released news that Ding Xuexiang had suspended all work starting from December 20, 2024, with the daily functions of the State Council temporarily taken over by He Lifeng. Approval of documents from relevant departments was also respectively handed over to He Lifeng and Liu Guozhong. This suggests that his power had been weakened.
However, strangely enough, he made frequent public appearances in January. He attended the Davos Forum in Switzerland, visited the Netherlands, met with the King of the Netherlands; on January 27, he appeared at the Chinese Communist Party’s annual Chinese New Year gathering, and on February 5, he was also present at the State Council’s meeting.
If he is truly under house arrest or marginalized, why can he make such frequent public appearances? Is it due to health issues, or has he become embroiled in the quagmire of political struggle?
One can’t help but suspect whether Ding Xuexiang has encountered a new “palace struggle” within Xi’s camp? Or has he been ousted by Xi Jinping’s opponents?
The current question is, although Ding Xuexiang is a core member of Xi’s camp, his background is somewhat complicated.
Born in 1962, he started his career in Shanghai and was originally part of the Jiang faction under Huang Ju and Chen Liangyu. In 2007, during Xi Jinping’s brief tenure as the leader in Shanghai, he promoted Ding Xuexiang to Secretary-General of the Municipal Party Committee, officially aligning with Xi’s faction.
Since then, he has progressively entered the Central Organization Department system, eventually becoming Xi’s core staff member.
However, many analysts believe that when Xi Jinping came to power, Jiang Zemin deliberately arranged for Ding Xuexiang to be around him, in a role similar to a “supervisor.” It wasn’t until Xi Jinping fully consolidated his power that Ding Xuexiang quickly switched allegiance to Xi’s camp.
Despite this, his position within the party has always been awkward.
Within the State Council, he is officially the Executive Vice Premier, equivalent to the Deputy to Premier Li Keqiang. However, his power is far inferior to Li Keqiang’s, and he has even been jointly suppressed by Li Keqiang and He Lifeng.
What’s more, his background has a major flaw—he lacks experience governing at the local level, making his foundation within the party much weaker compared to other senior leaders.
Independent commentator Du Zheng analyzed that although Ding Xuexiang has had a smooth career, lacking experience in local governance, he appears more like a “tool” of Xi’s camp rather than a future ruler.
And a recent major case may have dragged him down further.
In December 2024, Customs Commissioner Yu Jianhua, who committed suicide, was considered a close ally of Ding Xuexiang.
Yu Jianhua, from Jiangsu, had a close relationship with Ding Xuexiang. Furthermore, on the day before his suicide, he had just been summoned by the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection. It is speculated that Ding Xuexiang may have also been implicated in certain cases, even leading to a reduction in his power.
At the same time, another significant event occurred—the delayed convening of the Fourth Plenum of the Twentieth Central Committee.
As per tradition, the Fourth Plenum usually involves significant decisions, such as party building and arrangements for a successor. But considering the time, the meeting that should have taken place in the fall of 2024 has yet to occur.
Why?
There is speculation that Xi Jinping’s health may have taken a turn for the worse.
Since July last year, rumors have been circulating that Xi’s health is precarious, with multiple hospital stays, yet there has been no official response.
If Xi’s health is indeed unstable, it poses a potential variable to the internal struggle for a successor within the party. The delayed Fourth Plenum likely is connected to this power game.
A report from Nikkei Asia on January 16 also suggested that 2025 might be a crucial year for China’s political scene, as the power struggle within Xi’s camp has intensified, hinting that Beijing might face a new political storm.
Independent commentator Cai Shenkun also analyzed on social media, stating that Ding Xuexiang is currently the only post-60s member in the Politburo Standing Committee, possibly becoming the so-called successor. This amplifies his political significance, making him a focal point amidst the various factions.
Regardless, 2025 is destined not to be a calm year for China’s political scene. What do you think Ding Xuexiang’s future holds? Feel free to share your thoughts in the comments section.
Lately, unsettling sentiments are not limited to just within the party but are also starting to manifest in the military. There are even speculations that signs of a “military rebellion” might be emerging within the ranks.
Why so? Because the Chinese Military Commission has recently taken two consecutive actions:
Firstly, they suddenly issued a notice requiring the entire military to undergo “ideological reform,” with a special emphasis on transforming the “key few.”
Secondly, they introduced the “Internet Military Information Communication Management Measures,” further tightening the control over military discourse.
When these two actions are combined, it’s hard not to suspect that Beijing might be starting to worry about a loss of control within the military ranks.
On February 4, the Chinese Communist Party’s military newspaper released an article criticizing the “relaxation of discipline in the military,” particularly emphasizing the need to address the phenomenon of soldiers violating rules by “jumping the fence” to access external networks.
What does this mean? It indicates that an increasing number of military personnel and officers are no longer solely adhering to official domestic propaganda but are beginning to explore the real world beyond the Great Firewall. For example, they might be accessing Epoch Times!
For the Chinese Communist Party, this poses a massive crisis.
As military personnel begin to adopt an international perspective, witnessing global criticisms of the Party’s regime, cracks in military morale are likely to widen.
In fact, this aligns with the earlier rumors of potential “militarization within the military,” as the more individuals “jump the fence,” the more they might come into contact with alternative ideologies, intensifying the sentiment of resistance within the military.
From these recent events, the situation within the Chinese army is becoming increasingly complex.
In fact, over the past few years, the turnover among high-ranking military officials has been shocking.
Starting from 2023, the military has undergone extensive purges, with numerous senior generals and top executives in the military-industrial complex being targeted:
The Rocket Army Command has witnessed a nearly complete turnover in leadership, with top-ranking officers falling one after another;
The Political Work Department of the Military Commission, both the previous and current directors Zhang Yang and Miao Hua, have been purged;
Widespread instances of buying and selling military positions, with many officers privately expressing dissatisfaction with Xi’s policies.
Independent commentator Du Zheng, in an analysis for Taiwan’s The Liberty Times, mentioned that what the Chinese Communist Party fears the most is the emergence of a situation within the military similar to the “Wuchang Uprising.”
Furthermore, Du revealed that his friends in Guangdong, with relatives serving in a certain military district, have shared insider information:
Many officers privately complain that corruption within the military is too severe, suggesting that the anti-corruption efforts are merely “changing the perpetrators”;
Frequent shifts of high-ranking officials in the military, leading to instability in leadership teams, where many individuals are uncertain whether they will retain their positions in the future;
Privately, some are discussing “military nationalization” and even mentioning “learning from the Wuchang Uprising,” waiting for an opportunity to act.
These rumors align with the analysis by former Navy Lieutenant Commander Yao Cheng.
Yao previously stated on a program that there is strong resentment against Xi within the military, with many believing that his anti-corruption campaign is more about arbitrary purging, leading to widespread discontent.
Moreover, in a surprising trend, an increasing number of military officers seem to be “jumping over the wall” (using VPNs) more frequently.
On December 23 last year, the Chinese Communist Party’s military newspaper released an article, criticizing the “relaxation of discipline within the military,” stressing the urgency to rectify soldiers’ unauthorized access to foreign websites.
What does this mean? It suggests that more and more soldiers and officers are not solely consuming domestic official propaganda but are beginning to access the international community. The trend is crucially watched by the Chinese Communist Party, as it signifies a shift in military consciousness.
These recent maneuvers—urgent ideological reform and the comprehensive control of military information—combined, unavoidably lead to suspicions of unrest within the military ranks.
In reality, over the past few years, the turnover within the Chinese army has reached staggering proportions.
From economic decline and social unrest to intensified political purges, the external pressures exacerbate the internal turmoil, embodying China in 2025 as a “pressure cooker” on the verge of explosion.
The collapse of the Chinese Communist Party might arrive overnight, akin to the dissolution of the Soviet Union. Are you prepared? How do you view this issue? Feel free to leave your thoughts. Our program concludes here today. Don’t forget to like, subscribe, and share. See you in the next episode.
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