Recently, the Japanese Ministry of Defense released the 2024 Defense White Paper, revealing a significant decrease in the number of medium-range missiles in the People’s Liberation Army Rocket Force, especially the disappearance of the DF-21D missile. The Chinese military seems to have realized the gap with the US fifth-generation fighters, as the growth of the Chinese Air Force’s fourth-generation fighters has almost stagnated. While the military in Zhongnanhai is being cleaned up, a large-scale arms race seems increasingly unsustainable.
The 2023 Japanese Defense White Paper revealed that the People’s Liberation Army Rocket Force had a total of 278 medium-range missiles, an increase of 24 from 2022 and 62 from 2021, showing a continuous growth trend. However, the 2024 Japanese Defense White Paper shows a decrease in the number of Chinese medium-range missiles to 212, fewer than in 2021.
The most significant change in quantity is seen in the DF-21 missile series. In 2023, the Japanese Defense White Paper indicated a total of 70 DF-21 missiles; by 2024, only 24 DF-21A/E missiles remained. The other types, DF-21/B/C/D, disappeared completely, especially surprising is the absence of the DF-21D, known as the “aircraft carrier killer.”
The data in the Japanese Defense White Paper is generally considered relatively accurate by the public, and the Japanese Ministry of Defense is unlikely to make mistakes with such essential numbers, as the DF-21 missiles pose a direct threat to Japan’s security. The DF-21 missile has a maximum range of 2,150 kilometers, capable of targeting most areas in Japan and is one of the missiles that Japan is always ready to intercept in case of an attack.
In 2022, the Japanese Defense White Paper disclosed that the various types of DF-21 missiles owned by China totaled 134, remaining relatively consistent in the previous two years. However, the number decreased to 70 in 2023, indicating that China may be phasing out older models. This further reduction to 24 in 2024 suggests more than just the elimination of old types; it could indicate China’s dwindling confidence in the existing DF-21 missiles. If China is not even planning to retain the DF-21D anti-ship missile, it may confirm that the previous boasting was not only an attempt to deceive the outside world, but also potentially misled officials in Zhongnanhai.
In 2010, the United States publicly noted China’s testing of the DF-21D anti-ship missile, primarily aimed at US aircraft carriers. Although the US acknowledged its significance, doubts persisted about how accurately such a hypersonic missile, with speeds reaching 4 Mach, could hit moving naval targets, and whether it would truly be a “game-changer.”
In 2014, China was supposed to have deployed two brigades of DF-21D anti-ship missiles. In 2020, China launched two DF-21D missiles from Zhejiang into the South China Sea, and also fired two DF-26 missiles from Qinghai towards the same region.
Whether or not the DF-21D anti-ship missile can be considered China’s “assassin’s mace,” its discontinuation after ten years of deployment would indicate a likely deception. The exposure of this deception may be linked to the extensive cleansing of the Rocket Force.
On June 27, two former Chinese Defense Ministers, Liang Feng and Wei Feng, were officially notified of their handling. Wei Feng served as the Commander of the Second Artillery Corps from 2012 to 2015, the first Commander of the Rocket Force from 2015, a member of the Central Military Commission since 2017, and the Defense Minister since 2018. He should have been well aware of the secrets of the DF-21 missile.
In addition to accepting bribes, Wei Feng was also charged with “disloyalty,” possibly for concealing the true performance of weapons systems. Moreover, it is rumored that Rocket Force generals leaked information to the United States or engaged in espionage. If these allegations are related to the DF-21 missile, it goes beyond mere corruption issues.
The elimination of the DF-21/B/C/D missiles by China likely coincides with the overall restructuring of the Rocket Force. However, retaining the nuclear-capable DF-21A, despite its precision error of 100-300 meters, has minimal impact on nuclear delivery. The DF-21E is believed to be the newest model, but public information on it is currently unavailable.
Saudi Arabia once purchased Chinese DF-21 missiles to replace the outdated DF-3 missiles. If China sold the phased-out DF-21 missiles to Saudi Arabia, it would be a significant loss for the latter.
Given the poor performance, the Chinese Rocket Force likely significantly reduced the DF-21 missiles. It is natural for observers to turn their attention to the DF-26, as it is developed from the DF-21 or can be considered an extension of it.
China claims that the DF-26 missile has a range exceeding 5,000 kilometers, allowing for precise nuclear or conventional strikes against ground and naval targets. With a range capable of reaching Guam, it is dubbed the “Guam Express.”
The 2024 Japanese Defense White Paper shows that China’s Rocket Force has a total of 140 DF-26 missiles, an increase of 30 from 2023. From 2021 to 2023, the number of DF-26 missiles remained at 110 before the increase in 2024. This move is likely to compensate for the significant reduction in DF-21 missiles, but may not be sufficient. The DF-26 missile now faces a multitude of targets, including numerous US bases in Japan, the Philippines, Guam, Tianjin Island, Palau, and even US aircraft carriers, indicating an overwhelming burden.
The phasing out of the DF-21 missiles, besides their poor performance, may also be due to their limited range, making them vulnerable to US retaliatory strikes and having poor survivability.
The US Aegis Destroyers and submarines can launch Tomahawk cruise missiles, while the THAAD missile defense system is deployed, capable of launching land-based Tomahawk cruise missiles with a maximum range of 2,500 kilometers. US aircraft can also deploy AGM-158 long-range air-to-ground missiles and AGM-183 hypersonic missiles, with a maximum range of 1,600 kilometers. The Chinese DF-21 missiles in coastal areas face significant risks, as opposed to the DF-26 missiles deployed inland, which are relatively safer but may not withstand US B-2 bomber air raids or the upcoming B-21 bombers.
The Chinese Rocket Force needs a weapon in hand, and the DF-26 seems to be the last viable equipment to rely on, hence the continued increase in production. Although this missile also claims to target US aircraft carriers, its effectiveness, similar to the DF-21D, is likely clear to the Chinese Rocket Force itself. Allegedly, Rocket Force generals are hesitant, probably due to these circumstances.
With the DF-21D missile gone and uncertainties around the DF-26, the Chinese Rocket Force may only rely on the DF-17 to target US aircraft carriers. The 2024 Japanese Defense White Paper reveals that China’s DF-17 missiles increased from 24 in 2023 to 48 in 2024, doubling the quantity.
It is evident that China urgently seeks to fill the void left by the disappearance of the DF-21D missile with the DF-17 missile. However, the DF-17 missile, with a range of 1,600 kilometers or potentially 2,500 kilometers, still needs to be deployed in coastal areas to target US aircraft carriers, presenting a significant risk of US counterattacks.
The 2024 Japanese Defense White Paper also indicates that China likely retired the early DF-4 missiles, leaving a total of 140 DF-26, 24 DF-21A/E, and 48 DF-17 missiles, totaling 212, a significant decrease from the 278 in 2023.
The 2024 Japanese Defense White Paper reveals an increase in China’s nuclear warheads to 410, up from 350 in both 2022 and 2023, 320 in 2021, and 290 in 2020. Despite China’s attempts to catch up with the superpowers like the US and Russia in the realm of nuclear weapons, there remains a substantial gap in quantity and quality.
The manufacturing and maintenance of an increasing number of nuclear warheads will consume a larger proportion of the military budget, potentially neglecting other aspects of China’s military development, especially given China’s current economic struggles and financial strains, echoing the path of the former Soviet Union.
The 2024 Japanese Defense White Paper also discloses that China’s land-based intercontinental ballistic missiles total 140, an increase of 10 from 2023. The DF-41 missile count rose from 24 in 2023 to 36, while the DF-31 remains at 86, and the DF-5 decreased from 20 to 18.
Despite the significant rise in nuclear warheads, the modest increase in the number of intercontinental ballistic missiles by China indicates that these are costly assets yet to be fully utilized.
China’s JL-2/JL-3 submarine-launched ballistic missiles remain at a quantity of 72, showing no increase.
The number of H-6 bombers capable of carrying nuclear warheads increased from 104 to 112, with the H-6K maintaining 100 units, and the H-6N rising from four to over 12. The H-6N primarily carries the DF-21D air-launched anti-ship missile and the CJ-10 ground-attack missile. If the land-based DF-21D is being phased out, it is uncertain if the air-launched DF-21D will continue to exist.
Though the number of Chinese nuclear warheads surged, there hasn’t been a notable increase in the delivery vehicles for nuclear weapons. It is possible that China has reached a bottleneck in military spending growth, leading to trade-offs; rampant corruption in the Rocket Force may have eaten up substantial military funding, resulting in few reliable equipment to date.
The 2024 Japanese Defense White Paper reveals that China’s Air Force has increased the number of J-20 jets from 140 in 2023 to 200 in 2024. This suggests that China is accelerating efforts to narrow the gap with the US in terms of fifth-generation fighters, with the US reportedly having at least 731 such jets in service. Although the J-20 bears a resemblance to the F-22, its performance in comparison to the F-22 and F-35 remains to be seen without real combat.
The quantity of J-16 has grown from 262 in 2023 to 292 in 2024, albeit at a slower pace than the J-20. This indicates that the Chinese Air Force recognizes the disparity between fourth and fifth-generation fighters, as the significant increase in fourth-generation fighter numbers does not bring substantial advantages. The combat capabilities of Russian-made fighters are well-known, and the Chinese-made J-16 is unlikely to fare any better.
The most numerous J-10 fighter jets are maintained at 588, unchanged from 2023. The Chengdu Aircraft Manufacturing Factory should pivot entirely to the production of the J-20, as the continued mass production of the J-10, a light fighter aircraft, is likely of insignificant strategic value. It is reported that the cost of a J-10 fighter jet reaches $23 million, demonstrating less cost-efficiency.
The number of Su-27/J-11 aircraft decreased from 329 in 2023 to 327 in 2024, indicating that the early Su-27/J-11A models are likely being phased out. The Su-27 by Russia hardly featured in the Russia-Ukraine conflict, and the follow-up of the Chinese J-11 may no longer be produced as the production of the J-16 has not significantly increased, potentially signaling a challenging trajectory for the Shenyang Aircraft Manufacturing Factory.
The imported Su-30 from Russia by China maintains at a quantity of 97, while the Su-35 remains at 24. The Su-35 may continue in service for some time, but the aging Su-30 should be carefully monitored by the Chinese Air Force, aiming to prolong the aircraft’s service life as much as possible, albeit at the expense of pilot training.
China’s carrier-based J-15 fighter jets remain at 60 in number, unchanged from 2023, suggesting that the Liaoning and Shandong carriers have become somewhat redundant. The existing J-15 fighters, apart from training at two land-based bases, still cannot fill the two carriers, and there doesn’t seem to be a willingness to increase them. The testing of electromagnetic catapults for the Fujian carrier and the corresponding carrier aircraft may still be pending, indicating no mass production yet.
Based on the data presented in the Japanese Defense White Paper, China’s nuclear weapons continue to grow rapidly, while the Rocket Force’s regular medium-range missiles decrease; the Air Force’s J-20 is on the rise, with moderate changes in the numbers of other aircraft; the changes in the Navy and Army are relatively minor, but rumors of submarine incidents persist; the Strategic Support Forces were recently split into three units.
Recently, China’s major focus shifted to “political rectification,” essentially targeting personnel; the once resounding slogan of “strengthening the military” seems to have lost its past fervor. Over the past year, China’s military equipment hasn’t seen significant improvement, and the morale within the military is unstable, hindering progress in the arms race, potentially leading to a decline in actual combat readiness; after the Rocket Force personnel shake-up and the exposure of equipment issues, military strength may be on the decline.
This translated news piece summarizes the recent updates from the Japanese Defense White Paper on the status of China’s military capabilities, particularly focusing on the changes in missile numbers, aircraft quantity, and the growth in nuclear warheads over the years, reflecting China’s efforts to assert itself as a formidable military power amid various challenges and uncertainties.