Recently, the official announcement was made about the upcoming 20th Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party, scheduled to be held in July. The official military newspaper of the CCP emphasized the importance of “discipline” within the military ranks. Rumors circulating within the Chinese military suggest discontent towards Defense Minister Dong Jun, particularly among senior military personnel and veterans. It is speculated that these factions may exert pressure on CCP leader Xi Jinping during the Third Plenary Session.
Published on May 3rd on the front page of the CCP’s “People’s Liberation Army Daily,” an article by a commentator titled “Emphasizing Discipline Ahead” highlighted the ongoing “party discipline education.”
Former Deputy Staff of the PLA Navy Command Yao Cheng expressed on social media platform X on May 3rd that prior to the 20th Central Committee of the CCP, various rumors were rampant within the military. Of particular concern was the dissatisfaction with the appointment of individuals lacking military expertise and engaging in flattery to key military positions. Competent and knowledgeable military officers reportedly feel a lack of prospects and are submitting requests to transition out of their roles.
Yao Cheng mentioned that the CCP military newspaper specifically drew a line in its published articles directed towards military cadres, indicating that the array of issues within the military was not merely a reflection at the grassroots level. He added that some high-ranking military officials, including dissatisfied veterans, may even pressure Xi Jinping during the Third Plenary Session.
In an article dated April 19th, commentator Wang Gong hinted at underlying reasons for the delayed appointment of the new Defense Minister, Dong Jun, who took office on December 29, 2023, but has not yet become a member of the Central Military Commission and the State Council. Allegedly, this delay is linked to conflicts involving Xi and military personnel, especially among the group of veteran military figures.
Criticism has been mounting against Xi Jinping’s actions within the military, particularly among older military leaders. Recent debates primarily revolve around personnel matters. Reports suggest that current Defense Minister Dong Jun is viewed as a stopgap measure and the delay in his appointment to the Military Commission stems from significant internal discord within the military, with the strongest opposition coming from retired veteran military officials. In a specific incident, a red second-generation veteran from a military region in southern China reportedly expressed strong dissatisfaction with the authorities during a gathering.
Following Dong Jun’s assumption of office, doubts and queries were raised regarding his appointment as Defense Minister, even by the Maoist Red Song Society network on January 5th. Concerns lingered about whether Dong Jun would follow in the footsteps of his predecessors and face unforeseen challenges or sudden events during his tenure.
On April 30, during the CCP Politburo meeting, it was announced that the Third Plenary Session would convene in July, contrary to the usual practice of holding the session by the end of the previous year.
On May 1, Chinese democracy activist Lu Honglai stated in a blog post on Wenxue City that the decision to hold the Third Plenary Session in July was influenced by certain forces resisting Xi, prompting him to proceed cautiously rather than forcing his agenda. The CCP military is seen as a significant concern and consideration for Xi in convening the Third Plenum, as it functions to protect the interests of the entire red family group, which have been threatened by Xi’s personal dictatorship.
The article also points out that under the guise of anti-corruption efforts, Xi Jinping’s targeted purges within the military have created an atmosphere of fear and discontent among military leadership.
Since assuming office in 2012, Xi has targeted factions associated with former leaders like Jiang Zemin, leading to the removal of nearly 200 military officers. Starting in 2023, a second wave of purges began, this time targeting Xi’s close allies.
During the extensive purge within the Rocket Force and equipment departments, incidents included the removal of former Defense Minister appointed by Xi, Li Shangfu, as well as former Air Force Commander Ding Laihang, Rocket Force Equipment Department Minister Lu Hong, former Rocket Force Commander Li Yuchao, Rocket Force Deputy Commander Li Chuanguang, former Rocket Force Commander Zhou Yaning, Central Military Commission Joint Staff Deputy Chief Zhang Zhenzhong, former Central Military Commission Equipment Development Department Deputy Minister Zhang Yulin, Central Military Commission Equipment Development Department Deputy Minister Rao Wenmin, and Southern Theater Command Deputy Commander Ju Xinchun, among others.
Additionally, several military-industrial complex leaders have been implicated, including China Aerospace Science and Technology Corporation Chairman Wu Yansheng, China Ordnance Industry Group Chairman Liu Shiquan, China Aerospace Science and Industry Corporation Vice President Wang Changqing, Director of the Rocket Academy under China Aerospace Science and Technology Group and Deputy Secretary Wang Xiaojun, former Chairman of China Aerospace Sanjiang Group, rocket expert Feng Jiehong, former Chairman of Aerospace Science and Industry Group Yuan Jie, former General Manager of Equipment Group Chen Guoying, Deputy Director of the Rocket Academy, and former Chairman of Aerospace Investment Holdings Han Shuwang.
Yao Cheng disclosed on social media platform X on April 16 that a new batch of generals in the CCP military has recently come under investigation, including Army Deputy Commander Lieutenant General Deng Zhiping, Eastern Theater Command Navy Deputy Political Commissar Major General He Yuehua, and Rocket Force Xichang Satellite Launch Base Commander Lieutenant General Deng Hongqin.