On May 20, the National Bureau of Statistics of the Communist Party of China (CPC) issued a rare and significant notice on its official website, pointing out statistical data falsification and interference with statistical work in seven provinces and cities including Jiangsu, Zhejiang, and three major State Council departments like the Ministry of Science and Technology. The units mentioned were required to submit rectification reports within three months. This news immediately drew strong attention from the public.
Falsifying statistics is not new within the CPC, but this time, the central government actively disclosed it, specifically targeting prominent provinces in the eastern coastal region. This has sparked discussions on the political motives and systemic challenges behind the issue. Many scholars and observers have pointed out that this is not just a technical audit but also reflects power restructuring and political maneuvering between the central and local governments.
According to the announcement by the CPC Statistics Bureau, in late November to early December 2024, ten statistical inspection teams were sent to various regions such as Shanxi, Liaoning, Jiangsu, Zhejiang, Hainan, Chongqing, Ningxia, as well as three State Council departments including the Ministry of Science and Technology, the General Administration of Market Regulation, and the General Administration of Financial Supervision to conduct routine statistical inspections. From May 7 to 20 this year, inspection teams provided feedback to the inspected areas and departments, identifying issues including hidden and new forms of statistical falsification, local interference in statistical work, and false data reporting by enterprises or projects.
Among them, the issues in Jiangsu were deemed the most severe, with the inspection report indicating that the province still had problems of interfering in data reporting and instructing or compelling statistical survey subjects to provide false data. Jiangsu’s statistics bureau had announced at the beginning of 2025 that the province’s Gross Domestic Product (GDP) in 2024 reached 13.7 trillion yuan, with a growth rate of 5.8%, sparking debates such as the “Jiangsu surpasses Guangdong” trend. However, in this recent disclosure, it became a focal point for criticism.
Many view the CPC’s “data rectification” as a form of pressure on local governments and a reflection of institutional self-reflection. However, China expert Wang He believes the reality is far more complex.
He explained, “Each round of inspection and audit is actually a display of political tactics. Which regions to flag, how to handle them in batches, and selectively enforce measures, all have high political considerations.”
Wang He pointed out, “From the content of the audit and inspection reports, to the intensity of media coverage and whether it becomes a media focus, it is all unified and deployed by the Propaganda Department. This nationwide extensive coverage of reports must have received high-level directives, not for correcting false data, but for political power considerations.”
Wang He questioned whether such operations may signify internal power struggles within the CPC: “The central government’s choice of certain provinces as examples might be a way to target famous regions like Jiangsu and Zhejiang, the strongholds of Xi Jinping’s loyalists.” Li Qiang, former Secretary of the Jiangsu Provincial Party Committee and Governor of Zhejiang Province, had close ties with Xi Jinping, who himself served as the Secretary of the Zhejiang Provincial Party Committee.
“This could likely indicate challenges to Xi Jinping’s political position, showing signs of his diminishing power,” Wang He added.
Davy J. Wong, a Chinese-American economist, mentioned in an interview with the Epoch Times that this “self-exposure of shortcomings” is actually a form of selective blame-shifting.
He stated, “The falsification of statistical data is no longer just a technical issue but has become a political tool. The central government’s intention with this move is to shift some of the economic difficulties onto local governments, especially those regions with more economic autonomy.”
Wong noted that Jiangsu, known for its manufacturing and export industries, has been considered region with relatively strong fiscal autonomy. “Being named by the central government this time may signify impatience towards the region and possibly reveal signals of internal power struggles within the CPC.”
For years, the CPC’s system has led to fictional data becoming common practice. Each year, the central government sets economic growth targets of 5%, 6%, or even 7%, and when local governments cannot meet these targets, they may resort to falsification. Wang He explained that practices such as linking enterprise subsidies and tax revenues with fabricated output values make the statistics appear to meet the targets.
“If there’s no falsification, the central government’s indicators would become a joke, leading to a mutual understanding that statistical falsification becomes a systemic performance,” Wang He said.
This perspective resonates with Lai Rongwei, Executive Director of the Taiwan Initiative Association. He mentioned to Radio Free Asia that the CPC operates under high-pressure, forcing officials at all levels to “fabricate indicators” in order to secure their positions.
“Local officials undergo evaluations every two to three years, and if they fail to show achievements, they are unable to be promoted. So, they arrange for young people to participate in temporary activities or volunteer services to lower the unemployment rate, even though it doesn’t actually contribute to the economy,” Lai said.
Davy J. Wong believes that CPC statistical data is selective, tailored for external propaganda and internal management purposes. “When reporting to higher authorities, local governments often tend to beautify or modify the data.”
The proactive announcement of local statistical falsification issues by the National Bureau of Statistics may indicate a subsequent centralization of financial and statistical powers from local governments. Wong pointed out, “This is not just about data governance, but a tightening of political discourse by the central government over local regions.”
The CPC has long proposed reconstructing the statistical supervision system. Since the central government authorized the Statistics Bureau to conduct audits in 2018, policies such as “comprehensive inspections” (2021), “reviews” (2022), “special actions” (2023), and “the significance of inspections” (2024) have been successively implemented.
Wang He believes that these measures aim to strengthen statistical governance on the surface but are actually part of the CPC’s restructuring of its power system.
He noted that the selection of targets and methods of disclosure in each round of inspection and audit are politically calculated and unified under the Propaganda Department: “This is not about correcting false data but about political interests and the redistribution of power.” Choosing Jiangsu and Zhejiang, where many of Xi Jinping’s trusted aides originate, may also reflect challenges within Xi’s regime.
Although this disclosure operation may seem like part of an anticorruption reform on the surface, if it only stops at selective naming and media publicity, it will ultimately become just a political show.
Observers believe that as long as the CPC’s governing logic remains unchanged, targeting indicators and prioritizing data will continue to be essential assets in the political arena, making the next round of falsification only a matter of time.
Wang He concluded, “Without fundamental changes in the system, so-called statistical reforms and inspection systems are merely extensions of selective blame-shifting and power struggles.”