Outrage sparked by CCP military exercise in the Torres Strait

China’s influence in the Tasman Sea, to the southeast of Australia, is driven by its broader goals in the Pacific region, including expanding its influence, ensuring maritime route security, and showcasing its continuously improving naval capabilities.

The Tasman Sea, situated between Australia and New Zealand, saw two live-fire exercises conducted by the Chinese navy at the end of February. Both Australia and New Zealand expressed concerns not about the exercises themselves but about the lack of communication and advance notification, leading commercial airlines to have to make last-minute flight changes.

Military allies of the United States and its Indo-Pacific Command view China’s actions as part of a broader strategic effort to establish a more enduring military presence in the Pacific region and challenge existing strategic orders.

Usually deploying various naval vessels during these exercises, China includes Jiangkai-class (Type 054) frigates, Renhai-class (Type 055) cruisers, and Fuchi-class (Type 903) supply ships. These ships are equipped with advanced weapons and substantial firepower, including ballistic missiles. The Fuchi-class supply ships provide logistical support to the fleet, enabling Chinese naval vessels to operate for extended periods without needing to dock in ports. This is crucial as China lacks traditional friendly ports in the Tasman Sea and must rely on supply ships for refueling and logistical support.

These exercises can vary in duration from a few days to weeks. During this time, Chinese navy vessels engage in a range of activities, such as live-fire exercises, formation changes, and deploying floating targets. China uses these exercises to assess and test capabilities and demonstrate its ability to operate in locations far from its own shores. Conducting live-fire exercises with advanced naval vessels in the Tasman Sea with minimal prior notice has raised external accusations of intimidation.

The U.S. Department of Defense report emphasizes some shortcomings in China’s naval modernization and training. The report notes that China’s joint combat capabilities beyond the first island chain are still limited, with most overseas activities conducted by single services and not involving combat, possibly reflecting the necessity of recent exercises. In 2023, China deployed the Yushen-class (Type 075) amphibious assault ship on a long-distance deployment for the first time.

Additionally, from the perspective of China’s naval leadership, the challenges of decentralizing command are evident. The “Five Do Nots” slogan within the Chinese military highlights this issue, indicating that unit commanders should not analyze situations, understand superior intentions, make decisive battle judgments, deploy troops, or handle emergencies. These problems may reflect China’s comprehensive military reform, with the Navy Headquarters no longer commanding operational actions, as the Joint Theater Command is responsible for command, while the Navy focuses on organizing, personnel, training, and equipment of naval forces.

The report also points out that China’s navy has not yet demonstrated the advanced long-range logistical capabilities required to handle major overseas incidents. The Tasman Sea serves as a vital maritime passage for trade and transport between Australia and New Zealand. By bolstering its presence in the region, China can monitor and potentially control these strategic routes, enhancing its ability to influence regional trade and security dynamics.

The Chinese regime continues to strengthen and refine activities in the gray areas. One such measure is employing maritime militia (often referred to as “little blue men”) to uphold its territorial claims in the South China Sea. These civilian fishing vessels, supported by the Chinese regime, engage in activities such as harassing foreign ships, surveillance, and establishing a presence in disputed waters. This strategy allows the Chinese government to exert pressure without directly deploying the navy, thus avoiding escalation into an open conflict. The unannounced live-fire exercises in the Tasman Sea appear to reflect similar behavior and intentions.

The U.S. Department of Defense report concludes that since 2019, the Chinese navy has been adjusting in response to changing requirements for nearshore defense and far-sea escort missions, indicating a “acceleration of the transition from near-shore defense tasks to far-sea escort tasks.”

All these factors indicate that China’s interests in the Tasman Sea are driven by its broader strategic goals in the Pacific region, which include expanding its influence, ensuring maritime route security, and showcasing its naval capabilities.