On November 8th, the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs announced that Xi Jinping will embark on a nine-day visit to South America, where he will attend the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) leaders’ informal meeting and the G20 leaders’ summit. Xi has conducted extended overseas trips lasting nine days or more in the past, mainly during the early days of his tenure, such as his first visit to Russia and Africa from March 22 to 30, 2013, and his European tour from March 22 to April 2, 2014. However, such lengthy visits have not occurred in the past five years. With the Chinese Communist Party facing challenges both internally and externally, along with delicate internal struggles, Xi’s prolonged absence abroad at this time may have significant implications for the domestic situation.
On November 11th, independent commentator Cai Shenkun revealed on X platform that Miao Hua, a member of the Central Military Commission, Director of the Political Work Department of the Military Commission, and Vice Admiral of the Navy, was taken away by the Central Military Commission’s disciplinary committee. This indicates that the Xi loyalists controlling military propaganda and personnel decisions have been purged, leading to a significant impact on a group of senior officers promoted by Miao Hua, including the newly appointed Minister of Defense, Vice Admiral Dong Jun of the Navy.
Cai Shenkun stated that Miao Hua’s troubles signify a significant blow to Fujianese factions within the military that were favored by Xi.
Former Colonel Yao Cheng of the Chinese People’s Liberation Army Navy Command also stated on X platform on the 11th that the internal power struggle within the Chinese Communist Party Military Commission has escalated and become public, resulting in Miao Hua, a member of the Military Commission and Director of the Political Work Department, being taken away for investigation.
While these revelations have not been officially confirmed by the CCP, reports of high-ranking officials such as Rocket Force commander Li Yuchao facing troubles abroad since last year have eventually proven to be true. Cai Shenkun and Yao Cheng, now residing in the United States, maintain connections within the CCP system and often provide relatively accurate revelations.
According to the official website of the Chinese Ministry of National Defense, Miao Hua’s most recent recorded activity was on October 7th when he attended the 70th anniversary celebration of the Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps in Xinjiang as the Deputy Leader of the central delegation. Verification shows that on October 29th, a special seminar for provincial and ministerial-level officials was held at the Central Party School, where Miao Hua appeared on CCTV with a furrowed brow, indicating a tense situation.
There have been negative reports about Miao Hua earlier. In February this year, freelance writer Du Zheng published an article in “Shang Bao” stating that Miao Hua was a silent “huge tiger” within the military. As head of propaganda, he placed his people throughout the military, with all political commissars being his subordinates and informants. All promotions in the military required his approval before being reported to Xi. Officers needed to curry favor with Miao Hua. In terms of corruption, Miao Hua could be considered the “most corrupt” within the military.
At the age of 68, Miao Hua has a long-standing relationship with Xi Jinping from his service in the 31st Army of the Nanjing Military Region stationed in Fujian. In December 2014, he transferred from the Army to the Navy, moving from the Political Commissar of the Lanzhou Military Region to the Political Commissar of the Navy. In August 2017, he became the Director of the Political Work Department of the Central Military Commission and entered the Military Commission in October of the same year, overseeing personnel matters for the entire military.
The rumors surrounding Miao Hua’s current situation come at a time when internal conflicts within the CCP Military Commission are escalating and becoming public. It is said that there is discord between the Shaanxi faction led by Zhang Youxia, the first vice-chairman of the Military Commission, and the Fujian faction led by another Vice Chairman of the Military Commission, He Weidong. While neither He Weidong nor Miao Hua are from Fujian, both originated from the former 31st Group Army stationed in Fujian and are considered part of Xi’s loyalists from Fujian within the Xi family’s military structure.
Since the Third Plenum held in mid-July this year, a series of unusual events have emerged in the Chinese Communist Party’s political landscape, with rumors circulating that Xi’s power has been weakened, particularly in terms of military authority. The veteran military head Zhang Youxia is said to have the support of senior CCP elders, as he has been making frequent high-profile appearances.
In October, former Colonel Yao Cheng of the Chinese Communist Party Navy Command disclosed on X platform that there are indications of Zhang Youxia targeting the Navy for restructuring. It was rumored that former political commissar Qin Shengxiang and current political commissar Yuan Huazhi were under investigation, both of whom were promoted during Miao Hua’s tenure as the Political Commissar of the Chinese Communist Party Navy from 2014 to 2017 and both being close confidantes of Xi Jinping. Yao Cheng said that if there were issues with the Director of the Political Work Department of the Military Commission, Xi had essentially lost control of the military.
On July 9th, the Central Military Commission’s Deputy Head of the Political Work Department, He Hongjun, was promoted to the rank of General. He Hongjun had long served in the former General Political Department and continued to work in the Political Work Department of the Military Commission after the military reorganization. His promotion to General and concurrent appointment as the Deputy Head of the Political Work Department was seen as a move to consolidate power beneath Miao Hua, hinting at the likelihood of Miao Hua’s retirement or even potential downfall being prepared in advance. He Hongjun, a native of Yang County in Shaanxi Province, was believed to be associated with Zhang Youxia’s Shaanxi faction, raising questions about whether this appointment was orchestrated by Zhang Youxia.
In fact, individuals promoted by Xi Jinping have been continuously falling from grace or disappearing recently. For instance, Zhong Shaojun, Xi’s key aide, was promoted to head the General Office of the Military Commission but recent reports suggest he may be replaced and transferred to the position of Political Commissar of the National Defense University, though this news has yet to be confirmed. Furthermore, 61-year-old Lieutenant General Chen Guoqiang, a member of the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection and Deputy Secretary of the Military Commission Discipline Inspection, was transferred at the end of September to serve as the Political Commissar of the National University of Defense Technology, indicating a loss of real power. The whereabouts of his replacement, Fu Aiguo, a junior officer at the age of 60, remain unknown. These signs raise suspicions that a redistribution of power is happening among the high ranks of the military, and Zhang Youxia seems to be the one pulling the strings.
Looking back to Xi Jinping’s upcoming nine-day visit, could trouble brew at home while he is away?
During Xi’s visit to Vietnam in December last year, a confidential document forwarded by the Shaanxi Provincial Weinan City Public Security Bureau from the provincial public security department surfaced, outlining emergency preparedness measures during Xi Jinping’s visit titled “Notice Regarding the Implementation Plan of Emergency Duty and Situation Intelligence Operations for the Weinan City Public Security Bureau during General Secretary Xi Jinping’s Visit.” The document was distributed to public security bureaus, sub-bureaus of counties (cities, districts), and various departments within the city’s public security bureau.
The document, spanning 10 pages, emphasized the importance of ensuring high-level security and stability during Xi’s visit to Vietnam, with a focus on countering foreign hostile forces’ propaganda disruption and attacks by foreign media, disturbance by overseas dissidents, and domestic security risks, all aimed at ensuring “national political security and social stability” during Xi’s visit.
This precedent raises concerns that internal unrest could occur during Xi’s upcoming visit, including potential uprisings among the populace, internal dissent within the CCP, and rebellions within the military.
Just recently, Henan’s Zhengzhou witnessed a significant event where 200,000 people engaged in the “Night Ride Revolution” to Kaifeng, which has since spread to many parts of the country, with even the young people targeting Tiananmen Square in Beijing for their nocturnal rides. Authorities believe that hostile forces may be involved and are intensifying control measures.
With Xi’s close ally and Military Commission member Miao Hua facing rumors of trouble even before his departure, though unconfirmed, internal power struggles are intensifying, which at least foreshadows a ominous sign for Xi and the CCP regime. This situation may leave Xi uneasy during his trip to South America, similar to his state of confusion last August in South Africa when his entourage was unexpectedly blocked by venue security. Following his visit to South America, Xi may likely worry about a political upheaval in China, leaving him unable to return to Beijing.
The upheavals of history often come unexpectedly, and anything is possible!