Stanford University Professor Xu Chenggang, from the China Economic and Institutional Center, spoke at the “2024 Contemporary China Research International Conference” in Taipei on November 29th. He stated that the reasons behind the Chinese Communist Party’s “reform and opening up” over forty years ago, and the reasons for its backward trajectory in the past decade, are all aimed at saving the CCP’s authoritarian rule.
Xu Chenggang recently published a new book in Taiwan titled “Institutional Genes: The Origin of China’s Institutions and Authoritarianism.” At the “2024 Contemporary China Research International Conference” in Taipei, he delivered a speech on the topic of “Institutional Genes: The Institutional Basis of China’s Economic Reform and Backtracking,” drawing from his new book.
Born in 1950, Xu Chenggang experienced the “Cultural Revolution” and taught at Tsinghua University in Beijing for many years. As a firsthand observer within the CCP system, he has conducted extensive research on the Chinese Communist regime.
During his speech on November 29th, he pointed out that the main difference between the CCP’s “regionally managed authoritarian system” and the Soviet authoritarian system lies in the fact that while the Soviet Union was centrally planned, the CCP began decentralizing administrative and economic powers on a large scale to local governments as early as the Great Leap Forward in 1957 and the subsequent Cultural Revolution period. This decentralization brought significant development drive through competition among local governments and enhanced the adaptability of this authoritarian system.
He noted that during the period of “reform and opening up,” private enterprises in China exhibited “limited diversification” under the control of the Communist Party. However, the CCP has always maintained a high vigilance towards private property rights and foreign influences.
Xu Chenggang indicated that the CCP does not allow the development of institutional genes leaning towards democratic constitutionalism. Around 2005, it became aware that preventing “peaceful evolution” and “color revolutions” were more critical than economic development. He emphasized that the reforms launched to save the authoritarian regime eventually ended within the framework of sustaining authoritarianism.
In his speech, Xu Chenggang emphasized that the CCP has never relinquished its comprehensive control over society.
In an interview after the conference, Xu Chenggang mentioned that the current poor economic situation in China will not necessarily lead the CCP towards greater openness or providing more development space for private enterprises. While the methods employed by the CCP may change, its fundamental principles remain unchanged.
He cited Hong Kong as a concrete example, stating that under any Chinese leadership, such as during the 2019 anti-extradition protests, the CCP never compromises with the people of Hong Kong. This behavior is inherent in the nature of the CCP. The specific means may vary, but “direct repression is one method, making concessions at first and then using softer methods of suppression is another.”
Xu Chenggang believes that the CCP’s allowance of some space for private enterprises is aimed at saving the economy, which, in turn, aims to preserve the political power. However, the conflicting social changes brought by the CCP and private enterprises stem from the CCP’s nature. Unless there is a change in the nature of political power, such as reducing the power and shaking the position of the Communist Party, which the CCP cannot accept.
He stated that the Chinese Communist Party has never intended to develop private enterprises or abandon its basic ideological principles.
According to Xu Chenggang, the success of the CCP’s “regionally managed authoritarian system” in economic reform is contingent on a crucial premise that competition among regions must have only one goal, and anything outside that goal is ignored without leading to severe consequences. The sole target had been GDP growth rate, which allowed for rapid economic development in China under circumstances where the country was extremely poor and failure to reform could jeopardize CCP rule.
Xu Chenggang believes that since Xi Jinping came to power and aimed at complete social control, all levels of government need to assist him in achieving comprehensive social control. The central directives are no longer solely focused on economic growth, and many backward practices in the eyes of outsiders have emerged.