On November 17, the Zhuhai Airshow ended, with the focus still on the J-20, while the J-35 just made its debut. The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) is trying to narrow the gap with the US fifth-generation fighters. However, the US military already has at least 731 fifth-generation fighters in service, maintaining a significant air superiority and having other methods to counter the CCP’s J-20.
According to the Japanese Defense White Paper, in 2020, there were 22 J-20s in China, increasing to 24 in 2021, 50 in 2022, 140 in 2023, and reaching 200 in 2024, nearly a tenfold increase in four years. The CCP hopes to quickly deploy more J-20s to match the US F-22 and F-35.
Even though the J-35 has also been unveiled, it will be difficult for the CCP to surpass the US military in the quantity of fifth-generation fighters for some time. Despite positioning itself as the “world’s factory,” China does not have a real advantage in aircraft manufacturing. Key production equipment primarily relies on imports, and precision components including high-end chips are also mainly imported. The US and its allies’ control over cutting-edge technology and products will make it increasingly difficult for China to acquire the core components and equipment needed to produce the J-20 and J-35.
The lifespan of the J-20 is expected to be much shorter than that of the F-22 and F-35. The F-22 has been in service since 2005 with a lifespan of at least 8,000 hours. US pilots are required to fly 180 to 250 hours per year, meaning the first batch of F-22s can fly for at least 30 years until 2035 when the sixth-generation aircraft is expected to be introduced. The F-35 has a similar timeline, with F-35s produced in 2024 expected to serve until 2054.
Although the J-20 and J-35 have copied from the US military, due to differences in materials, internal structures, and processes, their lifespan may fall between 2,000 to 4,000 hours. For instance, the lifespan of the engines is believed to be only a quarter of that of US fighters.
Initially, the J-20 used domestic WS-10 engines, then switched to Russian engines, further upgraded to WS-10B, WS-10C engines, and in 2023, WS-15 engines. The J-35 initially used Russian-made engines similar to the Mig-29, then moved to reverse-engineered WS-13 engines, and might eventually transition to WS-19 engines. The continuous need for the latest engines for the J-20 and J-35 will result in limited lifespan.
The engine issue is just a glimpse; the overall lifespan of the J-20 determines a shorter service time, possibly retiring within 10 to 15 years, making it challenging for China to surpass the US militarily. Unless the Chinese Air Force intentionally reduces training time, similar to how imported Su-30s and Su-35s extended service life, the aircraft’s effectiveness might decrease, with lower pilot training levels.
The US military’s fifth-generation fighters are continuously upgraded, making it difficult for China to engage in technology theft again. China’s quantity and quality of fifth-generation fighters are challenging to match the US, and the sixth-generation aircraft may be on the horizon for China to steal from the US or other countries.
The production of the J-20 is limited to mainland China, while the US’s F-35 production involves collaboration throughout the alliance, which is beyond China’s reach. Fourth-generation fighters like the J-16 are not a match for fifth-generation fighters. China will have to continue to rely on the J-20 and J-35.
The Chinese Air Force is allocating J-20s to different theaters, with the Eastern theater receiving the most—4 brigades total, Northern and Southern theaters with 3 brigades each, Western and Central with 2 brigades each, totaling 14 brigades. The J-16 is also equipped with 14 brigades. With 200 J-20s distributed among 14 brigades, each brigade has an average of about 14-15 aircraft. Many aviation brigades only have a single squadron, with full strength still requiring additional time.
The J-20 must defend Beijing and Shanghai in the Yellow Sea and East China Sea, prepare for a Taiwan Strait conflict, and deal with countries in the South China Sea, India, and Southeast Asia. China is also imitating the US military’s dispersed deployment, fearing that clustering J-20s could be easily targeted by the US.
In order to confront the US in the first island chain airspace, China has deployed at least half of the J-20s near the coast, fully exposed to US strike capabilities. The US’s THAAD missile system is deployed in the Philippines, and possible future deployment in Japan, which can swiftly strike at the airports where J-20s in the Eastern, Southern, and Northern theaters are located. US Aegis ships and submarines can launch Tomahawk cruise missiles, bomber aircraft can launch AGM-158 missiles, and plans for thousands of drones are underway, covering Chinese coastal airfields.
If any J-20 is destroyed or the airport facilities damaged, China will be at a disadvantage in aerial combat in the nearby airspace. China’s imitation of the S-300 with HQ-9 air defense missiles may struggle to intercept US missiles effectively.
China’s rocket force plans to attack US bases in Japan, the Philippines, Palau, Guam, and Tinian, but the US’s Patriot missile interception capability has proven effective, making it challenging for China to conduct multiple saturation attacks at once.
The Japanese Defense White Paper reveals a decrease in China’s Dongfeng-21 series missiles, especially the Dongfeng-21D “aircraft carrier killer” is no longer seen. China mainly plans to use the Dongfeng-26 missile to strike multiple US bases and aircraft carrier fleets. From 2021 to 2023, the Dongfeng-26 missiles have been maintained at 110, increasing to 140 in 2024, but it is difficult to compensate for the significant reduction in Dongfeng-21 missiles. The rocket force’s false messages may have exposed the shortcomings of China’s medium-range missiles.
US forward-deployed fifth-generation fighters are continuously on the move, strategically adaptable to any airport, making it difficult for China to grasp their targets. In contrast, the deployment of the J-20 is more challenging for China.
Even if China’s J-20 manages to evade the first round of US missile attacks, it would need to return for refueling within a few hours and remains at risk of encountering strikes again. If coastal runways are damaged, J-20s will have to divert to inland airfields for landing, which adds complexity and increases the need for earlier returns.
After refueling at inland airfields, the J-20 might take off again, but the extended distance will reduce combat time. China’s limited aerial refueling capability may restrict the number of fighters that can be supported, possibly limiting their reach beyond the coastline. With constraints on inland runways and refueling, China’s aircraft’s actual combat efficiency could significantly decrease, possibly utilizing fewer than half of the 200 J-20s for maritime engagements.
With substantial support from numerous refueling aircraft, US fighters can maintain prolonged presence near the first island chain airspace. US fighters have significantly longer loiter times and higher operational efficiency, while Chinese fighters need continual long-distance round trips and rotations. If both sides deploy an equal number of fifth-generation fighters, the US may likely hold a 2:1 advantage in the air. With more fifth-generation fighters, the US’s advantage could even increase to 3:1 or higher.
China’s J-20 requires specialized ground teams for maintenance and servicing; failure to promptly transfer these teams to inland airfields could hinder the J-20’s operation, with China notably lacking professional personnel in this regard. The US’s B-2 bombers, future B-21 bombers, and ongoing airstrikes on China’s inland airfields will continue.
In the event of a conflict, China’s coastal airfields would face continuous strikes, forcing J-20s to relocate inland, thus reducing combat efficiency, similar to the J-16. The J-35’s shorter range would exacerbate the situation.
Despite copying from the US, the J-20 and J-35 still have significant performance gaps. Primarily in stealth capability, the J-20 may only achieve frontal stealth, potentially exposing vulnerabilities from other angles. The difference in on-board equipment may be more significant, allowing the F-22 and F-35 to detect the J-20 and J-35 earlier, with the ability to launch attacks first. The US has revealed encounters of the F-35 with the J-20 and airborne early warning aircraft from China; however, China has not indicated that the J-20 can detect the F-35.
The US’s AIM-260 air-to-air missile has a range of 200 kilometers, providing a longer beyond-visual-range attack capability compared to the J-20.
While China claims the PL-15 air-to-air missile has a range of 150 to over 200 kilometers, radar detection capabilities of Chinese fighters are estimated to be around 100 kilometers. The J-20 likely requires support from airborne early warning aircraft to detect targets earlier, but may lack the capability for long-range guided air-to-air missiles.
The recent demonstration of the US’s AIM-174 missile, with a range of up to 460 kilometers, will likely be used to target Chinese early warning aircraft and fighters like the J-20. Crucially, US fighters can relay missile guidance through the Link 16 data link, a capability that China likely lacks. This will be a decisive factor in future air combat.
Chinese pilots predominantly train in close-range dogfights, likely due to the absence of beyond-visual-range combat capability. However, with no guns equipped, the J-20 cannot engage in close-range combat effectively.
Most countries’ air forces primarily equip multi-role fighters. China’s previous imitation of the Russian Su-27 air superiority fighter with a significant number of J-11s is now considered outdated, with the Zhuhai Airshow even omitting the J-11. The Japanese Defense White Paper reveals that China’s Su-27/J-11 fighter totaled 349 in 2022, decreased to 329 in 2023, and 327 in 2024. China likely only has seven air force brigades still equipped with the J-11, far fewer than the J-20 or J-16 brigades.
China’s acquisitions of Su-30 and Su-35 fighters showed unsatisfactory performance during the Russia-Ukraine conflict. The rapid production acceleration of the imitated J-16 in 2020 with 60 aircraft increased to 150 in 2021, 172 in 2022, 262 in 2023, and 292 in 2024, showing slowed growth.
China’s position with the J-16 has continuously vacillated between hoping to replace the J-11 as a new air superiority fighter and seeking to enhance ground attack capabilities. However, the rapid development of the US’s fifth-generation fighters has made the gap apparent, forcing China to rely heavily on the J-20.
The F-22 is an air superiority fighter copied by China with the J-20 following a similar path. The US has followed up with the multi-role fighter F-35, leading China to develop the J-35. China understands that mass-producing the J-20 could trap them solely in air superiority fighters. While the J-35 is claimed to be a multi-role fighter, if it can only load air-to-air missiles in internal bays and struggle to equip air-to-ground weapons, it may not serve well as a multi-role fighter and lean towards an air superiority role.
The risk of a US homeland airstrike is minimal, with the F-22 mainly tasked with air dominance in enemy airspace to clear the way for airstrikes. With the widespread service of the multi-role F-35, including the B-2, B-1B, B-52 bombers, next-generation B-21 bomber, and ongoing service of F-15, F-16, and carrier-based F/A-18 aircraft, the US possesses a fully integrated series of air combat and strike aircraft.
It is believed that the cost of the J-20 exceeds 100 million USD; even if it reaches near US aircraft carriers or bases, it lacks the capability for airstrikes or strafing without cannons to engage ground targets. Despite having more J-20s, China’s airstrike capabilities remain deficient. Thus, the hope is that the J-35 can bridge the gap, which may still be unattainable for now. By solely investing heavily in air superiority fighters, China may inadvertently weaken itself in the arms race of fifth-generation fighters.
US methods to counter the Chinese J-20 and other fighters extend beyond winning in aerial combat and include more strikes on Chinese coastal airfields, making it difficult for the J-20 to operate effectively from the nearby seas. China is likely aware of its shortcomings but seems limited to continue relying on the J-20 and J-35 without other substantial options.
The Epoch Times Exclusive.