Exposure of CCP Shadow Fleet’s Sabotage of Submarine Cables Reveals Covert Hybrid Tactics.

On February 25, Taiwan Coast Guard confiscated the vessel “Hong Tai 58” for allegedly damaging Taiwan’s third undersea cable in the Taiwan Strait. The ship was registered in Togo, but all crew members were of Chinese nationality. The captain, surnamed Wang, denied the accusations of cable destruction in front of the Tainan District Court on February 27 and was detained pending trial. Another incident occurred in early January involving a Chinese-owned vessel flying both Cameroon and Tanzania flags, the “Shun Xing 39”, which was suspected of severing an undersea cable in the northeastern waters of Taiwan before fleeing the scene.

Researcher Mercedes Page recently published an article on the Australian Strategic Policy Institute’s (ASPI) website, detailing how the Chinese Communist Party has shifted its tactics regarding undersea cable disruptions. Instead of registering ships in China, more vessels are now operating under foreign flags, creating a shadow fleet similar to tactics seen in the Baltic Sea by Russia. North Korea and Iran also often utilize shadow fleets to bypass sanctions for trade or transport of illicit goods.

These vessels operate through intricate corporate structures involving shell companies registered in one country, management based in another, and the ships registered in yet another country. They employ deceptive tactics such as manipulating identification systems, disabling tracking systems, changing vessel names and flags, among others.

Since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, Moscow has heavily relied on a sizable shadow fleet not only for evading oil sanctions but also for conducting hybrid warfare against NATO, including suspected damage to European undersea cables and critical infrastructure. These incidents underscore the shadow fleets’ use as tools in hybrid warfare, with NATO continuously working to expose and counter Russia’s hybrid warfare efforts.

Taiwan has taken notice as well. In January, Taiwan blacklisted 52 Chinese vessels suspected of operating as part of shadow fleets, registered in countries including Cameroon, Tanzania, Mongolia, Togo, and Sierra Leone. Taiwan authorities publicly shared detailed evidence of vessel ownership, flags, and tracking system manipulation to prevent CCP’s denial tactics. Taiwan monitors vessels and conducts inspections, recently issuing a warning to a vessel flying the Russian flag that had been loitering near an undersea cable. Taiwan is cognizant of the increasing coordination between China and Russia in hybrid warfare operations, with Beijing’s main objective being to pressure Taiwan rather than conceal its intentions.

However, the incidents in the Taiwan Strait may not remain limited to that region. China’s shadow fleet tactics could expand into the Indo-Pacific region where Beijing has already deployed gray zone tactics, from intimidating ships in the South China Sea to targeted provocations in disputed territorial waters and investments in strategic infrastructure to exert influence over neighboring countries. Damaging undersea cable infrastructure is another coercion tactic employed by Beijing, operating in a gray zone of international law and accountability, while denying involvement.

From applying for patents for undersea cutting technology to unveiling a powerful new deep-sea cable cutting device, it is apparent that China is preparing to expand its undersea cable disruption operations. As Taiwan endeavors to protect its critical infrastructure, countries in the Indo-Pacific region must enhance regional cooperation and re-evaluate existing deterrence strategies.

If the events in the Baltic Sea and around Taiwan serve as indicators, disruptions in the Indo-Pacific region may not be a matter of “if” but “when.” The most effective way to counter Beijing’s shadow fleet actions is through public exposure. After all, a vessel flying a neighboring country’s flag but following Beijing’s orders to engage in nefarious actions should be publicly exposed and held accountable under the law.

Minna Alander from the Finnish Institute of International Affairs published an article on the Carnegie Foundation website, emphasizing that in light of the Ukraine conflict, Europe has initially focused on Russia. Russia has conducted underwater military exercises at depths exceeding 6,000 meters and collected information on NATO member states’ undersea infrastructure. In multiple instances, Russian vessels have been discovered sailing near areas where European undersea cables were damaged. Some officials attribute the recent Baltic Sea undersea cable ruptures to Russia.

Some U.S. and European officials have expressed concerns about undersea data cables constructed and operated by Huawei, citing network security and espionage risks. The United States has strongly urged European allies to avoid installing cables built by Chinese companies, though Europeans have not always aligned with this risk assessment, as evidenced by the commencement of operations of a 25,000-kilometer cable connecting Singapore and Marseille, France, via Pakistan and East Africa, operated by Huawei in December 2022. However, with China openly supporting Russia’s war efforts and Chinese-flagged vessels being involved in two Baltic Sea cable severance incidents, Europe is beginning to view China as a threat to European security, including threats to its undersea cables.

Following the 2023 incident involving the “New Arctic Bear” vessel, in October, NATO defense ministers signed a new “Digital Maritime Vision” initiative, and in February 2024, the European Commission issued its first set of recommendations on the security and resilience of undersea cable infrastructure, encouraging member states to conduct regular stress tests, share information, and enhance cable maintenance and repair capabilities.

In late October 2024, at a summit in Sweden for Nordic and Baltic leaders, Polish Prime Minister Tusk proposed the establishment of a joint naval patrol program among Baltic Sea countries to protect undersea infrastructure. This initiative would run parallel to existing Baltic Sea aerial patrol missions. However, these countries are well aware that any protective measures must be closely tied with deterrence – relying solely on military patrols cannot cover all undersea facilities.

Current international law has not adequately protected undersea cables from damage or held perpetrators accountable, prompting the EU to push for an update in geopolitical regulations. During this process, European governments should ensure legal and regulatory tools for protecting undersea cables are more consistent. Legislators should also consider increasing penalties for damaging undersea cables to deter destructive behaviors at their source.

Looking ahead, European countries must enhance information-sharing mechanisms and communication between public and private sectors to better understand undersea vulnerabilities. They should invest in new technologies for protecting undersea infrastructure and cable repair capabilities to enhance cable security. They should strategically allocate resources to support European leadership in undersea cables. Lastly, they should engage in innovative initiatives with partner countries to ensure data security flowing through their cables and deepen global partnerships with countries lacking cable repair capabilities.