The Chinese Communist Party conducted a military exercise around Taiwan on the 14th and announced the end of the “Joint Sword-2024B” exercise in the evening. Experts analyzed that the deployment of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) had three major characteristics, and pointed out that the Taiwanese military was prepared and provided recommendations for future responses to PLA exercises. Scholars suggested that the top priority for the Taiwanese military should be to break through the eastern blockade, in order to open up subsequent combat capabilities for both the Taiwanese and U.S. militaries.
Former instructor of the Republic of China Marine Corps Amphibious Reconnaissance Unit, Peng Jieshen, reassured the public that the main purpose of the recent PLA military exercise around Taiwan was to intimidate the people of Taiwan. He emphasized that the PLA would not launch a war in the Taiwan Strait with great fanfare. At the same time, he highlighted that the Taiwanese military was fully prepared for any contingency. The U.S. State Department expressed concerns on the 9th that Beijing was using routine annual celebrations as a pretext for provocation and coercion to disrupt peace and stability in the region.
Peng pointed out that the PLA’s surrounding Taiwan military exercise had three main characteristics in terms of deployment. First, the PLA deployed forces in the northern sea and airspace of Taiwan as a feint attack. Secondly, they established superior air power in central Taiwan to prevent Taiwanese aircraft from entering and attempted to gain air superiority. Lastly, the main battlefield for the PLA was in the southwest in the waters around Kaohsiung and the Bashi Strait to Taiwan’s east, aiming to achieve comprehensive control in the region, including deterring U.S. intervention.
In analyzing the deployment of PLA forces during the “Joint Sword-2024B” exercise around Taiwan, Peng highlighted three main points. Firstly, the PLA’s deployment in the northern sea and airspace of Taiwan was relatively weak, indicating a feigned or containment deployment. Secondly, in central Taiwan, the PLA aimed to achieve air superiority. Lastly, the PLA focused on achieving comprehensive control in the southwest near Kaohsiung and the Bashi Strait to the east of Taiwan.
Peng suggested that the Taiwanese Navy should refine their tactics, considering the challenging nature of engaging the PLA’s navy in single ship combat. He proposed a strategy of deploying the Gearing-class destroyers effectively against the PLA’s naval forces in Kaohsiung and the Liaoning aircraft carrier battle group in the Bashi Strait.
Moreover, he emphasized the importance of the Gearing-class destroyers in managing the battlefield and taking over command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillence, and reconnaissance (C4ISR) missions. The Gearing-class destroyers would play a crucial role in establishing battlefield management tasks in Taiwan’s waters in the event of disruptions at the Taiwanese Joint Operations Command Center.
Lastly, Peng noted that the PLA’s military exercises around Taiwan presented a rare opportunity for the Taiwanese military to conduct realistic combat training. He stressed the importance of enhancing the navy’s defense capabilities against the PLA’s potentially gray zone operations, such as reinforcing the hull strength of retired Knox-class frigates for collision prevention.
In addition, he suggested learning from the effective use of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) in conflicts like the Russia-Ukraine war, urging the Taiwanese military to quickly equip tanks with roof fences to defend against UAV attacks and improve countermeasures against drones for various combat units.
Taiwanese legislator Chen Guanting commented that while the Chinese Communist Party’s military actions posed pressure on Taiwan, they also provided an opportunity for Taiwan to develop countermeasures and strengthen military-civilian cooperation. He pointed out that such actions by the CCP would strengthen cooperation among the U.S., Japan, South Korea, the Philippines, forming a similar “Pacific Security Partnership,” increasing the frequency of joint maritime exercises in the future.
Assistant researcher Gao Zhirong at the think tank of the Ministry of National Defense of the Republic of China provided immediate analysis on the official website of the National Defense Institute. He highlighted that compared to the previous “Joint Sword-2024A” exercise on May 23 and 24, the current PLA training areas did not extend further west past Pingtung and Penghu, but slightly shifted closer to Taiwan in the northern and central Taiwan Strait, impacting international air and sea routes from north to south.
Gao analyzed that the six PLA exercise areas near Taiwan, not only aimed at sealing off critical areas of Taiwan in wartime, but also potentially prepared for “anti-access/area denial” operations against U.S. forces in the Western Pacific. He mentioned specific military strategies involving tactical ballistic missiles targeting Taiwanese air bases, along with the deployment of cruise missiles and electronic warfare aircraft to neutralize Taiwanese defenses.
Regarding potential wartime scenarios in the Taiwan Strait, Gao suggested that while the PLA can plan and execute blockade operations effectively, they must also consider the risk of foreign intervention. He underscored the importance of Taiwanese forces responding appropriately to maintain combat effectiveness and to break through the blockade in the east, allowing for subsequent military operations involving both the Taiwanese and U.S. military forces.