On September, China launched an intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) into the South Pacific, marking the first time in 44 years that the Chinese Communist regime has test-fired an ICBM in the region. Experts believe the launch served the dual purpose of evaluating missile capabilities and sending a political message, drawing attention from neighboring countries in the region.
In the context of heightened tensions in the Western Pacific, particularly in the South China Sea, this rare test launch indeed carried significant political implications. Experts suggest that it was also carried out to assess the capabilities of the People’s Liberation Army Rocket Force (PLARF).
Analysts believe that the missile, likely carrying a training mock warhead, could be China’s latest intercontinental ballistic missile Dongfeng-41 (DF-41) or the older Dongfeng-31AG (DF-31AG).
The DF-41 is China’s longest-range intercontinental ballistic missile, with a range of 12,000 to 15,000 kilometers (7,500 to 9,500 miles). The DF-31AG has a shorter range of 7,000 to 11,700 kilometers (4,300 to 7,300 miles).
The missile was launched on September 25 from a secret location, believed to be in northern Hainan Island in the South China Sea. It traveled approximately 12,000 kilometers (7,456 miles) and landed near French Polynesia, including Tahiti.
Beijing described the launch as a “routine arrangement” by the PLARF. Other countries with long-range missiles, such as the US, Russia, and India, regularly conduct such tests.
However, since 1980, the Chinese military has never launched long-range missiles into the Pacific region. In recent years, China has mostly tested missiles inland, primarily in remote deserts in the northwest.
Denny Roy, a senior researcher at the East-West Center based in Honolulu, suggested that the change in launch location could be purely technical. He mentioned that Chinese engineers may have considered the need to test-fly a long and relatively flat missile, similar to how they would be used in combat, rather than the usual elevated trajectory missile to keep it within Chinese territory or close to its borders.
Nevertheless, there could still be several possible political messages being conveyed alongside the technical necessity. Reuter’s sea tracking data showed that two of China’s most advanced missile tracking vessels, Yuanwang 3 and Yuanwang 5, were sailing in the Pacific at the time of the launch.
Despite not disclosing the launch site, Beijing stated that the missile “accurately landed in the designated area.”
Dr. Shu Xiaohuang, a deputy researcher at the Taiwan Institute for Defense and Security Studies, highlighted the importance of pre-planned transportation routes due to the heavy weight of missile carriers. Understanding the conditions of surrounding roads is part of the training for mobile missile units.
Both the DF-31AG and DF-41 are road-mobile intercontinental ballistic missiles, offering more flexibility and difficulty in detection and targeting compared to silo-based platforms. However, logistical planning is essential to address issues like road conditions and communication for these systems.
The PLARF, China’s rocket force, evolved from the Second Artillery Corps, responsible for land-based nuclear and conventional missiles. A report by the US Army mentioned that the PLA has modernized its rocket force over the last 15 years, expanding its role to align with China’s evolving deterrence strategy.
The US Army’s report underlined the necessity for military planners in the Asia-Pacific region to comprehend this unique force, considering its threat to neighboring countries, particularly Taiwan, and its impact on local, regional, and global military operations.
The missile test in September coincided with a series of corruption scandals raising doubts about the PLARF’s capabilities and escalating tensions between Beijing and neighboring countries in the region. Analysts noted the timing of the test before elections in the US and Japan could also hold significance.
In addition to technical requirements, analysts suggested that China’s test-launch of an ICBM in the Pacific could also convey political messages internally and externally. It could serve to deter US intervention in conflicts in the Indo-Pacific region, among other intents.
Dr. Shu commented that Beijing sent a clear message to its adversaries: “My missile’s operational capability is sufficient to pose a threat to you.” This message was primarily directed at the US and other neighboring countries, with a major focus on the US.
Following a series of conflicts involving Chinese and Philippine coast guard ships and aircraft in the South China Sea and its airspace, the US reaffirmed its commitment to the US-Philippines Mutual Defense Treaty.
As part of an annual military exercise, in April, the US Army deployed the medium-range Typhoon missile system in northern Philippines, sparking multiple protests from the Chinese regime.
While the US has traditionally pursued a policy of strategic ambiguity, President Biden signed off on military assistance to Taiwan beyond regular arms sales. He has repeatedly stated that the US military will defend Taiwan in the event of a Chinese invasion, yet US officials tried to downplay the President’s comments each time.
In July, as a protest against US arms sales to Taiwan, Beijing rejected Washington’s calls for further nuclear arms control talks.
Analysts pointed out several potential political messages that Beijing may have been trying to convey through the test launch in the Pacific, such as reiterating the effectiveness of its strategic missile force and signaling dissatisfaction with the US deployment of the Typhoon missile system in the Philippines.
Military expert and associate professor at the National Taiwan University’s Department of Political Science, Shihmin Chen, suggested that Chinese leader Xi Jinping might be emulating Russian President Putin’s “nuclear blackmail” strategy.
Putin threatened nuclear escalation to prevent the West from allowing Ukraine to launch Western-acquired long-range missiles against Russia.
Professor Chen noted that China’s nuclear threats could be aimed at casting doubts among US allies on America’s role as a “nuclear umbrella,” which provides protection to non-nuclear allies in the event of a nuclear attack.
He mentioned, “Whether America’s allies… truly believe that America is willing to sacrifice Los Angeles to save Tokyo, Australia, or our Taipei? Perhaps China wants to make these countries ponder over this question through such means and then weaken the credibility of these countries’ security commitments under the US nuclear umbrella.”
The erosion of trust could potentially prompt more countries to develop their own nuclear weapons.
While Beijing upholds a “no first use” policy regarding nuclear weapons and urges other nuclear powers to make similar commitments, analysts remain skeptical about whether the Chinese regime would adhere to their policy in wartime scenarios.
Regarding concerns that Beijing might threaten to use nuclear weapons in potential conflicts in the Indo-Pacific region, Dr. Shu noted that the US also possesses such capabilities. In situations where both sides resort to tactical nuclear weapons to deter each other, a “balance of terror” could ensue.
Currently, China’s active nuclear warhead count is significantly less compared to Russia (approximately 4,380 warheads) or the US (about 3,708 warheads).
However, the Chinese regime is rapidly expanding its nuclear arsenal.
In a report by the US Department of Defense in 2020, it was estimated that China’s nuclear arsenal would increase by around 200 warheads by 2025.
By May 2023, the US Department of Defense estimated that China already possessed over 500 warheads. The Pentagon predicted that by 2030, China’s warhead count would double, with many of these warheads being “deployed at higher alert levels.”
According to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute’s annual arms report released in June, by 2030, China could potentially have a number of intercontinental ballistic missiles comparable to Russia or the US.
Additionally, based on the US Department of Defense’s 2023 report, the deployment of the medium-range ballistic missile DF-17 equipped with the Dongfeng ZF hypersonic glide vehicle is expected to “further change the missile force of the PLA.”
However, the PLARF heavily relies on its fleet of 231 Xi’an H-6 bombers. Despite constant improvements and upgrades, such as being capable of carrying hypersonic anti-ship missiles, they remain aircraft from the Soviet era. Analysts believe that China’s dependence on outdated aircraft signals that China still has a long way to go to achieve a credible triad of nuclear forces.
Vipin Narang, who served as the Acting Assistant Secretary of Defense for Space Policy at the US Department of Defense until August, stated in a speech at the Center for Strategic and International Studies that the US President issued the latest nuclear weapon usage guidance due to “unprecedented” circumstances, with multiple nuclear challengers rapidly upgrading and expanding their nuclear arsenals, openly threatening the use of nuclear weapons to achieve their goals.