“Charlotte’s Web: China Turns Gray Operations Red by Cutting Undersea Cables”

For some time, undersea cables in the Baltic Sea, along the coast of Norway, and around Taiwan have been occasionally damaged. People have begun to view the “Grey Zone Operations” suspected of intentionally cutting important undersea communication cables worldwide as targeted attacks. This indicates that the Chinese Communist Party’s so-called “Grey Zone Operations” are evolving towards a broader range, more diverse methods, and closer to the dangerous direction of actual combat conflict.

Worryingly, during these incidents, both Chinese and Russian ships have been seen shuttling back and forth at the times and locations of these accidents, making them prime suspects and raising questions about whether these events are deliberate sabotage. While the Chinese side has always claimed these events were accidental, evidence shows that China is developing technology specifically designed to damage undersea cables.

In early January, two underwater cables connecting Taiwan’s Matsu Islands, just 10 nautical miles off the Chinese coast, were severed. A similar incident occurred in February 2023 when two Chinese commercial ships cut two cables connecting these islands to other parts of Taiwan. The recent cutting of an undersea cable outside Keelung Port in Taiwan has raised concerns about China’s attempts to disrupt Taiwan’s telecommunications. One of Taiwan’s major telecom operators, Chunghwa Telecom, notified the Taiwan Coast Guard on January 3 at 12:40 pm that the cable had been severed. Due to the activation of backup systems, services were not affected after the cable was cut.

This sabotage incident is highly suspicious. The Chinese cargo ship “Shunxin 39,” flying the flag of Cameroon, is suspected of anchoring in an unusual cross pattern, seemingly designed specifically to cut the cable. The ship is owned by the Hong Kong Jieyang Trading Company, whose director, Guo Wenjie, is from Guangdong, China, and the ship has 7 Chinese crew members. The vessel is equipped with two Automatic Identification Systems (AIS), which is unusual for a single ship. The AIS equipment identifying the ship as “Shunxin 39” was turned off after the incident. The other operating AIS indicated that the vessel’s true identity was the “Xingshun 39,” flying the flag of Tanzania. The symmetrical naming of “Shunxin” and “Xingshun” suggests a highly suspicious dual identity for this ship.

In maritime law enforcement against illegal activities, ships with unknown identities or AIS turned off are often closely monitored, as these ships may engage in illegal, unreported, and unregulated fishing activities and may also be involved in other forms of illegal activities, such as human trafficking or illegal transshipment.

Taiwanese media investigations revealed that the ship under the name “Shunxin 39” had been appearing in Taiwan’s territorial waters for over three months, including before and after the undersea cable was cut, frequently turning off its AIS system.

Since the cable was cut, the Taiwanese government and civil defense organizations have consistently referred to this incident as part of China’s Grey Zone Operations. However, Taiwan is concerned that China may attempt to assist in launching attacks on Taiwan by cutting undersea cables and disrupting communications.

Furthermore, an undersea telecommunications cable connecting Finland and Germany across the Baltic Sea was also severed. On November 18, 2024, Finnish telecommunications service provider Cinia reported that the C-Lion1 undersea cable was detected with a “fault” and had been taken out of service. Cinia CEO Ari-Jussi Knaapila stated that it was the first time the cable had experienced a fault. He believed that the cable would not break without external impact and ruled out the possibility of an earthquake causing such damage.

The 728-mile C-Lion1 undersea cable, laid in 2016, runs from Hanko and Helsinki in southern Finland to Rostock in northern Germany, connecting the Central European telecommunications network to Finland and other Nordic countries. The location where the cable broke was in the southeastern waters of the Åland Islands within Sweden’s exclusive economic zone, outside a busy shipping lane.

In a joint statement, Finland and Germany expressed immediate suspicion of intentional sabotage in such incidents, highlighting the turbulence of our times. They announced a thorough investigation, stressing the importance of protecting critical infrastructure for global security and societal resilience.

Former Secretary of the Russian Security Council, Nikolai Patrushev, accused the United States and the United Kingdom of attempting to sabotage underwater cables “to promote their economic interests.” He claimed that the US and UK were behind the attacks on the Nord Stream 1 and Nord Stream 2 gas pipelines in September 2022.

Katja Bego, an International Security Program researcher at the Royal United Services Institute in the UK, stated on the social media platform Bluesky that cable faults in busy maritime zones like the Baltic Sea are not uncommon, with the majority of faults being accidental. Regarding Patrushev’s remarks, she viewed them as Kremlin’s typical tactics, interpreting them as a warning that Russia plans to engage in such actions.

Reports also surfaced that a Russian spy ship, the “Yantar,” traversed Ireland’s economic waters where undersea pipelines and cables are located, and left the area under NATO ship surveillance.

While Russian ships are suspected of carrying out destructive activities, Chinese ships have been more brazen. In 2020, an engineering team from Lishui University in Zhejiang Province developed a “Towed Undersea Cable Cutting Device.” The brief description stated, “With the development of technology, the number of undersea and communication cables worldwide has increased, and it may be necessary to cut these cables in some emergency situations.” Can these so-called “emergency situations” be understood as potential hostile actions?

The group described in the patent application that the device was needed to destroy illegal cables outside of China. The patent application stated that the success of the cut could be determined by the presence of copper residues on the “cutting anchor,” as copper is the preferred conductor material for undersea cables.

For reasons unknown, this patent application did not pass. However, a Norwegian undersea cable expert, who requested anonymity due to sensitive circumstances, stated that the rhetoric of needing to dismantle so-called illegal cables mentioned in the application was absurd, as the method was random and could also lead to damage to useful cables. This implies that the reasons for using such dismantling equipment likely extend beyond commercial activities to other purposes.

Norwegian experts noted that such incidents are not new, as Russian ships have long been suspected of using modified anchors to damage underwater infrastructure. Multiple Chinese ships, including the “Xingshun 39,” “Xinxin Polar Bear,” and “Yipeng 3,” have been observed appearing at the times and locations of undersea cable damage incidents. The Chinese government claimed that the damage to the Baltic Sea cable by the “Xinxin Polar Bear” in 2023 was an accidental incident caused by the anchor.

Benjamin L. Schmitt, a senior researcher at the Kleinman Energy Research Center at the University of Pennsylvania, stated that China (the CCP) certainly has the technical ability and motivation to conduct such hybrid threat actions, abruptly using a supposedly commercial vessel to damage underwater infrastructure around Taiwan. He remarked, “After all, this is a trend we have continuously seen in European waters.”

Schmitt said, “China (the CCP) has developed mechanical systems such as ‘Ocean Towed Cutting Devices’ and ‘Towed Undersea Cable Cutting Devices and their cutting methods.’ This indicates that Beijing has a variety of technological choices in its arsenal to pose a war threat to global undersea energy and telecommunications infrastructure.” He emphasized the need for global democratic countries to respond decisively to prevent Russia and China (the CCP) from attempting to destroy key Western underwater infrastructure in the future, actions aimed at undermining democratic resilience. He recommended that NATO establish a consultation mechanism and strengthen maritime and satellite monitoring, as failure to act would only encourage Moscow and Beijing to continue these destructive actions worldwide, jeopardizing global security.

Gregory Falco, the Assistant Professor of Systems Engineering Projects at the Sibley School of Mechanical and Aerospace Engineering at Cornell University, described this as an urgent issue. He viewed it as a clear example of China’s ongoing refinement of dual-use military-civilian technologies over the years. Falco stated that while the technology was commercially effective, as it could be used to dismantle old cables when divers or remotely operated underwater vehicles are not viable, it is apparent that it will be used for other purposes.

On January 24, the private think tank “Institute for National Basic Research” in Japan released an analysis of the recent series of undersea communication cable ruptures in the Baltic Sea and around Taiwan. They suggested that such actions may be to assess the response capabilities and impacts of other countries and urged the Japanese government to develop specific protective measures.

Former Commander of the Japan Ground Self-Defense Forces, Kazuake Kadota, stated that the Self-Defense Forces would mobilize in emergency situations. However, the disconnection of European undersea cables falls into a gray area and not an emergency. He called for stronger responses and increased security measures to safeguard undersea cables.

The actions of China and Russia in damaging undersea cables have already had practical effects, leading experts to suspect that such actual destructive activities under the cover of the grey zone may be gradually evolving toward real combat. These specialized ships, disguised in civilian roles, are equipped with dedicated “weapon systems” specifically designed to sabotage sensitive civilian or military communication facilities. These actions are akin to armed attacks in a state of war, with China turning the “Grey Zone Operations” into a dangerous “Red Zone.”