In Ukraine’s war against Russian invasion, besides relying on military assistance from the United States and the West, Ukraine has also made efforts to build its own weapons system and strategies that have proven to be effective in combat. Ukraine’s experience of achieving big results with limited resources and defeating a stronger opponent could serve as a valuable lesson for Taiwan, which faces potential invasion risks from China.
Last December, the Center for Naval Analyses (CNA), a think tank of the US Navy, released a report discussing the lessons that Taiwan’s government and defense officials should learn from the Russian invasion of Ukraine.
Taiwan shares historical similarities with Ukraine in terms of potential invasion threats, and the methods used by potential aggressors and the costs involved also bear similarities to Russia. China could potentially target Taiwan’s infrastructure with missiles and airstrikes to neutralize Taiwan’s ability to resist, similar to Russia’s actions in Ukraine. However, for China to occupy the entire island of Taiwan, it would incur significant casualties and equipment losses. The speed and scale of China’s warfighting capabilities could exceed the losses Russia incurred in Ukraine.
The primary goal of Taiwan’s military is to defend the island from Chinese occupation, not to inflict losses on the Chinese military. Based on the analysis from the Center for Naval Analyses, Taiwan has the opportunity to achieve this goal by drawing on the experiences of the Ukrainian war. The CNA report summarized at least five key lessons that Taiwan could learn from the conflict in Ukraine, including the role of unmanned aerial systems in warfare, optimizing force structures, the importance of personnel in comprehensive defense strategies, maintaining smooth communication networks, and addressing cognitive warfare issues.
The report from CNA emphasized the role of unmanned autonomous systems highlighted during the Russia-Ukraine conflict, stressing the necessity of satellite communication links. Taiwan has been implementing various reforms aiming to build a reliable deterrent and combat force. By learning from the experiences of the Russia-Ukraine conflict, Taiwan’s military has undergone restructuring. These changes include extending the service period of conscripts and modifying military training schedules.
In the war between Ukraine and Russia, there was the unprecedented widespread use of unmanned systems, attracting global attention. One noteworthy theme among the unprecedented experiences of this conflict was the efficacy of relatively low-cost unmanned aerial systems in combat against tanks and other expensive conventional weapons. Despite intensifying the conflict for both sides, Ukraine, as the weaker mobilization-capable party, seemed to have more opportunities in the field of unmanned systems compared to Russia, indicating a greater emphasis on their development and deployment.
Taiwan’s efforts in developing unmanned systems reflect the government’s flexibility, acute insights from the Russia-Ukraine conflict, and the ability to assimilate lessons from the Ukrainian battlefield. Taiwan has established a drone unit and increased investment in innovative unmanned system development, aiming to build a chain of unmanned “lethality.” The goal is to construct thousands of unmanned aerial systems of five major categories by 2028.
However, the Ukrainian military has 20,000 drone operators, procured 100,000 drones as early as 2023, and planned to manufacture 1 million drones in 2024. This suggests that Taiwan needs a significantly increased procurement of unmanned systems to meet wartime demands.
Kevin Pollpeter, a researcher at CNA, mentioned in a speech that unmanned systems could maintain Taiwan’s defensive capabilities following an initial attack. In the event of an initial attack by China, Taiwan might need to rely on unmanned systems, ranging from small quadcopters to larger drones like the MQ-9, as they would have to close down airbases and may be unable to launch F-16s and Mirage fighters. Taiwan is also considering combat using small quadcopters, unmanned surface vessels, underwater drones to counter China’s amphibious landing forces, and ground-based unmanned systems that are particularly useful in urban warfare.
Moreover, Russia employed cognitive warfare during the conflict, using disinformation to influence operational actions. While Taiwan has not neglected the impact of false information and propaganda on warfare and has established a fact-checking center, its psychological warfare strategies still need improvement. The country requires more network equipment and infrastructure to monitor the spread of harmful information effectively and respond promptly. Pollpeter noted that Taiwan faces potential threats that are more complex, severe, and challenging to address.
The conflict between Russia and Ukraine highlighted the significance of satellite communication networks on the modern battlefield. CNA’s report revealed that Taiwan’s communication links rely on 14 submarine cables, making communication vulnerable to disruption by China. Reports indicate that from 2017 to 2023, submarine cables to Taiwan were severed 30 times. The latest incidents were attributed to Chinese ships, although China claimed they were accidental.
Since 2023, Taiwan has taken measures to mitigate the impact of submarine cable disruptions. The Ministry of Digital Affairs has partnered with local and European companies to establish low Earth orbit satellite communication services. The National Space Organization of Taiwan suggested the need for 120 satellites to achieve communication system redundancy and pledged to procure more ground satellite communication terminals. However, Taiwan’s terminal quantity is significantly lower than Ukraine’s. While Taiwan may not require as many terminals as Ukraine, the threat from China may prompt Taiwan to consider a more reliable and extensive communication network.
Both Russia and Ukraine implemented extensive conscription policies to maintain combat effectiveness. In 2022, Taiwan extended the service period from four months to one year under the current conscription policy. This change aims to expand the army’s size and enhance the quality of personnel but has also raised concerns about training and equipment shortages. Pollpeter highlighted that full-time soldiers serving four years would engage with China’s forces on beaches, while conscripts serving one year would be stationed in cities, both needing to operate modern weapon systems, including various anti-tank, anti-ship, and anti-air missiles, and requiring adequate coaching and training equipment.
April Herlevi, a researcher at CNA, stressed that the future holds uncertainties, and allies must await Taiwan’s conclusions on its needs in many aspects. She believes that apart from discussing solutions with allies, Taiwan should carry out its own research. Taiwan will not simply assume that others have the correct answers.
The best defense is a strong offense. After three years of war, Ukraine demonstrated its ability to take the fight to Russia’s territory. While Taiwan is significantly smaller than Ukraine, the experiences and lessons from Ukraine remain relevant for Taiwan. If China were to invade Taiwan, none of China’s coastal cities would be safe.