The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) continues to promote the inspection of villages while normalizing its “anti-corruption and anti-evil” campaign. Experts believe that the CCP’s grassroots political power is unstable. If the control is too tight and officials become passive, leading to a vacuum in governance, the CCP’s regime could collapse unexpectedly.
On November 20th, Li Xi, head of the Central Inspection Work Leadership Group, spoke at a symposium on advancing the inspection work in villages, emphasizing the need to “deepen the inspection work in villages” to “consolidate the party’s governing foundation” and to “elevate political standing.”
Beijing Youth Daily’s WeChat public account “Political Insights” stated that currently, the inspection of villages is a key focus of the deepening and expanding inspection work.
In February of this year, the CCP Central Committee issued the revised “Regulations on Communist Party Inspection Work in China.” The regulations stipulate that municipal and county party committees establish inspection systems, set up inspection institutions, and for the first time, include village (community) party organizations in the scope of county (city, district, banner) party committee inspections.
According to Yue Shan, a current affairs commentator, this marks the first time that the CCP central authorities have conducted inspections of grassroots village-level political powers. The official explanation is to “extend municipal and county inspections to the grassroots level,” but in reality, it is still one level inspecting another. Under the supervision of the central government in Beijing, county-level party committees are now tasked with inspecting village-level entities.
Yue Shan believes, firstly, this illustrates the CCP’s concern over the instability of grassroots political power. In fact, the CCP’s official data released earlier this year on anti-corruption activities from January to September reported that the number of ongoing or former village party branch secretaries and village committee directors facing investigation was 77,000, exceeding the total for similar cases in the previous year (61,000). This indicates that the central leadership is aware of the severe corruption at the grassroots levels, rendering the top echelons ineffective, hence the urgent need for bottom-up rectification.
Secondly, the central government can only rely on local officials to conduct inspections. Due to the bureaucratic and widespread corruption within the entire CCP system, village officials often have limited powerful connections, mostly at the county level at best. Hence, even with central directives, the local level may still manipulate the situation, cover up for each other, or manufacture false accusations, effectively making the central government’s supervision ineffective, thereby just going through the motions.
According to “Political Insights,” China has approximately 500,000 administrative villages, with over 600 million farmers residing in towns and villages, facing numerous pressing issues that harm public sentiment, infringe on people’s rights, and provoke public outrage.
A system insider, using the pseudonym Gao Ju, told the media that corruption cases in rural areas mainly target village officials involved in illicit and criminal activities such as unauthorized land transfers and illegal mineral rights ownership. The top leaders in villages, including the village chiefs and secretaries, are often extremely wealthy. Many reports on corruption cases against officials mention involvement in underworld activities, acting as protectors, and engaging in illicit or criminal behavior, indicating a drive towards weeding out illegal activities.
Gao Ju highlighted that lack of finances is a significant issue, with many entities borrowing money to pay salaries. The long-term anti-corruption efforts aim to dismantle illicit networks with labels of organized crime or protection rackets, leading to the seizure of assets of all individuals involved in such cases. Therefore, within the criminal world, there is no profit in preying on each other as everything could be confiscated.
She mentioned a case in a province where a former city committee secretary was labeled as belonging to an organized crime group despite lacking evidence, resulting in public denouncements of his misdeeds in newspapers. His daughter, son, and all relatives were detained, including his son-in-law involved in real estate, with the likelihood of their assets being seized.
Many business owners also fall under the category of being “involved in illicit activities.” For instance, an individual involved in illicit activities previously owned coal mines that were consequently confiscated by the state.
In 2018, the CCP launched a three-year special campaign to combat organized crime and rid the system of corruption. In June of the same year, the National Leading Group Office for Special Campaign Against Organized Crime and Elimination of Evil was established.
Public data indicates that by the end of November 2020, nationwide efforts had dismantled 1,289 criminal organizations in rural areas, including 4,095 criminal groups, and severely punished 3,727 “village bullies.” Investigations uncovered and dealt with 42,700 village officials who had undergone criminal penalties and were involved in activities related to “village bullying” or organized crime. Strategies were implemented to manage and oversee 887 enterprises involved in such cases.
Subsequently, anti-corruption campaigns have become an institutionalized practice across regions. For example, on November 20th, the Dahadra Police Station in Inner Mongolia issued a notice to carry out a special operation to crack down on and combat illegal activities of “village bullies,” family clans, and rural criminal elements within the jurisdiction until the year’s end.
Gao Ju expressed concerns over the overcrowded prisons and the frantic arrests by the discipline inspection commission. Currently, officials faced with any issues, such as accidents, are held accountable, prosecuted, and dismissed from their positions, especially targeting those nearing retirement. Penalties include asset confiscation and fines, resulting in the loss of pensions, medical insurance, and all assets. She revealed that the discipline inspection commission wields enormous power, making it easy to destroy individuals. Refusal to confess would lead to family members being implicated, turning the commission into a quasi-organized crime entity.
She stated that many instances of corruption involved forceful coercion. The discipline inspection commission often exaggerates the amount of money involved in corrupt practices, attributing any wealth to the accused, even if the funds belonged to extended family members, leading to unfair charges.
Gao Ju emphasized that current officials in the system are well aware of the corrupt landscape within governance. What is discussed behind the scenes by officials differs vastly from their public portrayals, leading to a culture of duplicity where officials opt for passive actions. As a result, attempting to execute any official duties in government offices based on proper guidelines often leads to obstacles due to the absence of individuals willing to take responsibility.
Yue Shan also added that attempts to crackdown at the grassroots level may backfire. The CCP’s regime currently relies on corruption to maintain its operations, with village officials often having connections to organized crime backgrounds as a means to accumulate wealth. Tightening controls and eliminating opportunities for corruption may lead to even less productivity, with officials becoming passive. Ultimately, the entire grassroots political landscape could become stagnant, posing a risk of collapse under unexpected circumstances for Xi Jinping’s authority.