Today’s Focus: Harvard discontent with Trump’s ban lawsuit, judge rules temporary suspension for two weeks; Prior to the Fourth Plenum, whispers strike fear, TikTok reveals prophecy of “Xi stepping down”; Why is the CCP exposing its own shortcomings? Statistical rectification or political games.
On May 23, the US Department of Homeland Security suddenly announced the revocation of Harvard University’s qualification to admit foreign students, sparking a huge controversy.
According to reports from Reuters and other media outlets, Harvard failed to provide the various information requested by the government. It was also pointed out that Harvard University allowed students to publish hate speech on campus, support terrorist ideologies, implemented “racially discriminatory diversity policies,” leading to a significant increase in the school’s crime rate.
Furthermore, Harvard University also maintained close cooperation with the CCP, hosting and training members of CCP quasi-military organizations sanctioned by the US for “participating in the genocide of Uighurs”; collaborating with individuals from CCP defense industrial bases, including conducting research on robots with military applications; utilizing funds from the US Department of Defense to maintain research partnerships with CCP military-related universities; amidst increasing evidence of organ harvesting by the CCP, Harvard was also involved in research on CCP organ transplants; and receiving substantial funding from foreign governments.
In addition, Harvard also collaborated with researchers funded by the Iranian government, including projects funded by the Iranian National Science Foundation.
As a result, the Department of Homeland Security canceled Harvard’s “Student and Exchange Visitor Program” (SEVP), which means Harvard University will no longer be able to enroll foreign students, and existing foreign students must transfer or leave the country.
Harvard University stated that the government’s actions violated the US “First Amendment” and would have a “devastating impact” on the school and approximately 6,800 international students.
It is reported that among nearly 7,000 international students at Harvard, Chinese students make up the largest group, accounting for about one-fifth of the total.
Many Chinese students are at a loss about not being able to continue studying at Harvard.
Mr. Zhang, a 24-year-old physics doctoral student, said his friends advised him to temporarily move out of his residence because they feared that if the situation escalated, immigration officers would come knocking on his door to arrest him.
Some Chinese students referred to themselves as “Harvard refugees” and posted on “Little Red Book” saying that their teachers informed them that the school plans to negotiate with the US government and will respond to students within 72 hours.
On May 23, Harvard University filed a lawsuit in the Boston Federal Court. Harvard stated that if the policy is implemented, it will affect the normal operation of a large number of courses and research institutions, and the school must strive to safeguard the legitimate rights and interests of its students.
Upon hearing this news, many students canceled their plans to return home. Some students are worried about their visas expiring, internships being hindered, and are seeking legal assistance in hopes of staying.
On social media, students are exchanging legal information and seeking ways to stay.
Hours after Harvard filed the lawsuit, US Federal Judge Allison Burroughs issued an emergency restraining order, temporarily freezing the “implementation policy” for two weeks.
It is noteworthy that over the past twenty years, Harvard University has attracted many offspring of the CCP “princelings” to study, including the daughter of CCP leader Xi Jinping, Xi Mingze.
In fact, not only Chinese students are affected by this policy but also students from Taiwan, South Korea, and other countries and regions studying at Harvard. Taiwanese media reports stated that at least 52 Taiwanese students have been affected.
It is not clear whether the US government’s ban will be extended to other universities.
Miss Zhao, a 23-year-old who is about to start a master’s program at Harvard, expressed that if the ban continues, she would consider postponing her enrollment or transferring to another country.
Miss Zhao’s considerations are correct. According to current US policy, Miss Zhao can no longer enter Harvard for study unless the Trump administration changes its decision or the courts intervene to overturn the government’s decision.
However, US Secretary of Homeland Security Kristi Noem has stated that if Harvard University provides all the data within 72 hours, including providing relevant data such as international students’ disciplinary records and protest-related audio and video files, Harvard can regain its qualifications to admit foreign students.
As of now, Harvard University has not responded to the data matter.
A Guangzhou independent education consultant stated that although this incident did not completely close the doors of US higher education, it has intensified mainland parents’ concerns about the study environment in the United States.
In fact, since the tensions between the US and China began, many Chinese families have shifted their focus on studying abroad to English-speaking countries such as Australia and Singapore.
With the Fourth Plenum of the CCP approaching, rumors of Xi Jinping’s loss of power are growing, and the political situation within the CCP is becoming increasingly tense. At such a sensitive time, a TikTok live broadcast garnered public attention.
On May 22, user “Global Breaking” posted on an overseas platform about an incident where a mainland blogger predicted on a live stream on TikTok that Xi Jinping would “step down in less than five years.” Not only that, he also discussed who would succeed him. Based on his hints, it seems to be Hu Chunhua. Soon after, this live stream was shut down.
The anchor said that based on the information he obtained, the next in line is the godson of the former BOSS, with some people commenting “Chunhua,” others commenting “Hopefully it’s Haifeng,” and some commenting “Xia Zong”… At this point, the anchor emphasized again that the successor is “the godson of a former BOSS surnamed Hu, the adopted son,” “It’s already been clearly stated, can’t be clearer, keep guessing!”
Let’s briefly introduce the three names mentioned by the netizens:
Chunhua refers to “Hu Chunhua,” a native of Wufeng, Hubei, who served as the first secretary of the CCP Youth League in 2006, one of the representatives of the Youth League faction, and the successor designated by Hu Jintao across generations. However, at the CCP’s 19th National Congress, he failed to become a regular member and was pushed out of the Politburo by Xi Jinping.
Haifeng refers to “Hu Haifeng,” the son of Hu Jintao, who currently serves as the Deputy Minister of Civil Affairs.
The mention of “Xia Zong” likely refers to General Zhang Youxia of the CCP Central Military Commission, who has been referred to as the one who “solely wields military power” recently.
The anchor claimed that Xi Jinping would step down within five years. Many analysts believe that Xi Jinping may not even last five years and might step down during this Fourth Plenum.
On May 23, independent commentator Cai Shenkun posted on an online platform stating that there have been overseas claims that on May 14, the CCP held an unprecedented expanded Politburo meeting where all members of the Political Bureau, veterans, old military figures, old Standing Committee members, and old cadres attended. It is said that General Zhang Youxia delivered a 30-minute report at the meeting, claiming that all the generals and lieutenant generals personally promoted by Xi Jinping had been caught and stating that Xi Jinping cannot stay and what he is currently doing is saving face. The focus of the meeting was said to be on Xi Jinping’s mandatory resignation, whether partially or completely.
The revelations also stated that there was a preliminary consensus reached at the meeting, which is that this year’s Fourth Plenum will be transformed into a personnel meeting. The meeting also confirmed the list of upcoming Central Committee members, with the Youth League faction accounting for one-third; discussions on restructuring the lineup of the seven Standing Committee members and how to divide Xi’s powers. This meeting did not reach a consensus and will need to have a vote at the Fourth Plenum.
On May 20, the CCP National Bureau of Statistics remarkably published a notice on its official website, specifically criticizing seven provinces and cities and three major departments of the State Council for issues such as data falsification and intervention in statistical work in their statistical reports. The named units are required to submit rectification reports within three months.
Data falsification by the CCP in statistics has been an open secret, but this time, the central government proactively revealed it, unlike its past actions, raising external concerns.
According to the content released by the CCP’s National Bureau of Statistics, the regions named for criticism this time include Shanxi, Liaoning, Jiangsu, Zhejiang, Hainan, Chongqing, Ningxia, as well as the Ministry of Science and Technology, the State Administration for Market Regulation, and the China Banking and Insurance Regulatory Commission, three departments under the State Council. The problems identified include hidden and new types of statistical falsification, local intervention in statistical work, and falsified data from companies and projects.
Among them, Jiangsu was singled out for having the most severe problems and was the primary target of criticism. What is the story behind this?
In early 2025, the Jiangsu Statistics Bureau announced that the 2024 GDP of Jiangsu was 13.7 trillion RMB with an annual growth rate of 5.8%. Looking at the data, Jiangsu seemed to be developing well, even sparking the hype of “overtaking Guangdong.”
Regarding the CCP’s rare criticism, many believe it is the central government’s suppression of local authorities. However, Chinese affairs expert Wang He disagrees.
Wang He stated that the CCP’s recent bold exposure of statistical falsification is not just a simple audit or anti-corruption action but is highly politicized. It should be noted that every round of CCP’s inspections and audits, from which regions are named to how the media reports, requires unified deployment by the CCP’s Department of Propaganda. This move is not to clean up false data but arises from the redistribution of political interests. For example, this time, the areas of Jiangsu and Zhejiang were targeted, why? Because this is the stronghold of Xi Jinping and Li Qiang’s factions.
Wang He explains that Li Qiang previously served as the Secretary of the Jiangsu Provincial Party Committee and Zhejiang Governor, while Xi Jinping himself was once Secretary of the Zhejiang Provincial Party Committee. The targeting of these areas likely indicates a challenge to Xi Jinping’s political status. In other words, signs of Xi Jinping losing power are emerging.
David Huang, a Chinese economic scholar based in the US, pointed out that the CCP’s extensive exposure of local statistical falsification is a selective behavior to shift blame.
He mentioned that statistical falsification is not a technical issue but a political tool. The central government’s “self-exposure” is actually aimed at dumping part of the economic difficulties on local governments, especially in regions with relatively strong economic autonomy. For instance, Jiangsu is an important manufacturing and export base in mainland China with relatively strong local financial capacity. This time, the central government specifically targeted Jiangsu, which may signal the top CCP leadership’s impatience with it, and may even reveal signals of internal power struggles within the CCP.
Wang He pointed out that since the establishment of the CCP, systemic data falsification has become commonplace. For example, the economic growth targets set by the central government every year, even if not achieved by various regions, they have to manipulate data in various ways to “fulfill” them; otherwise, the central government’s targets become a joke. It is this unspoken agreement that has turned falsifying statistics into an institutionalized performance. This time, the central government suddenly requested enhanced statistical management, statistical system inspection, and reform, but this is merely a selective blame-shifting and an extension of power struggles.