Analysis: The failure of “crony politics” in Zhongnanhai – anti-corruption becomes a fig leaf

After the 20th National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party, many of Xi Jinping’s close associates have taken control of important positions, but in the past two years, many of them have either fallen from grace or gone “missing.” Some analysts believe that Xi Jinping’s biggest characteristic in appointing people is to only rely on “old acquaintances,” but as time goes by, this “cronyism” is destined to fail. The anti-corruption campaign under Xi Jinping has now turned into targeting his own people, and the announcement to continue the anti-corruption campaign is seen as merely a cover-up.

Xi’s inner circle is said to consist of several factions, including those from Zhejiang, Fujian, Shaanxi, Tsinghua University, and Party School, all represented by Xi’s “old acquaintances.” Many of them were friends, classmates, long-time followers, or family acquaintances from Xi’s earlier years. The seven members of the Politburo Standing Committee, including Li Qiang, Cai Qi, Ding Xuexiang, and Li Xi, are all close confidants of Xi.

Independent commentator Du Zheng wrote in Taiwan’s “Up Media” on February 11th that the 20th Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party consists of 205 members and 171 alternate members. According to official Chinese media reports, they are all personally endorsed by Xi, belonging to the broad category of Xi’s inner circle. This includes individuals absorbed from the Jiang faction, the Youth League faction, as well as some technical bureaucrats with unclear factional backgrounds. The narrow definition of Xi’s inner circle refers to a group of “old acquaintances” who had direct interactions with him in the past.

In the last two years, many of the high-ranking officials promoted by Xi have been removed from their positions, including two former Ministers of National Defense Wei Fenghe and Li Shangfu, former Minister of Foreign Affairs Qin Gang, and Miao Hua, director of the Political Work Department of the Central Military Commission, among dozens of others. Many senior officials have been absent from important occasions or have disappeared after being dismissed, leading to speculation that they have encountered trouble.

Du Zheng pointed out that at least 20 officials in this Central Committee have problematic records. In recent years, Xi has been systematically taking down top generals he personally elevated, with five already ousted and nearly ten more possibly facing investigations, a situation that is deemed rare.

On January 6th, Xi Jinping stated at a meeting of the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection, “There is still corruption that has not been eliminated, and new cases continue to emerge… Any hesitation, wavering, weakness, or giving up halfway will lead to subversion.” He also demanded that officials maintain a high degree of alignment with the central leadership and emphasized the need to “practice what is preached.” Current affairs commentator Li Lin told Dajiyuan that this suggests many officials are saying one thing and doing another, being disloyal to Xi.

Du Zheng believes that for Xi, who claims to be “Wei Guang Zheng,” the anti-corruption campaign driven by fear of subversion has turned into a humiliating drama of targeting his own people over the past two years. His continued declaration to intensify the anti-corruption efforts serves only as a fig leaf to cover his shame.

The author’s view is that by relying on “cronyism,” Xi has exposed himself to a crisis as relationships are not permanent, observing that many close friends throughout history have eventually turned against each other. Therefore, while Xi’s inner circle is currently in the spotlight, the future prospects for their safe landing are uncertain, and their fate could turn out to be tragic.

The author argues that due to Xi’s reliance on a circle of “old acquaintances” to consolidate power without a system guaranteeing long-term rule, his autocratic rule is reinforced, but within three years, most of his “old acquaintances” have vanished. He fails to establish mutual trust with the “new guard,” indicating that his downfall is imminent. As for the day when Xi falls, whether that signifies the collapse of the Communist regime, it should be synchronized, as communism as an ideology is bankrupt, and following the so-called “strongman” Xi Jinping, no one can sustain this rotten regime, leading to an inevitable change in power.

However, discussions have arisen overseas regarding Xi’s preference for using “old acquaintances.” Some argue, “Which leader doesn’t rely on their own people? The problem is that even close friends may lack loyalty and trust.”

Interestingly, several Feng Shui masters from Hong Kong and Taiwan have analyzed Xi Jinping’s features and demeanor, concluding that Xi’s relationships with others are superficial, as he only truly cares for himself, making those around him susceptible to revolt due to being “as dangerous as a tiger.”

Taiwanese Feng Shui master Zhou Yingjun once analyzed Xi Jinping on a program called “News Wow,” mentioning that Xi’s thin eyebrows indicate a distant connection with others, as his primary focus is only on himself, implying that others mean little to him. Zhou believes that Xi is likely to be brought down in internal power struggles.

According to an article in the 2018 Hong Kong Apple Daily, Hong Kong Feng Shui expert Qiu Zhiwei stated that after the age of 73 (2026), Xi Jinping will enter a period of declining fortune, experiencing deteriorating health, especially in areas like the heart, blood vessels, and eyes. Due to Xi’s thin eyebrows and the presence of broken lines near his cheekbones, insurrections within his inner circle are highly probable.

Taiwanese Feng Shui master Jiang Bo Le also highlighted Xi Jinping’s lack of emotional attachment and ruthless behavior, stating that Xi is harsh regardless of being a brother or friend, describing the people around him as walking on eggshells.