The Chinese Communist authorities have disbanded the Strategic Support Force and initiated a new military reorganization. What is the calculation behind this move? Katsuji Nakazawa, former head of the China branch of Nikkei, analyzed Xi Jinping’s political machinations in restructuring the military in his latest article.
On April 19, a founding ceremony for the Communist Party’s military “Information Support Force” was held. Xi presented the unit with a military flag and gave a speech, stressing the importance of ensuring “absolute loyalty and reliability” within the force.
According to reports from official Chinese media, based on a decision by the Central Military Commission, the newly established “Information Support Force” will be directly commanded by the Central Military Commission. Simultaneously, the designation of the “Strategic Support Force” has been revoked, leading to adjustments in the leadership and management of the Military Astronautical and Network Space forces.
The dissolution of the less than a decade-old Communist Party’s “Strategic Support Force” signifies a significant change. Comments circulating on Chinese social media suggest that it was one of the shortest-lived key units in the history of the Communist Party’s military, standing alongside the Army, Navy, Air Force, and Rocket Force.
Earlier this year, the former commander of the Strategic Support Force, Ju Qiansheng, had been out of the public eye for nearly six months. His current status remains unclear, and he has not been reassigned as the new commander of the Information Support Force.
Regarding the dissolving of the Strategic Support Force and the establishment of the Information Support Force, Yao Cheng, former Lieutenant Colonel Staff Officer of the Communist Party Navy Command, stated that Xi incorporated cyber warfare, information warfare, electronic warfare, intelligence systems, and space warfare into the Strategic Support Force after the military reform in 2015. This integration of various departments led to confusion in management and command structure.
Why did the “Strategic Support Force” disappear in less than a decade? Katsuji Nakazawa’s article provides an analysis and insights into Xi Jinping’s motives for establishing this force initially and his current political ambitions in restructuring the military.
Initially, when the “Strategic Support Force” was established, its mission, functions, and structure were shrouded in mystery. Based on later leaks from official Chinese sources, it is believed that Xi started meticulous preparations in secret for military reorganization in 2014, a year after becoming the President and three years before the Communist Party Congress in 2017.
During this time, Xi Jinping was actively conducting an anti-corruption campaign targeted at senior military officials, leading to the removal of former Vice-Chairmen of the Military Commission, Xu Caihou and Guo Boxiong. These “purges” and unprecedented military reorganization were aimed at ensuring the military’s loyalty to Xi and served his underlying political agenda.
At the 2017 Communist Party Congress, Xi highlighted these purges and reorganizations as “achievements,” paving the way for the 2018 constitutional amendments, including the removal of the two-term limit for the Chinese presidency.
In 2022, Xi Jinping was reelected for the third time as the General Secretary of the Communist Party of China, and in March 2023, he was reelected as the President of China during the National People’s Congress.
Katsuji Nakazawa suggests that Xi Jinping’s intention is to present the latest military reorganization as another “achievement” at the upcoming Communist Party Congress three years later, aiming for a fourth term.
Therefore, Xi seems to be attempting to replicate the scenario of ten years ago when the “Strategic Support Force” was established. These preparations began in the three years before the previous Communist Party Congress, just as the latest restructuring is taking place in the three years leading up to the next Congress. Is this a mere coincidence?
Li Shangfu, a former member of the Central Military Commission and Minister of National Defense, had served as Deputy Minister of the General Equipment Department, but was removed from office in October last year without an official explanation.
Katsuji Nakazawa’s article implies that the recent military reorganization in China is linked to Li Shangfu’s fall from grace, as he was a trusted official of Xi Jinping. Li’s dismissal was reportedly due to corruption allegations during his tenure leading the equipment development department. Additionally, the Rocket Force of the Communist Party is also plagued by severe corruption issues similar to the Strategic Support Force and the Equipment Development Department; they shared personnel, indicating that the Strategic Support Force did not operate as smoothly as Xi originally intended.
The article also raises the issue of the “balloon incident.”
In February of the previous year, a large balloon entered US airspace and was subsequently shot down, with its debris recovered by the United States.
The US concluded that it was a Chinese “surveillance balloon” equipped with antennas believed to be related to intercepting communications.
The Chinese Communist Party claimed that the balloon was a “civilian unmanned airship” designed for weather observation and lodged a “strong protest” against the US for shotting it down.
This “balloon incident” escalated tensions between China and the US rapidly, with the Pentagon stating that it was an “unacceptable intrusion” on US sovereignty.
Katsuji Nakazawa’s article suggests that the Central Military Commission led by Xi Jinping is responsible for military-related meteorological issues, hence, the “Strategic Support Force” may have been tasked with the balloon mission.