On November 17, 2024, the newly elected President of the United States, Trump (Trump), faces a multitude of foreign policy decisions in his new government. One of the crucial challenges is how to deal with the imminent threat from the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) in the Taiwan Strait. This issue not only tests the relationship between the United States and Taiwan but also affects the United States’ Pacific strategy. The issue of US arms sales to Taiwan is particularly sensitive in this context.
The US government’s strategic ambiguity towards Taiwan may deter the CCP from taking rash actions, as they cannot predict how Washington might respond to a Taiwan Strait crisis. However, with the CCP conducting increasingly large-scale and threatening military exercises around Taiwan and demonstrating capabilities to encircle, block, and attack Taiwan, uncertainty is on the rise. Some long-standing norms within US established policy are being challenged.
Recent reports suggest that Taiwan hopes to initiate a comprehensive weapons purchase plan worth over $15 billion, including F-35 fighter jets, E-2D “Hawkeye” early warning aircraft, Patriot missiles, retired Arleigh Burke-class destroyers, or possibly directly acquiring Lockheed Martin’s Aegis combat system to detect and destroy incoming ballistic missiles using satellite and ship-based air defense missiles.
On November 14, senior security officials in Taiwan told the media that Taiwan has not yet submitted a specific list of new arms deals to the incoming Trump administration. However, they are willing to discuss how to enhance Taiwan’s defense capabilities. Other Taiwanese security officials mentioned that the government regularly discusses with major US political parties and think tanks whether Taiwan’s existing military hardware and software are effective enough to counter any CCP attacks.
Taipei is considering whether to pursue a bulk weapons procurement plan or to discuss potential trade lists with the incoming Trump administration. While there are conflicting reports from various sources, they all indicate that Taipei may hope to understand the new US government’s stance on reaching a new large-scale arms deal with Taiwan early in its term. Taipei may be more concerned about whether there will be breakthroughs in the contents of arms sales.
During Trump’s first term and the Biden administration, US arms sales to Taiwan have generally favored Taiwan. The US foreign military aid is primarily divided into Foreign Military Sales (FMS) and Direct Commercial Sales (DCS) parts. The latter, being faster and typically free, is more advantageous compared to the former. The US Congress has consistently supported continued arms sales to Taiwan, but delays in the delivery of the FMS portion remain unresolved. Whether these issues will be addressed during Trump’s new term remains to be seen.
The DCS part is also crucial, not just in terms of gratuitous aid but in rapidly achieving capabilities. For instance, in cases of sudden changes in the Taiwan Strait situation or projects with longer cycles but time pressures such as critical training and capability assessments, support through DCS is essential. Before 2027, Taiwan’s ability to establish sufficient conventional deterrence is almost indispensable, as relying solely on domestic projects or foreign acquisitions in just two to three years may not be enough to ensure defeating a CCP invasion of Taiwan. However, DCS is susceptible to government policy changes and carries significant uncertainties.
Some Taiwan experts believe that US arms sales to Taiwan will not only continue but also increase. The principles guiding US arms sales to Taiwan are based on the level of threat posed by the CCP. Given the increasing threat from the CCP’s military, the US may further ease restrictions on the types, quantities, and delivery timelines of defensive weapons, where Taiwan still has notable gaps.
Currently, President-elect Trump has only mentioned that Taiwan should pay a “protection fee.” This attitude may not necessarily hinder or negatively impact Taiwan’s future arms purchases, as Taiwan does not currently require a massive quantity of no-cost, lower-tech weapons and ammunition support within a few days like Ukraine. Taiwan needs more advanced weapon systems and platforms for high-end confrontations with the CCP. In Taiwan’s vision for weapon development, acquiring advanced asymmetric warfare capabilities to deter the CCP is more critical than obtaining inexpensive weapons. Paying for advanced US weapons could benefit Taiwan in acquiring what they need and developing operational capabilities in a shorter time, but prudence in spending is crucial. The best strategy and the most favorable weapons for Taiwan remain core issues in US-Taiwan arms sales discussions.
With the rapid development of CCP weapon platforms, Taiwan is shifting its attention to advanced systems for its army, navy, and air force, potentially deviating from established asymmetric development strategies and Overall Defense Concept (ODC).
Su Ziyun, a researcher at Taiwan’s Ministry of National Defense think tank, the Institute for National Defense Security, believes that under limited defense budgets, procurements should enhance Taiwan’s logistics resilience, ammunition or small platform armaments. Prioritizing Taiwan’s needs, the acquisition order should focus on Patriot missiles, Perry-class missile frigates, E-2D early warning aircraft, Ticonderoga-class missile cruisers, and finally, F-35 fighter jets. He emphasized that regardless of purchasing equipment from the US military, Taiwan should uphold the principle of “independent defense” and complement it with foreign arms purchases.
Some believe that the Taiwan Air Force has expressed interest in purchasing F-35 stealth fighter jets. Compared with the J-35 unveiled by China at the Zhuhai Airshow, the F-35 offers clear superiority in stealth capabilities, maneuverability, electronic warfare capabilities, countermeasures, active defense technologies, and accumulated combat experience. Taiwan’s continued interest in the F-35 is beneficial in countering military threats from the CCP.
Whether these aspirations can be realized is uncertain, but they generally lean towards large-scale high-end platforms. If permitted by Taiwan’s defense budget, these ideas may have merit. The challenge is how Taiwan can maximize overall equipment effectiveness under limited funding constraints, testing the wisdom of Taiwan’s military equipment development decision-makers.
Moreover, a clue hidden in these recent procurement scheme ideas may reflect the foresight of Taiwan’s military decision-makers to establish joint operational capabilities with like-minded partners.
Whether it’s the E-2D early warning aircraft, F-35 fighter jets, Aegis missile destroyers, or other warships, they share a common feature as essential components of a joint battlefield information command and control system. They can operate independently or as part of a larger system, offering significant strategic advantages. The early warning aircraft can provide intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance of air, ground, and sea targets in the war zone and command and control of internal friendlies through the battlefield data link connecting aircraft, ships, and air defense systems. The F-35 can execute missions independently, under the guidance of early warning aircraft, be an airborne sensor or information node, transmitting observed data to other combat platforms. The Aegis missile destroyers can detect and intercept incoming targets using target data from various sensors, including satellites.
The US government and Congress understand that aiding Taiwan should not isolate Taiwan. The CCP’s expansion heightens security conditions in the Western Pacific, elevating Taiwan’s strategic importance along the “First Island Chain.” This may prompt the Trump administration to adopt a more open policy regarding US arms sales to Taiwan, helping Taiwan better integrate militarily with its allies and partners, and creating greater synergy with the US in competition against the CCP.