Experts believe that the Chinese Communist Party’s persistent increase in military spending amidst a weak economy, as announced by Premier Li Keqiang in the government work report at the National People’s Congress on March 5th, has raised concerns reminiscent of the specter of war from the Mao Zedong era. Some analysts suggest that this move is not just aimed at Taiwan, but also serves as a contingency plan for maintaining power by CCP leader Xi Jinping.
Associate Professor Zhang Zhengxiu from the Department of Public Administration at Tamkang University wrote in an article on March 6th for “Newtalk News” that Li Keqiang’s government work report emphasizes the need to stimulate China’s economy by expanding domestic demand.
Li Keqiang outlined in his report that this year’s deficit ratio is planned to be around 4%, an increase of 1 percentage point from the previous year; with the deficit size at 5.66 trillion yuan, up by 1.6 trillion yuan from last year. Plans include issuing ultra-long special national bonds of 1.3 trillion yuan, an increase of 300 billion yuan from the previous year; issuing special national bonds of 500 billion yuan to support capital replenishment for state-owned large commercial banks; and allocating 4.4 trillion yuan in local government special bonds, an increase of 500 billion yuan from the previous year, focusing on investment in construction, land storage and acquisition of existing commercial housing, and clearing local government arrears to enterprises.
According to Zhang Zhengxiu, the CCP’s push to “promote consumption to expand domestic demand” as a top priority this year demonstrates an attempt to stimulate the economy. However, even when combining last year’s fiscal deficit size with the additional deficit and the off-budget ultra-long special national bonds for this year as economic stimulus measures, the fiscal expenditures only represent about 3% of the GDP, indicating a lack of significant impact. Moreover, the timing of the announcement is relatively late, possibly failing to dispel pessimism about China’s economic future.
American economist David Huang stated to “Epoch Times” that the essence of China’s debt issuance is to use new debts to pay off old debts, aiming to sustain essential government expenditures rather than drive substantial economic growth. The actual funding flowing into the market through debt issuance is minimal, and this approach does not address the real economic challenges, increasing the pressure of structural economic decline in China.
As disclosed by the Chinese Ministry of Finance, China’s defense budget for this year amounts to 1.78 trillion yuan, a 7.2% increase compared to the previous year, maintaining the growth rate seen since 2022.
Zhang Zhengxiu pointed out that the continued 7.2% increase in China’s defense budget indicates that the CCP government prioritizes military expansion even in times of economic downturn, echoing the specter of Mao Zedong’s era of focusing on military buildup amid economic struggles.
Su Zi-yun, Director of the Institute for National Defense Strategy and Resources at the Taiwan Institute for National Defense and Security Research, stated to “Epoch Times” on the 5th that the growth of China’s military budget surpassing economic growth reflects Beijing’s unrelenting strategic pursuits to secure maritime hegemony. Additionally, international think tanks generally estimate that, including hidden military expenditures, China’s actual military spending is about 1.4 times higher than the publicly disclosed budget.
China expert Wang He stated to “Epoch Times” that China’s pursuit of military expansion, aligning with the upcoming 2027 “Century of Military Buildup,” is widely believed to target military occupation of Taiwan. The current economic challenges do not curb China’s military expansion but rather further incentivize such actions, highlighting the underestimated dangers of the CCP regime.
Premier Li Keqiang reiterated the importance of “Xi Jinping’s thinking on strengthening the military” in his report, emphasizing the CCP’s “absolute leadership” over the military and the “military commission chairman responsibility system.”
The significant reduction in the number of military representatives attending the two sessions, due to many military officials being removed from their positions, indicates an extensive purge. Notable absentees include former Army Political Commissar Qin Shutong, Navy Political Commissar Yuan Huazhi, and Armed Police Commander Wang Chun-ning, raising speculation about the ongoing cleanup within the military.
French media analysis on March 5th highlighted that before the two sessions, Xi Jinping emphasized several “security” aspects at a Politburo meeting, including “regime security,” “economic security,” and “military security,” with all being subservient to “regime security,” where “military security” guarantees this safeguard. This observation links the continuous increase in military spending and maintaining the 7.2% high level in 2025 to these security imperatives.
The commentary also pointed out that the military clean-up aims to ensure that the “gun barrels” are controlled by individuals loyal to Xi, not just targeting Taiwan but also preparing for the worst-case scenario to safeguard “the regime.”
However, analyst Zhong Yuan noted in a “Epoch Times” article that during the group discussions of military representatives on March 5th, Vice Chairman of the Military Commission Zhang Youxia did not stress the “military commission chairman responsibility system” in his remarks, while another Vice Chairman He Weidong mentioned the “Party Central” before “Chairman Xi.” Moreover, other military representatives, including the two Vice Chairmen, did not explicitly pledge unwavering loyalty to Xi as in the past. Changes in behavior such as mixed reactions during Xi’s presence, where some officials applauded and others did not, further suggest underlying tensions within the military and continuous speculation regarding power struggles and Xi’s leadership within the CCP.