On February 21, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) issued new revisions to three military regulations, involving internal management such as lodging and discipline. Recently, the PLA has launched a sudden “ideological reform” and strengthened information censorship. Analysis indicates that frequent internal control actions within the PLA confirm that the military is in turmoil during the great purge, with undercurrents surging, possibly leading to a potential mutiny in the future.
The official Chinese news agency Xinhua reported on February 21 that PLA Chairman Xi Jinping recently signed orders to issue the newly revised “Regulations on Internal Affairs”, “Discipline Regulations”, and “Formation Regulations” of the PLA, collectively referred to as the “Common Regulations”, to be implemented from April 1, 2025.
The “Regulations on Internal Affairs” cover aspects like internal and external relations, duty arrangements, internal affairs settings, leaves and absences, lodging, and the management of smart electronic devices. The “Discipline Regulations” mainly involve disciplinary measures, while the “Formation Regulations” mainly introduce new norms for handling firearms and signal soldiers. The authorities emphasize that the newly revised Common Regulations will ensure the military “follows the party”.
Commentator Li Lin told Epoch Times that Xi signing three revised military regulations concerning internal management, from leaves of absence to mobile phone management, emphasizing military personnel to “follow the party,” may be related to the unsettling military situation during the recent large-scale purges and the authorities’ further efforts to enhance so-called political loyalty education, which has sparked backlash. The authorities are now keen to continue strengthening monitoring actions, indicating the turbulent undercurrents in the military, which may lead to potential mutiny in the future.
Since the PLA’s large purge storm starting in 2023, numerous senior military officials and executives of military-industrial state enterprises have been placed under investigation or fallen from grace, including Xi Jinping’s confidant Miao Hua. Some officials have been dismissed or absent from significant events, without any official explanations. For instance, at the end of last year, four generals, including Army Commander Li Qiaoming, former Army Political Commissar Qin Shutong, Navy Political Commissar Yuan Huazhi, and Armed Police Commander Wang Chunying, were absent at the promotion ceremony of Army Political Commissar Chen Hui to general rank.
Liu Weidong, Deputy General Manager of China Weapon Equipment Group Co., was detained in mid-February this month, drawing attention to corruption in the military-industrial complex once again.
This February 4, the PLA’s political work department reportedly issued notices directing the military to conduct annual significant education, emphasizing learning “Xi Jinping’s Strong Military Thinking” and highlighting the strengthening of education and ideological transformation for a “critical minority.”
In the context of the Chinese Communist Party, the “critical minority” refers to senior officials. According to a report by the American media outlet The Wall Street Journal on February 21, in the latest anti-corruption and cleansing actions, Xi Jinping seeks to enhance ideological education in the military, emphasizing the party’s absolute leadership to ensure the loyalty and reliability of the armed forces.
Since last summer, two million PLA officers and soldiers nationwide have been studying Xi Jinping’s speeches, CPC regulations, military history, holding seminars, exams, and essay competitions, promoting loyalty education activities. It is said that each brigade must take at least 20% of the year for ideological and political training, while grassroots combat units require a higher proportion of 40%.
The report quoted American experts saying that Xi Jinping’s emphasis on ideological indoctrination, coupled with anti-corruption actions, could hinder his modernization plans for the military. Military officers are more cautious in decision-making, worrying about making “wrong” decisions that might lead to future penalties. Furthermore, commanders need to explain their actions to political commissars, which could slow their decision-making and response time in battles.
Li Lin previously stated that the CCP’s specific requirement for “ideological reform” in the military only shows that people now have their independent thoughts, making the top CCP leadership feel a loss of control.
Recently, ten departments, including the Cyberspace Administration of China, the Ministry of State Security, and the PLA’s political work department, jointly issued the “Regulations on the Management of Internet Military Information Dissemination”, to be implemented from March 1, 2025. The regulation prohibits defaming the party’s absolute leadership over the military and the chairman’s responsibility system, spreading rumors about “depoliticizing” and “state-owning” the military, and more.
It is noteworthy that on December 23, 2024, the PLA Daily published an article discussing the management of grassroots officers and soldiers, indicating loose management and discipline, emphasizing the need to rectify violations like circumventing regulations. It reflects the prevalence of many soldiers “climbing over the wall” to access overseas websites.
Former PLA Navy Senior Colonel Yao Cheng recently mentioned on a TV program that the situation reflected in the military, especially Xi Jinping arbitrarily arresting people during the military anti-corruption campaign, has offended the military. Currently, the CCP is dealing with the military, and the military’s reaction is very strong.
Independent commentator Du Zheng expressed in an article in Taiwan’s “Up Post” on January 22 that an armed uprising within the CCP’s military is the authorities’ greatest fear. A friend in Guangdong with relatives in a certain military region recently revealed that the military’s morale is actually unstable, as the quality of the military is poor. Many soldiers are appointed through bribery, with the consecutive fall of heads of the Personnel Department of the Military Commission, Zhang Yang and Miao Hua; the ideologically-oriented grassroots military officers and soldiers are very dissatisfied, and some officers are contemplating emulating the Wuchang Uprising, waiting for an opportunity to act.