In the span of five days from October 10th to 14th, three senior Chinese Communist Party officials were sentenced to “death penalty with reprieve.” Amid rumors of the downfall of the CCP leader, Xi Jinping was absent from an important meeting of the Central Military Commission, instead choosing to inspect Dongshan in Fujian. Meanwhile, Xi’s close ally Wang Xiaohong made a high-profile visit to Tianjin to show his support for Xi.
Former Vice President of the People’s Bank of China (PBOC), Fan Yifei, was sentenced to death penalty with reprieve on October 10th for illegally accepting over 386 million yuan. Fan confessed truthfully after being brought in, voluntarily revealed bribery facts not yet known to the investigating authorities, and was sentenced to death with a two-year reprieve. He is the highest-ranking official in the past decade of the PBOC to be implicated.
Jiang Jieyi, former Vice Chairman of the Tibet Autonomous Region Political Consultative Conference, was sentenced to death penalty with reprieve on October 12th for illegally accepting over 225 million yuan. The judgment noted Jiang’s significant merits for providing other major case clues after his arrest, voluntarily confessing many bribery crimes not yet known to the authorities, resulting in a lighter punishment of death penalty not immediately carried out.
Wang Dawei, former Vice Governor of Liaoning Province and Director of the Public Security Department, was sentenced to death penalty on October 14th for embezzling 555 million yuan. The court recognized Wang’s “significant merits” for confessing truthfully and voluntarily disclosing most of the bribery facts not yet known, resulting in a lighter punishment of death penalty with a two-year reprieve followed by life imprisonment.
Wang Dawei fell from power on March 1, 2022. He served as an assistant governor for four years without promotion. Speculations indicated that Wang Dawei later received promotion to Vice Governor and Director of Public Security Department through the behind-the-scenes operation of his ally Sun Lijun. Sun Lijun was accused of forming a political clique when he fell from grace, with high-profile members including Fu Zhenghua, former Minister of Justice, and others.
Wang Juntao, Chairman of the China Democracy Party National Committee, told Epoch Times that Xi Jinping’s continued purge of the public security system may target the influence of Meng Jianzhu. “They are targeting Sun Lijun’s people, but it’s actually against Meng Jianzhu.” Xi aims to “dismantle forces that could potentially gather to oppose him.”
Meng Jianzhu had a strong and close organizational system within the public security and political-legal systems, which made Xi Jinping fearful. Regardless of Meng Jianzhu’s loyalty, Xi used the pretext of corruption to dismantle his network. Wang Juntao suggested that conflicts with Meng Jianzhu’s faction were inevitable for Wang Xiaohong to take over the Ministry of Public Security.
Wang Dawei was promoted to the Director of Liaoning Province Public Security Department during Meng Jianzhu’s tenure as Secretary of the Communist Party’s Central Political and Legal Affairs Commission, with Sun Lijun, the then Deputy Minister of Public Security, acting as the actual operator. Sun Lijun was backed by Meng Jianzhu and Zeng Qinghong.
Since the CCP’s Third Plenum this year, rumors about Xi Jinping’s waning power have been persistent. More signs indicate that Xi Jinping’s power is being diluted to some extent.
On October 16, Chinese media reported that on October 15, Xi Jinping visited Dongshan in Zhangzhou, Fujian province. Political commentator Zhang Tianliang indicated in his media program that Xi’s absence from the important military theory meeting of the Central Military Commission and the insignificant nature of his visit to Dongshan was “ill-timed.” Xi Jinping’s visit to Dongshan could be a publicity stunt to signify “East Mountain’s rise.”
Xi Jinping’s confidant and Minister of Public Security Wang Xiaohong, in his capacity as a member of the Standing Committee of the CPC Central Committee and State Councilor, along with Li Xi, Secretary of the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection, went to Tianjin for research from October 15 to 16. Their visit was perceived to be related to internal struggles within the CCP and may put the current Tianjin party chief, Chen Min’er, at a disadvantage. Chen Min’er was considered as one of Xi Jinping’s potential successors.
During the research, Wang Xiaohong commended Xi Jinping’s recent remarks at the Politburo meeting and urged Tianjin to implement the decisions of the central government, aligning thoughts and actions with the central government’s decisions.
Wang Juntao highlighted an interesting phenomenon: Wang Xiaohong’s continuous rise. Lately, Wang Xiaohong has been expanding beyond the public security system into the economic sector, indicating potential elevation and increased importance in his role. “I have always believed that one Political Bureau Standing Committee position may be reserved for Wang Xiaohong, as he may be appointed to a higher and more significant position.”
Regarding the purpose of Wang Xiaohong’s visit to Tianjin, current affairs commentator Zhong Yuan provided a different interpretation. He analyzed that recent rumors of Xi Jinping losing power led to Wang Xiaohong’s visit as a facade. It may be a deliberate display to bolster Xi Jinping’s image, showing his camp’s consolidation and control over economic affairs.
Zhong Yuan noted that Chen Min’er has always been an essential member of Xi’s camp, and with ongoing rumors of Xi Jinping’s successorship, it is possible that Li Xi, as Xi’s ally, aims to boost Chen Min’er’s visibility as a potential candidate.
Before the CCP’s 20th National Congress, to secure his power, Xi Jinping initiated a political purge, with the “Sun Lijun political clique” becoming the focus of public attention. Sun Lijun was sentenced to death penalty with a two-year reprieve by the Changchun Intermediate People’s Court on September 23, 2022. The day before Sun Lijun’s sentencing, on September 22, former Minister of Justice Fu Zhenghua was also sentenced to “death penalty with reprieve.”
Xi Jinping’s handling of Sun Lijun, Fu Zhenghua, and others follows the same pattern seen with Bo Xilai, Zhou Yongkang, and Guo Boxiong, where political cases are disguised as economic corruption charges. Prior to the 18th National Congress of the CCP, Bo Xilai was Jiang Zemin’s favored successor, supported by Zhou Yongkang. Zhou Yongkang, Guo Boxiong, and Xu Caihou were all close to Jiang, but were considered double-faced towards Xi. They were all sentenced to life imprisonment. Wang Juntao mentioned that this demonstrates Xi’s typical “selective anti-corruption.”
The CCP’s military and political-legal systems have long been under the control of Jiang Zemin’s faction, posing a significant threat to Xi Jinping’s governance. Thus, Xi Jinping continually cleanses these two systems and replaces key positions with his loyalists.
Legal expert Yuan Hongbing, familiar with the CCP’s internal dynamics, previously stated to Epoch Times that when Xi Jinping came to power in 2012, he faced resistance from the opposition factions led by Jiang Zemin and Zhou Yongkang. Xi lacked his own influence in the political-legal system and encountered resistance from vested interest groups against his confidant Wang Xiaohong taking control. This resistance was most notably seen in the Sun Lijun incident.
As the Deputy Minister of Public Security, Wang Xiaohong initiated the establishment of the “Eradicating Sun Lijun’s Influence” task force in January 2022, vigorously purging the Jiang faction’s anti-Xi forces from the political-legal system. He emphasized thorough investigations into individuals, events, and cases related to Sun Lijun’s group, aiming to “eliminate all political risks” and still periodically mentions this slogan to deter any “unscrupulous” motives.
Wang Juntao commented, “The internal struggles within the communist party, military, and police system have always been the most brutal, a fight to the death.”