In recent news, there have been speculations surrounding the absence of Ding Xuexiang, a member of the Politburo Standing Committee of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and the Vice Premier of the State Council, from some important meetings.
For instance, Ding Xuexiang, who is responsible for overseeing technology-related work, was absent from the Artificial Intelligence (AI) Technology Summit held in Paris on February 10. Similarly, despite being in charge of cultural and educational health matters, he was also absent from the opening ceremony of the Ninth Asian Winter Games held in Harbin on February 7.
Ding Xuexiang is the youngest among the seven members of the 20th CCP Politburo Standing Committee, born in 1962. Due to his relatively young age, some speculate that he might be the successor of CCP leader Xi Jinping.
During the 3rd Plenary Session of the 20th CCP Central Committee last July, reports in both domestic and overseas media circulated that Xi Jinping suddenly fell ill and could not perform his duties, leading to significant changes in the CCP’s political landscape. Signs of these changes included a decrease in personal adulation towards Xi, reassignment or disappearance of his close military confidants, and shifts in military communications emphasizing “collective leadership” and promoting “democratic centralism,” diverging from the previous focus on Xi’s personal leadership.
It is possible that the CCP leadership has discussed the issue of Xi’s successor. Whether Ding Xuexiang is eyeing to become Xi’s successor after his illness remains unknown to the public.
Currently, many discussions focus on the issue of Xi’s successor, particularly on whether Ding Xuexiang’s troubles are related to his ambition to become the successor. Here, let’s first take stock of high-ranking CCP officials who have been considered potential successors or challengers to Xi since he took office before discussing Ding Xuexiang.
Among the officials who have aspired to succeed Xi or have been seen as potential successors, three are currently imprisoned, including Bo Xilai, Ling Jihua, and Sun Zhengcai. Two others, Hu Chunhua and Chen Min’er, have been marginalized.
Bo Xilai and Xi Jinping, both second-generation revolutionaries, contended for the position of successor. However, Bo Xilai’s high profile ultimately led to his downfall, paving the way for Xi to succeed smoothly. Nevertheless, Bo Xilai remained determined and sought to replace Xi.
During the 18th CCP National Congress in 2012, then Politburo Standing Committee member and Central Politics and Law Committee Secretary Zhou Yongkang, along with Bo Xilai, conspired to have Bo succeed Zhou as a Standing Committee member and then orchestrate a coup to replace Xi. However, their plan was thwarted.
Ling Jihua also harbored dreams of succession. According to former National Security Commission Secretary Liu Yanping, before the 18th CCP National Congress, then Central Office Director Ling Jihua conspired with Zhou Yongkang to have Zhou appointed as the National People’s Congress Chairman, while Zhou supported Ling’s entry into the Standing Committee to eventually succeed Xi.
However, in December 2014, Ling was investigated for serious disciplinary violations and sentenced to life in prison in July 2016.
Sun Zhengcai also desired the “yellow robe”. When he served as member of the Politburo and Secretary of the Chongqing Municipal Party Committee, he dreamed of succeeding Xi.
Reports from the 2018 issue of “Caixin Weekly” revealed that Sun’s longtime mistress, Liu Fengzhu, consulted a fortune teller using Sun’s birthdate and was told that he had the potential for further political advancement. Consequently, Liu Fengzhu presented Sun with a dragon robe as a gift. An acquaintance of Sun mentioned that in Sun Zhengcai’s house, there was an empty room with nothing but a dragon robe hanging on the wall. Sun, whenever at home, would pay respects to the dragon robe daily.
However, on July 24, 2017, Sun was arrested for serious disciplinary violations. On May 8, 2018, Sun was sentenced to life in prison.
Hu Chunhua was once considered as a potential successor to Xi. In 2012, Hu Chunhua and Sun Zhengcai became Politburo members at the 18th CCP Congress. Being part of the post-60s generation, both were the youngest members of the CCP Politburo. Traditionally, one of them could have been the successor to the General Secretary of the CCP, while the other could have been the successor to the Premier of the State Council. However, Xi Jinping altered this dynamic after becoming the CCP Leader during the 18th Congress. As the 19th CCP Congress neared, Sun Zhengcai was arrested. Although Hu Chunhua was re-elected as a Politburo member during the 19th Congress, he was excluded from the Politburo during the 20th Congress, holding only a Central Committee position.
Chen Min’er was once viewed as a potential successor to Xi. Chen Min’er was one of Xi’s “Zhejiang New Army,” and after Xi took office as the CCP leader, Chen Min’er was promoted successively, serving as the Party Secretary of Guizhou Province and then as a Politburo member and Party Secretary of Chongqing.
On October 15, 2019, Singapore Deputy Prime Minister Heng Swee Keat met with Chen Min’er in Chongqing.
The Singapore Straits Times reported that Heng Swee Keat remarked, “We hope this meeting can pave the way for our next generation of leaders to strengthen our bilateral relationship.” This statement essentially identified Chen Min’er as a potential successor to Xi. At the time, Chen Min’er was flattered by this notion.
In 2019, which marked a crucial year for Xi’s pursuit of “three consecutive terms” at the 20th CCP Congress in 2020, it was clear that in Xi’s mind, “Xi Jinping’s successor is Xi Jinping,” leaving no room for Chen Min’er. Despite widespread speculation domestically and internationally regarding Chen Min’er potentially succeeding Xi, Xi became even more wary of him. During the 20th CCP Congress, Chen Min’er failed to ascend to the Politburo Standing Committee, retaining only his position as a Politburo member before being transferred from the Party Secretary of Chongqing to Tianjin.
Following the 20th CCP Congress, Chen Min’er’s former associates in Guizhou and Chongqing were successively investigated, resulting in his marginalization.
From the 18th to the 20th CCP Congress, over a decade has passed without Xi appointing a successor. Instead, Xi has taken actions against five high-ranking officials who aspired to takes his place or become his successor, with three being investigated and two marginalized.
Through Xi’s efforts to amend the term limits regarding the presidency in the constitution and seeking “three consecutive terms,” it appears that Xi aims to establish a lifelong leadership akin to Mao Zedong.
In this backdrop, the prospect of CCP high-ranking officials succeeding or becoming Xi’s successors becomes increasingly challenging.
Could Ding Xuexiang potentially become Xi’s successor?
In favorable aspects, Ding possesses three advantages:
Firstly, he is the youngest among the seven Standing Committee members, marking an age advantage.
Secondly, having served Xi from Shanghai to Beijing, Ding has gained insights into Xi’s temperament, character, and thoughts.
Thirdly, Ding was originally affiliated with Jiang Zemin’s faction, having worked in Shanghai for 30 years and receiving promotions and important roles from Jiang’s faction members before Xi appointed him as the Party Secretary of Shanghai. Currently, there are three Jiang faction members among the senior CCP leadership: Wang Huning, a Politburo Standing Committee member and Chairman of the CPPCC, Zhao Leji, a Politburo Standing Committee member and Chairman of the National People’s Congress, and Han Zheng, the Vice President. In the event of Xi falling ill or being unable to fulfill his duties, they may potentially support Ding Xuexiang as Xi’s successor.
On the contrary, Ding faces four disadvantages:
Firstly, he lacks the experience of serving as the top Party or government official in a local area.
Secondly, besides the Central Office, he has not held the position of the top official in a Party Central Committee or State Council department, lacking the experience of leading a department.
Thirdly, due to the aforementioned lack of experience, he may struggle to control military and judicial officials. During Mao Zedong’s era, despite Mao’s backing, many senior military officials did not respect Zhang Chunqiao, who was appointed as a Politburo Standing Committee member, Vice Premier of the State Council, and head of the General Political Department.
Fourthly, Ding may not be able to manage the “Zhejiang faction” and “Fujian faction” of high-ranking officials close to Xi, such as Li Qiang, a Politburo Standing Committee member and Premier of the State Council from the Zhejiang faction, and Cai Qi, a Politburo Standing Committee member and Secretary of the Central Secretariat from the Fujian faction.
Additionally, it is rumored that Ding Xuexiang had a close relationship with the late Yu Jianhua, the Director of the General Administration of Customs.
On the evening of December 11 last year, the official website of the General Administration of Customs released an obituary stating that on December 10, Yu Jianhua, the Director of the General Administration of Customs, passed away due to a sudden illness, at the age of 63.
Independent commentator Cai Shenkun revealed on X platform on December 11 last year, that on the evening of the 10th, Yu Jianhua committed suicide in his office after being questioned by officials from the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection the day before. Multiple online sources also claimed that Yu Jianhua died by suicide by gunshot, linked to the case of Sun Yunqing, the former Deputy Director of the General Administration of Customs who was detained in September.
Cai Shenkun stated on December 12, 2024, that Yu Jianhua’s appointment as the Director of the General Administration of Customs was related to his connection with Ding Xuexiang, both from Jiangsu. The General Administration of Customs conveyed significant benefits to personnel related to Ding every year.
If Ding Xuexiang is implicated in a major corruption case involving the General Administration of Customs, this leverage could be seized by Li Qiang, Cai Qi, and others, reducing Ding Xuexiang’s prospects of becoming the successor.
Based on the above analysis, it seems unlikely that Ding Xuexiang will become Xi’s successor, and if he becomes entangled in a significant corruption case, not only will he fail to become the successor, but he may also face further trouble.