“Sunken Boat: Negotiating Chips Inside and Outside the Russia-Ukraine Battlefield”

【Breaking News – February 15, 2025】

A glimmer of hope appeared in the Russia-Ukraine ceasefire in 2025. The soldiers on the frontlines, facing life and death, eagerly anticipate peace. As long as the war rages on, they are always at risk of falling. Both armies should eagerly await ceasefire negotiations, but the real driving force behind the peace talks comes from the other side of the world. Many of the chips are being played outside the battlefield. However, along with the negotiations at the table, soldiers are also forced to fight for more chips on the battlefield with their lives.

The Russia-Ukraine war has been ongoing for three years. The Russian army still holds the overall advantage but struggles to achieve its strategic goals. Despite significant casualties, they have been unable to rapidly occupy the entire Donetsk region in eastern Ukraine.

The Biden administration and NATO have not actively pushed for ceasefire negotiations, hoping to see Moscow suffer. Since the Kremlin initiated the war, the strategy of the previous U.S. government towards the Russia-Ukraine conflict has been to keep Russia weakened to the maximum extent, trapping it in the quagmire of war.

European allies of the United States also hope to see the Russian army continuously depleted, reducing the future threats facing NATO. The U.S. has taken on the main part of military aid to Ukraine, with European countries following suit. Ukrainian soldiers are the ones primarily engaging in combat with the Russian army.

With strong weapon assistance to the Ukrainian army, they have maintained a battlefield stalemate but know they currently lack the capability to reclaim large territories. The battlefield deadlock should have prompted ceasefire negotiations; however, both sides have set their demands too high and are unwilling to make concessions.

Despite being at a disadvantage overall, the Ukrainian government dare not speak of giving up parts of its territory, fearing being branded as traitors for eternity. The Ukrainian people may also fear voicing such opinions as they could be labeled as traitors as well.

Moscow, of course, won’t return the occupied land but realizes that a war of attrition is not a sustainable solution. However, the U.S. and NATO have been unwilling to offer concessions. The countries aiding Ukraine are reluctant to be blamed and are unwilling to propose land swaps for peace. As a result, a war of attrition has been ongoing for three years.

Following Trump’s presidency, efforts to quickly push for Russia-Ukraine peace talks began. On February 12, at a Ukraine defense contact group meeting at NATO headquarters, the new U.S. Secretary of Defense, Pete Hegseth, stated that the U.S. prioritizes containing a potential war with China in the Pacific region and acknowledges limited resources, making resource allocation decisions. He urged Europe to “take responsibility for the continent’s security” and suggested a division of labor to maximize their strengths in Europe and the Pacific.

This action proved to be a significant push towards peace outside the Russia-Ukraine battlefield. The new U.S. government has decided to give Moscow a way out. Hegseth stated that Ukraine would not join NATO temporarily, and U.S. forces would not deploy to Ukraine.

Hegseth also extended an olive branch to Kyiv, stating that returning to the borders before 2014 between Russia and Ukraine was an unrealistic goal. This is dictated by the current battlefield situation, everyone is aware of this reality, but no one dared to say it until now. The U.S. Secretary of Defense’s honesty has not only provided a dose of reality but also given Ukrainian leaders a chance to breathe a sigh of relief.

Ukraine lacks the capability to combat Russia on its own and must rely on the U.S. and NATO. However, knowing that the U.S. military will not directly engage in the Ukrainian conflict, the U.S. has clarified that their primary battlefield lies in the Indo-Pacific region, with China as the main adversary. The potential Indo-Pacific battlefield is the core focus, and by facilitating a quick ceasefire in Russia-Ukraine, one less battlefield conflict would exist in the world.

The U.S. is also making efforts to de-escalate tensions in the Middle East and ideally eliminate the root causes of warfare so that their military attention can be solely on the Indo-Pacific region to ensure victory against China. This interconnected approach to the world’s three major battlefields has been a driving force for peace discussions beyond the Russia-Ukraine battlefield.

Hegseth’s candid statements have faced criticism from some allies, who see the U.S. concessions to Moscow as a sign of weakness. However, negotiations are built on mutual concessions. Over the past three years, it seemed that no side was willing to compromise, and the brutal war seemed unending.

Ukraine struggles to halt the slow advance of the Russian army, and victory seems distant. Apart from negotiations, they have few options. Ukraine continues to rely on U.S. support, and it must adhere to the international strategic interests outlined by Trump. However, Trump has openly declared cooperation with Ukraine in developing rare minerals, providing Ukraine with a potential lifeline. With significant U.S. assets and interests in Ukraine, any further Russian aggression could provide ample reason for U.S. military intervention.

If the Kremlin had foreseen the current situation three years ago, it’s likely they would’ve hesitated to start the war. The true strength of the Russian army has been exposed, with various weapons underperforming and rapidly depleting the country’s resources, weakening its economy. Russia can no longer sustain support for neighboring countries like Syria and its Assad regime.

The Kremlin is mainly concerned about NATO dealing a fatal blow and potential issues in the Far East region. If they can quickly retreat, they may still attempt to spin it as a victory.

Moscow has recognized the growing U.S.-China rivalry, understanding Trump’s clear strategic intent, and realizing that blocking the U.S. against China is an unsustainable strategy.

On February 12, NATO announced new military assistance to Ukraine, including the UK pledging dozens of main battle tanks, armored vehicles, air defense systems, and drones; Germany offering 100 air defense missiles and 6,000 AI-equipped drones; the Netherlands providing 25 armored vehicles; Latvia supplying 42 armored vehicles, and Norway equipping Ukraine with drones for a brigade.

Recent reports suggest that Ukraine has refrained from strongly criticizing the timing of military support from other countries, claiming that frontline artillery has become competitive with the Russian army. The Ukrainian army continues to receive necessary weapons, significantly alleviating ammunition shortages, with increased production capacity from the U.S. and Europe. Ukraine has also received its first Mirage-2000 fighter jet from France, diversifying its aerial combat capabilities beyond the F-16.

However, despite the assistance, Ukrainian forces remain at a disadvantage. While UAVs have played a significant role, they have only managed to delay the Russian army’s advances, not halt them completely. In January 2025, the Russian army occupied approximately 320 square kilometers of Ukrainian land, adding to the approximately 400 square kilometers seized in December 2024 and around 700 square kilometers in November 2024, the highest monthly figure.

Ukrainian forces managed a successful counteroffensive in the Russian-held Kursk region in 2024, forcing some Russian troops to retreat, which alleviated pressure on the Ukrainian city of Kharkiv.

Ukrainian forces have conducted drone strikes on Russian ammunition depots, command centers, energy facilities, and military bases but remain largely defensive along most frontlines. Due to limitations in manpower, Ukraine’s options are limited. The most optimistic outlook would be for the Russian army to face diminishing ammunition supplies and weakening offensives, but Ukraine lacks the forces for a strong counterattack and to reclaim lost territories on a large scale.

Ukraine has begun recruiting volunteers aged 18-24 to enlist, with the option to serve for a year and then retire upon payment of $4,700 initially and $19,120 during service, plus an additional $2,870 per month, although it’s not compulsory.

The Ukrainian army’s commander has publicly outlined the battlefield priorities: firstly, continuing operations in the Russian-held Kursk region, secondly, attacking military facilities on Russian soil, and thirdly, maintaining stable defensive lines.

After nearly six months of occupation and retaining hundreds of square kilometers in the Russian-held Kursk region, Ukrainian forces are now launching a new offensive. This could be Ukraine’s latest effort on the battlefield in preparation for negotiations or to potentially regain some lost territory.

Perhaps Ukraine could utilize reserve forces to mount a full-scale counteroffensive while negotiating for peace, but the cost of breaking through Russian defensive lines might be high, and the ability to hold ground post-counteroffensive remains questionable, with significant risks involved in large-scale operations.

According to intelligence from the UK Ministry of Defence, in January 2025, the Russian army suffered approximately 48,240 casualties in the Ukrainian conflict, the second-highest monthly toll in recent times, averaging about 1,556 casualties per day. In December 2024, about 48,670 Russian soldiers were casualties, marking the deadliest month since the Russia-Ukraine conflict began, with an average of about 1,570 daily casualties. Over the past three years, the Russian army has suffered an estimated total of about 837,000 casualties.

In 2024, Russia did not recruit additional troops and instead increased the number of deployed forces in Ukraine by about 140,000, reaching approximately 600,000 troops. However, the Russian army’s numerical advantage has yet to translate into decisive victory rapidly. If artillery capabilities on both fronts reach an equilibrium, the Russian army’s sole advantage might be in sheer numbers.

Reportedly, the Russian army lost at least 5,000 tanks and armored vehicles in 2024, following a loss of about 3,000 in 2023, and Russia’s annual production or refurbishment capacity is insufficient to replace these losses. Starting from late 2024, the Russian army’s armored vehicles decreased on the Donetsk frontline, suggesting fewer large-scale mechanized attacks, possibly due to difficulties countering Ukrainian UAVs and artillery. The Russian army is employing more light infantry tactics, making rapid advances unlikely.

Furthermore, there have been reports indicating challenges for the Russian army in transporting ammunition to the frontlines, possibly due to strikes on ammunition depots or decreasing stockpiles. The millions of artillery shells provided by Korea are running out, and sustained large-scale resupply is becoming difficult.

Once the news of negotiations spreads, frontline Russian soldiers would likely value their lives more, realizing that any casualties or severe injuries before a ceasefire would be in vain. This could impact the morale of the Russian army, leading to reduced efficiency in their offensives. Mobilizing new troops may also become increasingly challenging under these circumstances.

The Russian occupation of the Kursk region in Russia is a significant concern for Moscow. While the Kremlin claims it does not accept land exchanges, it’s difficult to imagine Ukrainian forces continuing to occupy Russian territory long after a ceasefire. Russia could mobilize heavy forces to swiftly reclaim Kursk but would also need to maintain its offensives in eastern Ukraine, creating a difficult balance that serves as a bargaining chip in negotiations.

Analysts point to Russia’s inflation rate nearing 20% and the labor shortage caused by the war. Despite China providing most dual-use goods, Russia still needs to produce its weapons. Russia’s wartime expenditures have been escalating, and Trump’s efforts to lower oil prices and increase exports could severely impact Russia’s revenue from oil exports.

On his second day in office, Trump warned, “If we cannot quickly reach an agreement, I have no choice but to impose high taxes, tariffs, and sanctions on all products sold by Russia to the U.S. and other participating countries.” He emphasized that the U.S. has simple and difficult methods at its disposal, with the simple route always being preferable.

Trump has various options available, whereas Moscow is nearly constrained. The Kremlin may engage in a game of back-and-forth negotiations, but provoking Trump could backfire.

In 2025, the Russia-Ukraine war has finally seen an opportunity for a ceasefire, with peace on the horizon. The overall trends have clarified some chips on the domestic and international fronts, with others being temporarily undisclosed, suggesting the potential for significant changes. As the saying goes, those who recognize the situation’s urgency are the ones with exceptional insight, and it remains to be seen if the parties involved are willing to make bold decisions.

This concludes the news update for today.