In 2024, the case of Chinese student Ji Chaoqun revealed the hidden recruitment methods used by the Chinese Communist Party to recruit overseas students. Court documents showed that Ji was targeted by Chinese state security before his arrival in the U.S. and recruited as a “sleeper agent” to infiltrate American society for intelligence collection missions. This not only derailed his future but also led to the complete halt of the U.S. military’s MAVNI recruitment program, which allowed many Chinese students to gain citizenship through military service.
The over two thousand pages of court documents revealed the hidden details of the case.
In July 2013, 21-year-old Ji Chaoqun graduated from Beihang University in China and flew to the U.S. on an F1 student visa to study for a master’s degree in electrical engineering at the Illinois Institute of Technology in Chicago. On the surface, he appeared to be a normal international student, but behind him hid connections to the Chinese state security.
The story began with a job fair in January 2013. Ji Chaoqun, a student at the Beihang University School of Electronic and Information Engineering, met “Teacher Zha” Zha Rong for the first time. Zha did not mention his background at the state security department; he quietly asked Ji if he was interested in joining “a confidential unit” without disclosing specific duties.
Ji Chaoqun expressed interest without asking many questions. He was born in Dongying City, Shandong Province, completed high school in Shanghai, and was the only child of parents working in tax accounting and mathematics teaching, respectively. According to his high school classmates, Ji had an interest in the intelligence world during high school and dreamed of working in such a field someday.
In addition to Zha Rong, Beijing’s Geng Zhengjun and Nanjing’s Xu Yanjun also gradually connected with Ji through text messages, meetings, and other means, gradually involving Ji in the state security circle. This recruitment started in January 2013, and by the end of the year reached a formal agreement.
The Chinese state security department always operates in secrecy, and the entire recruitment process was carried out covertly. They also maintained a high level of confidentiality regarding Ji’s girlfriend. Despite the secretive recruitment process, there was a systematic approach. Testimony from prosecution witness and intelligence expert James Olson analyzed these interactions, revealing their underlying implications.
The first step was “search and explore.” In January 2013, Zha Rong, acting as “Teacher Zha,” entered the Beihang University campus to find potential recruits. Ji Chaoqun, who was about to graduate with his professional background and plans to study abroad, caught Zha’s attention. According to a report on Sino-U.S. aircraft espionage by our publication, Zha Rong was, in fact, the deputy director of the sixth office of the Jiangsu State Security Department, which specialized in stealing trade secrets from major U.S. aerospace companies.
Prosecution witness and FBI agent Bradley Hull noted that Chinese state security often recruited people from universities. For instance, evidence showed that in 2014, Xu Yanjun sent a recruitment notice from the Jiangsu State Security to Professor Zhang of the Southern University, requesting that students not mention their background in security organizations, only indicating it was from the Jiangsu Provincial Science Promotion Association. Subsequently, Xu requested the school to notify eligible students and send their resumes, and then inform the qualified students (such as party members) to attend the interview. Hull believed that due to China’s national security laws, these universities had to comply with state security requirements.
James Olson, the intelligence expert, also mentioned that the Chinese state security actively recruited Chinese individuals on campuses, often using unofficial roles such as businesspeople, journalists, and students to obtain information of interest to Beijing. These individuals were very active in the U.S. but lacked diplomatic immunity. Olson pointed out that security personnel without diplomatic immunity would typically avoid entering the U.S.
The second step of the recruitment process was the “evaluation.” When evaluating Ji Chaoqun, there were not many text messages between the two. On January 13, 2013, Zha Rong told Ji, “Call me when you get close, I’ll pick you up. The nearest exit is Exit F.” On February 9, the two exchanged New Year’s greetings via text message. By April 24, Ji told Zha, “Teacher Zha, Geng Zhengjun contacted me today. When you come to Beijing, make sure to find me.” Zha replied, “Ok, goodbye.”
After Zha introduced Ji to Geng Zhengjun, their relationship entered the next phase of “development.” At this point, Geng Zhengjun aimed to develop Ji into a spy, acting as a controlling friend who showed great concern for Ji, often inquiring, “What are you busy with? Where are you now? Have you gotten off the car?” Meanwhile, Geng Zhengjun created a file for Ji, delving into a deeper understanding and evaluation of Ji through one-on-one interactions, closely monitoring Ji’s actions and psychological state.
During this stage, did Ji Chaoqun clearly understand the true intent of the others? At that time, Ji seemed to not delve too deeply into questioning, and the state security officials did not directly reveal their true intentions. However, signs indicated that Ji had some awareness of the situation.
Based on the WeChat chat between Ji and his girlfriend on July 8, 2013, Ji mentioned a job opportunity and considered whether he should accept it, also mentioning the Eighth Bureau (Counterintelligence Investigation Department). His girlfriend urged him to reconsider the opportunity.
Ji said, “This job? For the future of the family, this job is absolutely not suitable. I am considering joining a Level 2 organization, an organization similar to yours. If it is unworkable, forget it; I have my own life to live.”
His girlfriend inquired, “Why is it unworkable?” Ji replied, “They want me to go to the front line. The second line is for technical development, while the front line is similar to a network management center. The Eighth Bureau, the Counterintelligence Investigation Department, is responsible for monitoring, investigating, and arresting foreign spies, among others. This is usually referred to as the Eighth Bureau, quite interesting, but not considered a good job.”
A month later, on August 15, Ji and his girlfriend continued to discuss, “I thought I was required to work in Nanjing. In any case, I will handle it. Nanjing officials also understand that they didn’t say much, I plan to call the department head.” His girlfriend replied, “Ok, attitude.”
Ji continued, “Yes. I told that big brother (Geng) yesterday. At the beginning, they didn’t make it clear, and I guessed excessively. But yesterday he finally hinted, and I finally understood.” His girlfriend inquired, “What did he hint at?” Ji replied, “He indicated they want to train me to work for them since they can’t travel abroad.”
Following this, Geng Zhengjun used banquets, hospitality, and facilitating tasks to show friendship, firmly grasping Ji and gradually advancing his plan. These interactions took place before Ji’s departure to the U.S. during the summer vacation. During the summer, Ji met state security agents three times: once in Nanjing and twice in Beijing. In Beijing, during one of the meetings, Geng talked to Ji about the early Chinese spies known as the “Three Jies of Longtan,” instilling a sense of heroism in Ji. “Longtan” was named so because former Chinese leader Zhou Enlai once said that if these three Chinese spies did not “dive deep into the Dragon Pool and Tiger’s Den,” Chinese history would have been rewritten.
According to prosecution witness and intelligence expert James Olson, this gradual deepening of contact is a typical spy recruitment method. During the development phase, a spy might reveal some information to test the other’s reaction. If the response is positive, the spy will further disclose their intentions, smoothly transitioning into the “sales phase,” and eventually “lifting the veil,” at which point there’s no need to conceal anymore. Once the official cooperation is established, training follows.
Below are some text records from this period, revealing how Geng gradually roped Ji into the state security trap through daily contacts:
On August 7, 2013, Geng asked Ji: “Chaoqun, are there any procedures left in China? If you need help, let me know. Also, do